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Western Michigan University 
After three decades of rapid economic growth, China has become 
the second-largest economy in the world. Its rise has driven its search 
for resources, opportunities, and outside influences, and economic 
expansion will inevitably be followed by political influences and poten-
tially overbearing military strength. In just four years, 2014–2017, 
China’s outward investment and construction combined exceeded $800 
billion. China has also established the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank, which rivals the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. 
Its economic expansion has inevitably brought about conflicts with its 
neighboring countries, including South Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, and 
it has recently shifted from being conciliatory to being more assertive 
toward territorial disputes. The ripples created by China’s first aircraft 
carrier are bound to travel across the Pacific and reach the shoreline 
of the United States. One of the contributors to this volume, Murray 
Scot Tanner, quotes former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Dr. 
Tom Christensen: “China’s return to great power status is perhaps the 
most important challenge in twenty-first century American diplomacy” 
(Christensen 2015, p. 1). This assessment of the relationship between 
the two nations has been epitomized by recent events that have occu-
pied the center stage of the U.S. trade and foreign policy, including ten-
sions in the South China Sea and diplomacy toward North Korea and its 
nuclear and missile activity. 
With this background, the 2015–2016 Werner Sichel Lecture Series 
featured six prominent experts who shared their insights on China and 
U.S.-China relations. Their lectures help put in perspective China’s rise 
and its impact on the Pacific region, and the relationship and potential 
conflicts between the United States and China. This collection presents 
the edited version of their lectures. 
1 
   
2 Huang and Zhou 
In Chapter 2, Tanner explores five underlying factors in the U.S.-
China relationship that pose challenges for the United States: 1) China’s 
rapidly expanding national interests and its increasing power to assert 
and protect them, 2) China’s governance problems and their lack of 
commitment to cooperation, 3) China’s view of security and the com-
plexity of building U.S.-Chinese “strategic trust,” 4) mobilizing the 
United States’ allies and partners, and 5) the challenge at home. 
China’s leadership remains committed to an established set of long-
standing, key security interests—most notably its core interests of pro-
tecting Chinese Communist Party rule, maintenance of social stability, 
sustained economic and technological growth, and protection of Chi-
na’s national unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The frontlines 
of these existing interests, however, are expanding beyond East Asia 
and to extended arenas of national security. These include maintain-
ing energy security, protecting its expanding overseas investments and 
the millions of expatriate Chinese workers in unstable environments 
abroad, asserting and protecting its expanding maritime security inter-
ests, advancing and protecting its communications security and military 
security interests in the space and cyber realms, and helping to secure a 
stable global environment conducive to the country’s sustained devel-
opment. China’s expanding interests inevitably define many arenas in 
which the United States and China share overlapping but not neces-
sarily identical interests. While these overlaps make the U.S.-China 
relationship increasingly complex and challenging, they also widen the 
range of issues on which the two countries actively cooperate. 
Another challenge that the United States faces in dealing with China 
is deficiencies of China’s bureaucracy in implementing agreements. 
With China’s prominent and extensive presence economically and 
politically in the world, it needs China’s public support to address key 
international problems. However, even if leading authorities in Beijing 
nominally support certain international norms and agreements, China’s 
capabilities to enforce, implement, or oversee its commitments often 
may be inadequate. Tanner points out that Chinese local officials and 
state companies often “control more than enough resources to under-
mine some international problem-solving efforts.” China’s international 
partners, including the United States, must work with Beijing to urge 
it to develop and strengthen its governance institutions and policy-
implementing capacities, and get China to demonstrate sustained 
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resolve in actively supporting and enforcing a wide array of interna-
tional solutions. 
The third challenge is so-called strategic trust between the United 
States and China. For many years, the Chinese have often told their 
U.S. partners that our two great powers need to overcome strategic mis-
trust or build strategic trust. However, according to Tanner, this call has 
typically “been accompanied by lists of actions that the United States 
should take that demonstrate respect for China’s core national security 
interests.” These actions relate to reevaluating the U.S.-Asian alliance 
structure, ending U.S. reconnaissance flights near China’s territory, 
decreasing U.S. support to allies and partners locked in tensions with, 
or lifting restrictions on U.S. technology sales to, China. 
The fourth challenge relates to China’s role in the South China Sea 
and U.S. relations with allies in that region. The United States will have 
to strike a balance among three missions: 1) signaling a joint resolve 
between the United States and its allies to protect our common interests 
in response to Beijing’s assertive behavior; 2) attempting to reassure 
Beijing that our continued alliance and partnership with Asian-Pacific 
nations are not aimed at undermining or encircling China; and 3) con-
tinuing to search for new areas where the United States and its allies can 
enhance nontraditional security cooperation with China in the region, 
such as counterpiracy, antiterrorism, and humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief. 
Finally, Tanner identifies a challenge here at home. To modify a 
continual long-term policy toward a rising China, it will require “more 
focused U.S. attention to China in our mass media, classrooms, and 
elsewhere. Discussions need go beyond an oversimplified debate over 
China as partner or China as adversary.” A good understanding of China 
and its relationship with the United States by the public is required for 
a stable long-term approach to budgetary politics that supports the poli-
cies toward China. According to Tanner, U.S. politics at home in turn 
has a major impact on our capacity to engage, cooperate with, and com-
pete with China, and work with our allies and partners to promote and 
protect our interests in the region. 
China’s foreign relations have become more assertive in recent 
years, and its domestic politics has undergone drastic changes. The 
change in position on foreign affairs is perhaps a result of changes 
in China’s domestic politics. Since Xi Jinping assumed leadership in 
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2012, he has launched a series of political maneuvers to crack down 
on corruption, amass his own political power, and suppress freedom 
of speech. In addition to the overhaul of the bureaucratic machine, Xi 
appears to have a different vision of the economy as well, which relies 
more on governments than markets. In Chapter 3, Barry Naughton gives 
a timely assessment of the prospects of the Chinese economy under its 
newly established leader. 
Xi Jinping laid out an ambitious program of reform in the Third Ple-
num Resolution of November 2013. However, since that time, progress 
on economic reform has been slow and uneven. Naughton, relying on 
his insightful understanding of the economy, explains why Xi’s model 
may fail. His arguments follow three closely related steps. First, the 
period of “miracle growth” in China ends; second, Xi Jinping’s policy 
agenda generally relies on a strengthening of government and, espe-
cially, party intervention in the society and economy; and third, as a 
result, Xi’s policy regime is marked by and mired in inconsistent and 
sometimes contradictory objectives. 
The Chinese economy grew at an average rate of just over 10 per-
cent a year between 1978 and 2010. However, in 2010 the growth rate 
fell below 8 percent and in 2016 it was around 6.7 percent. As China 
moves into middle-income range it faces fundamental challenges. 
“Cheap China” is not cheap any longer. Wages for unskilled work-
ers have risen rapidly, particularly between 2008 and 2013. Producers 
of garments, shoes, and sporting goods are beginning to move their 
businesses to Vietnam and Bangladesh, where wages are lower than in 
China. This change in labor costs strongly correlates with the end of 
the miracle growth era in earlier developing economies such as Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan. However, the “one-child policy” has exacerbated 
the labor cost increase in China. 
Another challenge is the debt overhang that China has built up over 
the past seven to eight years. China has been aggressively expanding 
bank lending to cope with the global financial crisis and maintain high 
rate of growth. For example, the debt accumulated by local govern-
ment jumped from 17 to 35 percent of GDP between 2007 and 2014. 
Naughton says that “while the overall debt level is not yet unsustain-
able, the trajectory certainly is. China needs to find a way both to slow 





In the face of such economic challenges, Xi Jinping’s administra-
tion adopted an approach that relied more on government interven-
tion than markets. As an economy approached the world technological 
frontier, it became less likely that bureaucrats had an advantage over 
private actors in predicting technological or sectoral evolution. Both 
Japan and Korea had successfully followed this approach. Naughton 
writes, “Although China has a very different political and economic 
system from Japan and Korea, the general direction in which China 
has evolved since 1978 seemed consistent with the earlier evolution of 
Korea and Japan. Since the 1980s, the Chinese government has stepped 
back from many aspects of society, and as China became richer, Chi-
nese society became more diverse and tolerant. However, to a remark-
able extent, Xi has sought to reverse this direction. He has consolidated 
his own individual power more rapidly than anyone expected, and he 
has established his own personal dominance of the political process 
more thoroughly than most believed possible.” In particular, he took 
over a new “leadership small group” (LSG), which had direct authority 
over the economic reform process. This group represented a significant 
departure from past Chinese practice, by which economic policy was 
run directly out of the State Council by the premier. Xi’s direct con-
trol of economic policy meant that the success or failure of economic 
reforms in China today would be a reflection on the validity of the “Xi 
Jinping model.” Naughton then examines three major reform initiatives 
during 2015: restructuring local government debt, opening the stock 
market, and reforming state enterprise. 
Beginning in 2014, the minister of finance laid out an ambitious 
program of local debt restructuring. The plan was to cap debt at the 
2014 level and then begin to transform debt into new, local government 
“municipal bonds.” However, this initial program of debt restructuring 
failed. Buyers and sellers were unable to agree on an interest rate. The 
government was forced to withdraw the offer. 
Chinese policymakers also laid out an ambitious reform of equity 
markets. The Chinese stock markets are highly “political”; that is, stock 
prices swing with intended, perceived, or rumored changes in policies. 
Anxious to revitalize the markets, some policymakers and government 
media zealously promoted a rosy picture of the markets. The entire 
political leadership, including Xi Jinping, had been complicit in state-
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ments that directly or indirectly encouraged the stock market bubble. As 
a result, the Shanghai Stock Exchange Index soared in June and then 
crashed in July, leaving China’s leaders anxious. After the plummet, 
Premier Li Keqiang presided over a series of meetings designed to bail 
out the stock market. The China Securities Finance Corporation was 
provided with unlimited liquidity to buy up “red chip” stocks. After the 
bailout, new listings were once again suspended. Interest by overseas 
investors quickly evaporated. Not only was the market still in a bear 
mode, but the added risk of unpredictable government policy was too 
great for most foreign investors to take. 
Attempts to further reform state-owned enterprises (SOEs) did not 
fare well either. The Resolution of the Third Plenum (November 2013) 
introduced several innovative approaches, such as an expanded role for 
“mixed ownership,” new investment funds that would manage govern-
ment wealth, and a role for employee share owning. The efforts to turn 
these ideas into reality quickly froze. Then, as Naughton explains, “in 
the summer of 2014, the Reform LSG made several decisions that thor-
oughly upended the stalled SOE reform process. Most strikingly, the 
LSG approved a limitation on the salaries of SOE managers, which 
was designed to bring SOE managers’ salaries in line with those of 
bureaucrats at a similar level. The abrupt adoption of these salary caps 
underlined the extent to which Xi Jinping was seeking to achieve mixed 
objectives in his approach to state-owned enterprises.” Another case of 
confusion of policies and setback of SOE reforms was a decision to set 
up a new specialized “SOE Reform LSG,” which gave the economic 
bureaucracy more control over SOEs. 
Naughton summarizes that by the end of 2015, all three of these 
reform initiatives of the Plenum had failed. He further points out that 
“there may be a deeper contradiction between the requirements of this 
stage of economic reform and the exercise of authority by a single 
individual. An authoritative leader may be helpful in the first stage of 
reform, adapting to crises and throwing off old constraints. However, at 
a certain point, market-oriented reforms require that leader to step back 
and allow market forces to work without constraint.” China today has 
developed into a satisfactorily functioning market economy. It needs at 
this stage independent regulatory and financial institutions, which have 
not been a prominent part of the Xi Jinping reform package. The year 
2015 thus “provides little support for the idea that an authoritative Xi 
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Jinping leadership can contribute effectively to the economic reform 
process.” 
In Chapter 4, Wing Thye Woo notes that China has been experienc-
ing or may encounter in the near future three classes of failures that 
will interrupt the miraculous growth that China has achieved in the past 
30 years: 1) a hardware failure from the breakdown of an economic 
mechanism, 2) a software failure from flaws in governance that cre-
ate frequent widespread social disorders, and 3) a power supply failure 
from hitting either a natural or an externally imposed limit. He then 
elaborates and illustrates these failures by citing important cases and 
factors. 
Of the hardware failure, Woo stresses state banks’ solvency and the 
central government’s fiscal health. The state-owned banks (SOBs) had 
in the past accumulated enormous bad debts to the point of insolvency. 
The central government previously had rescued the banks by injecting 
new capital. If the state is perceived to be able and willing to bail out 
the SOBs, depositors would retain their confidence in the banks regard-
less of the actual state of their balance sheets. The important question 
is, how many more rounds of bank recapitalization can China afford 
without generating a fiscal crisis? Woo claims that the government can 
hardly afford to recapitalize the SOBs without upsetting confidence in 
the financial markets about the soundness of China’s fiscal regime. The 
task then is to stop losses in the SOBs in order to ensure fiscal sustain-
ability. The solution lies in imposing a hard budget constraint on the 
SOBs. 
Woo suggests that the operations of SOBs could be improved by 
bringing in foreign strategic investors who would be part of the man-
agement team, and by removing the influence of the local governments 
on bank operations. He writes, “Another way to harden the budget con-
straint faced by the SOBs is to privatize some of their branches and use 
the performance of the new private banks to gauge the performance of 
the remaining SOBs. The privatization of some branches will also help 
convince the SOB managers that the government is indeed determined 
not to recapitalize SOBs in the future.” 
Citing two cases, Woo deems government corruption and derelic-
tion as major factors of software failures. In one, the former director of 
China’s Food and Drug Safety Agency took bribes from pharmaceutical 
and food companies in exchange for approvals of drugs and produc-
 8 Huang and Zhou 
tion licenses. The market was flooded with counterfeit products and 
tainted and substandard food and drugs, and tens of thousands of people 
were sickened or killed every year as a result. The other case pertains 
to government failure to protect workers. Child labor and slaves were 
not uncommon in rural and remote regions, especially in the mining 
businesses. 
For power supply failures, Woo’s main concerns are trade conflicts 
and environmental disasters. China’s chronic and growing overall trade 
surplus reveals a serious problem in China’s economy—its dysfunc-
tional financial system. The banking system favors SOEs to the extent 
that the returns of investment have been extremely low and eventu-
ally created huge excess capacity. High ratios of nonperform loans in 
the state banks and excess capacity have triggered a slowdown in bank 
loans. This cutback has created an excess of savings because the SOB-
dominated financial sector does not rechannel the released savings to 
finance the investment of the private sector. Woo suggests that the opti-
mum solution to the problem of excess saving is not for the government 
to absorb it by increasing its budget deficit, but to establish an improved 
mechanism for coordinating private savings and private investments. 
While the nonstate sector has risen tremendously in China through-
out the reform process, the state-owned and state-controlled enterprises 
have remained an important aspect of the Chinese economy. In fact, 
despite three decades of aggressive enterprise reforms involving priva-
tization of some state firms and retaining/restructuring of others, the 
remaining state enterprises continue to dominate some major sectors of 
the Chinese economy and have also emerged as global titans. In Chap-
ter 5, Mary E. Lovely and Yang Liang address the issue of state enter-
prise reform that Naughton touches on in Chapter 3. They examine the 
characteristics of firms that were retained by the Chinese state and those 
that were released to the private sector between 1998 and 2006. Their 
empirical analysis is conducted using microdata from China’s National 
Bureau of Statistics, specifically, China’s Annual Survey of Industrial 
Production. 
Lovely and Liang begin their analysis by tracking the evolution 
of enterprises away from China’s state sector over time. They first 
describe the inherent difficulties encountered by researchers to identify 
the state-owned and state-controlled firms. The difficulties stem from 
various definitions of state control, limited data, and opaque owner-
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ship arrangements. They then explain their approach to defining a firm 
as state owned and state controlled when it is registered as an SOE, 
when the share of registered capital held directly by the state exceeds 
or equals 50 percent, or when the state is reported as the controlling 
shareholder. Using this classification, they contribute to the literature 
by providing new estimates of the size of the state sector. Specifically, 
they find that about 5 percent of total enterprises were state owned and 
controlled in 2006, and that these enterprises supply more than 30 per-
cent of industrial output. 
Lovely and Liang’s major contribution to the literature, which also 
constitutes the main part of this chapter, is the insight gained from their 
econometric analysis examining the characteristics of those enterprises 
chosen by the state to be released and which it chose to grasp. Based on 
the various perspectives in the literature on how the state chose which 
assets to grasp and which to release to private owners, they formed 
hypotheses about the relationship between initial firm characteristics 
and the likelihood that they remained state controlled. They test these 
hypotheses using a linear probability model for two time periods, 1998– 
2002 and 2002–2006. Their main findings are that in both periods, firms 
that were larger and more viable financially, but had lower revenues 
relative to assets, were more likely to be retained by the state. Firms 
with low labor productivity, an indication of legacy burdens, were also 
more likely to be retained. Additionally, after 2002, firms affiliated with 
higher levels of governments were much less likely to be privatized. 
After presenting their regression results, Lovely and Liang review 
recent assessments made by several groups of researchers on the per-
formance and productivity gaps between the state and nonstate sectors. 
They summarize the findings of recent analyses of the success of the 
restructured state enterprises in reducing factor misallocations and, 
hence, in contributing to productivity growth. Considering their esti-
mates, the lower productivity of state-controlled firms appears to be 
a natural consequence of how enterprises were grasped and released. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that average state sector productivity con-
tinued to lag behind the private sector, despite innovation in the form 
of state control. Finally, they use their analysis of the grasp-or-release 
decision to highlight some of the challenges of continued SOE reforms 
in the future. 
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In Chapter 6, Guanzhong James Wen advocates for a significant 
reform in the land tenure system in China. Despite the phenomenal 
growth of China’s economy, which is an unprecedented achieve-
ment and probably cannot be surpassed by other nations, its income 
disparity has become the worst in East Asia. In particular, its urban/ 
rural income ratio has become one of—if not the—worst in the world. 
Unlike the experience of China since 1979, developed economies and 
more recently East Asian economies, such as South Korea and Taiwan, 
have been able to achieve growth without suffering from substantially 
worsening rural/urban disparity. Why can they achieve that? According 
to Wen, it is because the farmers in those economies were allowed to 
freely trade their land, and freely migrate to and settle in urban areas. 
Why can’t China also achieve that? Wen explains that China’s rural 
population is constrained by two institutional barriers depriving them to 
legally share urban prosperity and to accumulate wealth on equal foot-
ing: the hukou system and the land tenure system. China’s hukou sys-
tem has made urbanization almost exclusively inaccessible to the rural 
population, turning urbanization into urbanizing mainly land instead of 
rural population. The hukou (family registration) system was officially 
promulgated in 1958 by the Chinese government to control the move-
ment of people between urban and rural areas. Individuals were broadly 
categorized as a rural or urban worker. A worker seeking to move from 
the country to urban areas to take up nonagricultural work would have 
to apply through the relevant bureaucracies. The number of workers 
allowed to make such moves was tightly controlled. Migrant workers 
still need to obtain several passes to work in provinces other than their 
own. People who work outside their authorized domain or geographical 
area do not qualify for employer-provided housing, health care, or other 
urban amenities. Even their children are not eligible to attend municipal 
schools where their parents are working since they don’t have urban 
hukou. As a result, there are an estimated 60 million children left behind 
in rural areas, separated from their parents working in urban areas. The 
poor educational condition in rural areas dictates that most of them will 
have limited human capital and will acquire low social mobility and 
low income in the future. This vicious cycle dampens the prospect for 
China to improve its urban-rural income distribution, even though the 
central government is now moving to gradually dismantle the hukou 
system. Big cities are given some autonomy to decide on their own 
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hukou policy, and the towns and small cities are also urged to open up to 
rural migration. Only time will tell how effective and how soon China 
can ultimately eliminate control over free migration and free settlement. 
According to Wen, the prevailing land tenure system is an even 
bigger barrier than the hukou system, as it provides “local govern-
ments either a legal basis or an excuse to take rural land for urban 
development. Under this system the government becomes a monop-
sony in buying farmers’ land and a monopoly in auctioning off the 
leaseholds to developers.” The land price is thus seriously distorted, 
either inflated or suppressed. Wen articulates the impossibility of 
developing a true land market under the current constitution, particu-
larly Article 10, which stipulates that land in the cities is owned by the 
state and land in the rural and suburban areas is owned by collectives. 
Rural collectives are not allowed to trade land among themselves, let 
alone the individual farmers. Even if a collective is inefficient or cor-
rupt, or its leaders are abusive, members cannot exit with their share 
of land to regroup a new collective on a truly voluntary basis. Wen
points out that in the absence of a truly functioning land market, inef-
ficiencies and distortions abound, manifested by the contrasts of “on
one side, ghost towns, idling apartment buildings, and deserted indus-
trial parks are emerging everywhere, especially in China’s vast inland, 
but in its coastal areas, housing prices are skyrocketing; on the other 
side, most of the 2.6 hundred million migrant workers are living in shel-
ters, slums, ghettos, or urban villages, which are being bulldozed by 
the local governments, aggravating the shortage of affordable housing.” 
Wen concludes his chapter with a proposal of how to reform the 
land tenure system in China. The key, he says, is that farmers should be 
given the exit rights from the compulsory collective land ownership and 
that land trading should be legalized as long as the land use (zoning) is 
not changed. Wen also advocates that China should abolish its Hukou 
system as soon as possible. He expects that with these two reforms 
implemented, China can accelerate the absorption of rural surplus labor 
and significantly improve its urban-rural income disparity. 
In Chapter 7, Xiaodong Zhu provides convincing evidence of the 
benefits of reducing restrictions on movements of goods and people 
in an economy, using China’s experience between 2000 and 2005 as a 
case study. This chapter corroborates with Chapter 6, as Zhu’s findings 
provide quantitative endorsement of Wen’s proposal to lift restrictions 
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and facilitate rural to urban migration by granting farmers exit rights 
from compulsory collective land ownership and dismantling the Hukou 
system. 
Zhu begins by discussing the state of the Chinese economy in 
year 2000 and then motivates the study by describing some important 
changes that happened between 2000 and 2005, particularly those that 
reduced migration and trade costs. Next, Zhu reports findings from a 
previous working paper (Tombe and Zhu 2015) on the extent of migra-
tion and trade cost reductions. Specifically, Tombe and Zhu find that 
overall, migration costs declined to 84 percent of their initial level, and 
that costs to switch provinces fell the most, from 32.6 to 19.8 percent. 
They find that trade costs within China declined by 11 percent, and trade 
costs between China and the world on average declined by 8 percent. 
Also, China’s costs of importing from the rest of the world declined 
more than China’s costs of exporting to the rest of the world. 
Zhu then reports the quantitative impacts of these changes in migra-
tion and trade costs on aggregate productivity and welfare. Specifically, 
because of lower internal trade costs, aggregate welfare increased sig-
nificantly, by nearly 11 percent, whereas external trade cost reductions 
resulted in a smaller gain of only 3.1 percent. Further, the reductions 
of migration costs (mostly due to relaxation of the stringent Hukou 
system restrictions) increased the number of interprovincial migrants 
by more than 80 percent. Increased migration flows were also benefi-
cial for China as a whole; real GDP and welfare rose by 4.8 percent 
and 8.5 percent, respectively. Lastly, Zhu highlights the results from 
their growth decomposition exercise that decomposed China’s overall 
growth between 2000 and 2005 into four components: 1) productivity 
growth, 2) lower internal trade costs, 3) lower international trade costs, 
and 4) lower internal migration costs. Overall, reductions in trade and 
migration frictions together accounted for about one-third of China’s 
aggregate growth. Specifically, reductions in internal and migration 
costs contributed roughly one quarter of growth, whereas international 
trade cost reductions accounted for only 7 percent of the overall growth. 
This finding challenges the conventional wisdom that the main reason 
for China’s rapid growth is external trade liberalization associated 
with China’s entry in the WTO. Tombe and Zhu’s (2015) study shows 
that, at least for the period from 2000 to 2005, internal policy reforms 





migration costs contributed more to China’s growth than external trade 
cost reductions (27 percent versus 7 percent). Thus, Professor Zhu con-
cludes that if China continues to pursue reforms to dismantle the Hukou 
system and further internal liberalizations, we can expect increases in 
China’s aggregate GDP and welfare to continue in the future. 
China has been rising rapidly since the late 1970s, when it launched 
market-oriented reforms and opened gradually to the world economy. 
Thirty years later, in 2010, China surpassed Japan in GDP and became 
the second-largest economy of the world. The attainment of this sta-
tus was regarded as a milestone of the reform movement; it has since 
been referred to as the reforms of 30 years. The editors of this vol-
ume published a collection in 2012, titled Dragon versus Eagle: The 
Chinese Economy and U.S.-China Relations (Huang and Zhou 2012), 
which summarizes and evaluates the achievements and problems of 
the 30 years. Now the reform is quickly nearing its 40 years. Can we 
call it a reform of 40 years, implying that it follows the same direc-
tion and spirit of the previous 30 years? The term has not appeared 
yet, perhaps for a good reason. Recent policies and measures appear 
to have deviated from the previous path, especially since 2013, when 
Xi Jinping assumed leadership. In the name of anticorruption, Xi has 
not only concentrated power in his own hand within the Party but also 
tightened control over society by cracking down on freedom of speech. 
The leadership has shown distrust toward the private economy and 
markets. Private enterprises are required to set up Party branches, and 
financial markets asked to “place politics ahead of profits.” Now that 
the twice-a-decade Party Congress has ended and Xi Jinping further 
consolidated his power, the economic and political changes that were 
cultivated in the past five years will take a more definite direction and 
shape. The Party documents declared it was a beginning of a new era. 
While the Chinese populace at large acclimates and becomes desensi-
tized to the rhetoric, scholars, policymakers, and businessmen, in China 
and abroad, are anxiously watching what these changes will lead to 
and how they may impact the Chinese economy. The China experts in 
this collection have touched on some of the concerns and shared their 
insights on possible consequences. We believe that this volume will 
provide a backdrop for anticipating and understanding developments 
and changes in China in the near future. 
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The United States and 
the China Challenge 
Murray Scot Tanner 
CNA Corporation 
It is hard to dispute the judgment of Princeton scholar and former 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Dr. Tom Christensen that “China’s 
return to great power status is perhaps the most important challenge 
in twenty-first century American diplomacy” (Christensen 2015, p. 1). 
Because of China’s decades of rapid economic growth, and its invest-
ment of that growth in expanding its diplomatic and military power, 
there are now very few issues in U.S. diplomacy in which China does 
not play a major role. During meetings between Chinese Communist 
Party General Secretary Xi Jinping and President Obama, notably their 
2015 Washington Summit and their 2016 meeting during the Nuclear 
Security Summit, the two leaders have wrestled with important issues 
of cooperation—such as climate change and responding to North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile tests—while confronting equally 
important issues of competition and confrontation—such as territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea and threats to cyber security (Tanner 
2016). 
This chapter explores five underlying factors in the U.S.-China rela-
tionship that pose particularly strong challenges for the United States: 
1) China’s rapidly expanding national interests and its increasing 
power to assert and protect them, 
2) China’s governance problems and their challenge to cooperation, 
3) China’s thinking about security and the challenge of building 
U.S.-Chinese “strategic trust,” 
4) the challenge of mobilizing U.S. allies and partners, and 
5) the challenge at home. 
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CHINA’S RAPIDLY EXPANDING NATIONAL INTERESTS
AND BEIJING’S POWER TO ASSERT THEM 
Driving the emergence of many new or deepening challenges in 
U.S.-China relations has been China’s expanding national security 
interests—both within its region and globally—and Beijing’s grow-
ing capacity to assert or protect them. China’s emerging interests result 
mainly from its three decades of sustained economic growth and expand-
ing economic, diplomatic, and military power. China’s leadership, at 
its core, remains committed to an established set of long-standing, key 
security interests—most notably protecting Chinese Communist Party 
rule, maintaining social stability, sustaining economic and technologi-
cal growth, and protecting China’s national unity, sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity. But the front lines of these existing interests are 
expanding beyond East Asia, and China has increasingly demonstrated 
its growing concern over at least six emerging arenas of national secu-
rity interest (Tanner and Mackenzie 2015): 
1) Maintaining energy security, especially access to petroleum 
and natural gas through the Indian Ocean region and Russia 
and Central Asia. 
2) Protecting China’s expanding overseas investments and the 
millions of expatriate Chinese workers in unstable environ-
ments abroad. 
3) Asserting and protecting China’s expanding maritime security 
interests—its territorial and resource claims in the South China 
Sea and East China Sea, and its access to trade, investments, 
and resources in “distant seas” regions via strategic lines of 
communication, such as Malacca, the Persian Gulf, the Horn 
of Africa, and increasingly the Arctic. 
4) Protecting China’s increasing economic, security, and domes-
tic stability concerns along its west-southwest borderland 
regions, which are predominantly populated with ethnic and 
religious minority groups. These interests include China’s con-
cerns over long-running waves of Uyghur and Tibetan social 
discontent, but also China’s strategic relations with India, Pak-
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ing plan to establish a new “Silk Road” of trade and invest-
ment ties. 
5) Advancing and protecting its communications security and 
military security interests in the space and cyber realms. 
6) Helping to secure a stable global environment conducive to 
China’s sustained development. 
For the past decade, China has been engaged in a major internal 
discussion of how it conceives and prioritizes these interests, includ-
ing debates over which interests the country can now afford to assert 
and protect, something it has never been able to promote in the past. 
Related are discussions of how to develop and employ new strategies, 
tactics, and resources to assert and protect these interests—including 
diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, administrative, cyber/informa-
tional, intelligence, and military resources. As one part of this, the Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) doctrinal writers have been hard at work 
with China’s leaders establishing what the role of the military should 
be, and how and in what ways the PLA should extend its previous mis-
sions of deterrence, border defense, and internal security to assert and 
protect China’s emerging interests abroad. 
Many of the most sensitive issues that have taken center stage in 
recent U.S.-China summits, bilateral dialogues, and multilateral meet-
ings have been driven not only by enduring Chinese security interests 
but also by China’s desire to assert and protect these emerging security 
interests. These include 
• reported Chinese cyber espionage cases, most prominently, the 
reported massive theft of data from the Office of Personnel Man-
agement records; 
• China’s increasing use since 2009 of maritime law enforcement, 
administrative, military, land reclamation, investment, and other 
means to assert its still not well-defined sovereignty and resource 
claims in the disputed areas of the South China Sea; 
• the increasingly difficult environment for U.S. businesses in 
China, especially the legal pressure on foreign high-tech firms to 
permit government access to proprietary technology and client 
records; and 
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• human rights issues, including widespread detentions of human 
rights attorneys and the arrests of Chinese Uyghurs as part of a 
crackdown on ethnic separatism, extremism, and social violence. 
China’s expanding interests also define a large and growing num-
ber of arenas in which the United States and China share overlapping 
but not necessarily identical interests that also make the relationship’s 
challenges increasingly complex. The range of issues on which the two 
countries actively cooperate continues to widen along with China’s 
global presence. In the past several years, as part of the countries’ signa-
ture cooperative dialogue—the Strategic and Economic Dialogue—the 
U.S. State Department has released a list of more than 100 dialogues 
and other joint projects or endeavors in which China and the United 
States consult and cooperate. The list truly runs the full range of secu-
rity, environmental, trade, financial, homeland security, and other areas, 
and involves engagement across nearly every consequential govern-
ment agency in both countries. Two noteworthy firsts from 2015 illus-
trate this trend: 
1) The PLA Navy, at the invitation of the U.S. Pacific Command, 
for the first time took part in the world’s largest biennial naval 
exercise, the Rim of the Pacific exercise (RIMPAC), along 
with the United States, Japan, India, and many other countries. 
2) Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson became the first 
Department of Homeland Security secretary to visit China, 
where he met with Chinese representatives and spoke at the 
Chinese People’s Public Security University, China’s leading 
police staff college. 
CHINA’S GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS AND THE
CHALLENGE TO COOPERATION 
Another complex challenge for the U.S.-China relationship is that 
China’s economic and political linkages around the world are so expan-
sive that, for many global issues, it is not sufficient just to have China’s 
public support to address key international problems. Increasingly, Chi-
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with Beijing to urge it to develop and strengthen its governance institu-
tions and policy-implementing capacities, and get China to demonstrate 
sustained resolve in actively supporting and enforcing a wide array of 
international solutions. 
U.S. officials who deal with China find that all too often, even if 
leading authorities in Beijing nominally support certain international 
norms, agreements, or arrangements, China’s capabilities to enforce, 
implement, or oversee its commitments may be inadequate. These gov-
ernance and implementation problems may be sufficient to hold back 
or undercut international security or enforcement arrangements or other 
agreements. Notwithstanding the acquiescence of national authorities 
in Beijing, Chinese local officials, state companies, or Chinese mar-
ket trends often control more than enough resources or capabilities to 
undermine some international problem-solving efforts, as long as Bei-
jing does not, or cannot, actively and effectively enforce its international 
commitments. This is a challenge with respect to a wide range of issues 
in U.S.-Chinese cooperation and can occur through many channels. 
For example, Chinese corporate actors knowingly—or even uncon-
sciously—may sell technology and components to troublesome inter-
national actors in disregard of international efforts to cut off these 
flows. In 2015, the United States and China resumed their dialogue on 
counterterrorism. One of the central U.S. concerns was urging China to 
study and pursue international best practices in controlling the precur-
sor chemicals, materials, and technologies for manufacturing impro-
vised explosive devices, in part to prevent the possibility that China’s 
vast computer and chemical industries might become conduits for these 
items finding their way to extremist groups in countries on or near 
China’s borders. Despite strict on-paper regulations for the handling 
of dangerous chemicals, Chinese authorities do not believe that these 
regulations are often enforced adequately—a fact that was horrifically 
underscored by the tremendous chemical warehouse explosion that 
took place in the port of Tianjin on August 12, 2015, claiming at least 
173 lives. Chinese local officials, moreover, often have far less power-
ful incentives to enforce regulations on goods that merely exit, or transit 
through, their areas of jurisdiction. 
In another example, Chinese state companies have the financial 
capacity to undermine international sanctions regimes through their 




a critical step in enforcing the economic sanctions against Iran and its 
nuclear program was persuading China and its state petroleum compa-
nies to temporarily cut their purchases of petroleum from Tehran. Lurk-
ing behind the recent U.S. debate over whether to support the nuclear 
weapons deal with Iran is the issue of whether China (as well as Rus-
sia, India, and other major economic actors) would actively support 
renewed economic sanctions in the event that U.S. officials called for 
resuming negotiations with Iran. 
The United States and other Chinese partners continue to work with 
China to “foster the growth of the ineffectual Chinese inspection safety 
bureaucracies” regarding food, consumer products, pharmaceuticals, 
and many other products exported from China (Christensen 2015, p. 1). 
The United States lacks the capacity to inspect all incoming products 
from China, which raises the importance of building Chinese bureau-
cracies that can strengthen inspections at the factory. 
The United States and China’s other economic partners also have a 
stake in China developing more secure, transparent, and stable financial 
markets. In this respect, a disturbing aspect of China’s summer 2015 
stock market collapse was Chinese authorities’ reported use of police 
investigations, threats, harassment of traders, and attacks against jour-
nalists for “rumor mongering” to quell the market downturn. 
Active Chinese central government support for, and creation of, bet-
ter intellectual property institutions in China are essential for protecting 
not only U.S. patent holders but also Chinese inventors and innovators. 
And while these issues are some of the oldest and most enduring U.S. 
institutional interests in governance reform, they have been pushed into 
the background by mounting reports of systematic theft of U.S. foreign 
corporate intellectual property by state organizations, including Internet 
theft. 
Finally, China’s passage in 2016 of a law regarding the manage-
ment of foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is also likely 
to undermine some of the most important private institutional means 
for actors from the United States and China’s other partners to pro-
mote improved governance in China on environmental and many other 
issues. In 2015, U.S. officials on multiple occasions had called for Chi-
nese officials not to adopt tough new regulations that would harm the 
ability of U.S. and other foreign NGOs to promote better governance 
and social services in China. 
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THE CHALLENGES OF BUILDING U.S.-CHINESE
“STRATEGIC TRUST” 
For many years, Chinese interlocutors—when asked how best to 
strengthen the U.S.-China relationship—have often told their U.S. part-
ners that the two great powers need to “overcome strategic mistrust” or 
“build strategic trust.” Typically, this call for developing strategic trust 
has been accompanied by lists of actions that the United States should 
take that demonstrate respect for China’s core national security inter-
ests. These proposed actions often relate to rethinking the U.S.-Asian 
alliance structure, ending U.S. reconnaissance flights near China’s ter-
ritory, decreasing U.S. support to allies and partners locked in tensions 
with China (recently, in the South China Sea), or lifting restrictions on 
U.S. technology sales to China. 
Notwithstanding these calls for U.S. actions to promote “strategic 
trust,” Chinese officials and analysts, in their writings and interactions 
with U.S. experts, often mix together at least three schools of thought 
about the United States’ strategic motivations for U.S. actions in the 
region. These philosophies suggest to this author that many in China’s 
elite will likely struggle to embrace a sense of strategic trust toward the 
United States, even if it were to make a number of the requested conces-
sions to Chinese interests. 
The first school of thought draws on China’s sense of historical 
grievance about its mistreatment by Western powers, including the 
United States, during its century of semicolonial humiliation. 
The second comes from realist or neorealist thinking about interna-
tional relations theory—a very strong version of “power transition the-
ory,” which assumes that established powers such as the United States 
will be strongly committed to preventing the emergence of rising pow-
ers. Some Chinese analysts appear to see this forecast of power transi-
tion theory not merely as a theoretical cautionary tale, but as an inevi-
table historical-empirical fact that has a major impact on U.S. thinking 
and strategy toward China. Many appear quick to interpret a wide array 
of U.S. activities—from the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and Paki-
stan, to the U.S. rebalance to Asia, to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and 
human rights advocacy—as being about China, and as tools in a U.S. 
effort to contain China in a network of adversaries. These assumptions 
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about transitional tensions are certainly a motive for one of Xi Jinping’s 
signature policy initiatives—U.S. approval of what China calls a “new 
type of great power relationship” between the two countries. 
The third school of thought reflects some enduring aspects of 
Leninist thinking: these include a strong faith that the Chinese Com-
munist Party as an organization is uniquely qualified to strengthen 
China and its governance and achieve the “China dream.” A concern 
remains that the United States and the world’s liberal democratic pow-
ers are not merely aspiring to keep China strategically contained as a 
power—they ultimately aspire to weaken China by bringing down its 
party-state system, and return China to its self-perceived “sheet of loose 
sand” weakness of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In par-
ticular, this thinking has been discernible in China’s reaction to waves 
of uprisings against authoritarian governments in many other regions of 
the world—most notably during the 1989–1992 collapse of European 
Leninism, during the Eurasian “colour revolutions” of 2000–2005, dur-
ing the Arab Spring uprisings since 2011, and also in U.S. policy toward 
authoritarianism in countries such as Burma, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. 
The Arab Spring in particular caused a surprisingly strong “flinch” 
among Chinese Communist Party leaders, who were concerned that 
social media could further heighten unrest in China, and who responded 
with a strong assertion of “social management” systems. 
These three schools of thought raise questions about whether the 
challenges of building strategic trust with China are going to be sig-
nificantly more different and difficult than might be the case with other 
emerging powers—powers whose visions of international relations 
are more narrowly entrenched with traditional realist competitions 
over greater and lesser international power, and less so with their own 
individual historical-cultural concerns or global competitions between 
regime types. 
Beyond its potential impact on strategic trust, this third Leninist 
turn of thought among Chinese leaders and analysts also appears likely 
to raise challenges to smooth future U.S.-China relations in another 
area. This concerns the rise over the past 10–15 years of China’s efforts 
to protect the stability of the Chinese Communist system not only on 
Chinese soil but also increasingly on the sovereign soil of other coun-
tries, including the United States. There have been several reported 
manifestations of this trend: 1) Beijing’s insistence that other countries 
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repatriate, extradite, or deport Chinese citizens or noncitizens facing 
politically tinged charges such as corruption, as well as ethnic and reli-
gious minorities fleeing China; 2) China’s pressure on other countries 
not to meet with Uyghur or Tibetan rights activists (including of course 
the Dalai Lama); and 3) China’s apparent increase in the past 15 years 
of political security investigations abroad by public security and state 
security officers, such as investigation and research outside the border, 
or “Operation Foxhunt.” 
THE TASK OF MOBILIZING U.S. ALLIES AND PARTNERS 
A colleague of mine identifies two opposite approaches to U.S. 
policy toward China and its position in Asia: 1) to get policy toward 
Asia right, you first need to get policy toward China right, and 2) to get 
policy toward China right, you first need to get policy toward Asia right. 
Mobilizing U.S. relationships with regional allies and strengthening 
relations with emerging regional partners are the most important chal-
lenges facing the United States in its dealings with China—especially 
allies such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, non-
ally partner Taiwan, and partnerships such as India, Vietnam, Indone-
sia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Recent Chinese behavior in the South 
China Sea—notably its land reclamation efforts, oil exploration, and 
maritime law enforcement operations inside and beyond the Nine-Dash 
Line—have all created great new opportunities to enhance cooperation 
with many of these allies and partners in responding to assertive or 
aggressive Chinese behavior. But managing tensions in the relations 
between allies or partners remains a challenge—for example, bilateral 
tensions between Tokyo and Seoul over territorial disagreements and 
historical issues relating to World War II and Japanese occupation. 
Being strategic and selective in the management of these partner rela-
tions remains a challenge for U.S. policy. U.S relations with Japan, for 
example, involves continuing to reaffirm U.S. treaty commitments to 
Tokyo, lauding Japan’s positive role as a force for peace, development, 
and security in the region since WWII, and supporting its potential for 
expanded security cooperation under the Abe administration policies. 








with Japan as part of the United States’ East Asia strategy has at times 
required distancing itself from, for example, some Japanese leaders’
views of Japan’s WWII conduct, which are still major sources of ten-
sion in relations with China, South Korea, and other Asian countries. 
The United States will also have to continue to strike a balance 
between signaling a joint resolve among the United States and its allies 
and partners to protect common interests in response to Beijing’s asser-
tive behavior, attempting to reassure Beijing that the continued alliances 
and partnerships are not aimed at undermining or encircling China, 
and continuing to search for new areas where the United States and its 
allies can enhance nontraditional security cooperation with China in the 
region on issues such as counterpiracy, antiterrorism, and humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief. 
THE CHALLENGE AT HOME 
Finally, when considering U.S. policies toward China and East Asia, 
it is necessary not only to “get China right” and “get Asia right” but also 
to get right several major policy issues here in the United States. A solid 
long-term policy toward a rising China will also require more focused 
U.S. attention to China in mass media, classrooms, and elsewhere— 
discussion that goes beyond an oversimplified debate over “China as 
partner/China as adversary.” U.S. policy has long noted explicitly that 
the China-U.S. relationship will inevitably combine cooperation and 
competition. How the United States pursues politics at home has a 
major impact on its capacity to engage, cooperate with, and compete 
with China, and to work with its allies and partners to promote and pro-
tect regional interests. As one important example, the long-term mod-
ernization and development of U.S. Navy capabilities, which are criti-
cal to securing U.S. and allied interests in the region, require a stable, 
long-term approach to budgetary politics. Chinese analysts make note 
of tensions and obstruction in U.S. governance, and there is evidence 
to indicate that they interpret it as an important indicator of future U.S. 
capacity and commitment as a power in the Asia-Pacific. 
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Is There a Xi Jinping 
Model of Economic Reform? 
Barry Naughton 
University of California, San Diego 
Since becoming president of the People’s Republic of China in 2012, 
Xi Jinping has shaken up every aspect of Chinese policy. In the economic 
realm, Xi laid out an ambitious program of reform in the Third Plenum 
Resolution of November 2013. However, since that time, progress on 
economic reform has been slow and uneven. While reform is certainly 
not dead, there is real reason to question the consistency and effective-
ness of Xi’s economic policies. This analysis is based on three short steps. 
First, China is currently undergoing a growth transition. As the period of 
“miracle growth” ends, nearly every aspect of policy must adapt to a 
new economic environment. Second, contrary to what we would nor-
mally expect under such conditions, Xi Jinping’s policy agenda generally 
relies on a strengthening of government and, especially, party interven-
tion in the society and economy. This orientation is very different from 
what we would expect for a country moving into middle-income status 
whose society is far richer and more successful than ever before. Third, 
the result is a policy regime marked by inconsistent and sometimes con-
tradictory objectives. Xi has attempted to overwhelm these inconsisten-
cies by developing a centralized policy process that gives him very direct 
control over specific policy outcomes. However, it is unlikely that this 
approach will succeed in a country as big and complex as China. 
THE END OF MIRACLE GROWTH 
Between 1978 and 2010, the Chinese economy grew at an average 
rate of just over 10 percent a year. However, in 2010 the growth rate 
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fell below 8 percent and was 6.7 percent in 2016. This slowdown is not 
a short-term, cyclical slowdown but, rather, the reflection of a historical 
turning point. China’s miracle growth period was quite similar to that 
which was experienced earlier by Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. China’s 
growth lasted longer, to be sure, perhaps because some processes of 
structural change had been delayed during the Cultural Revolution and 
ended up contributing to the miracle phase of 1978–2010. We learned 
from the forerunner economies that when the end of the miracle growth 
era comes, it is often surprisingly abrupt and difficult to manage. This is 
the case with China as well. 
China’s economic policy was uniquely well adapted to the high-
growth era. Government policy stressed investment, and infrastruc-
ture was built out ahead of demand. Since there was a huge reservoir 
of underutilized labor in the countryside eager to move into the cities, 
building the roads, factories, airports, and railroads at maximum speed 
was effective in maintaining high-speed growth. After China entered the 
World Trade Organization in 2001 with a network of export-oriented 
factories and regions already in place, there was virtually no limit to 
the speed with which exports could grow and industrialization could 
proceed. China could follow the precedents of earlier developing econo-
mies, copying and adapting hard and soft technologies, and reproducing 
systems of infrastructure. 
Those days are over. As China moves into middle-income range 
it is immediately confronted with three fundamental challenges. The 
first is the end of “Cheap China.” As the pool of underutilized labor 
in the countryside has been drawn down, wages for unskilled workers 
have risen rapidly. As Figure 3.1 shows, unskilled wages increased par-
ticularly rapidly from 2008 to 2013. Since 2014 and 2015, the pace of 
wage growth has slowed but still remains at 7–8 percent. Despite higher 
wages, the pace of migration from the countryside has slowed dramati-
cally in recent years. The lower line in Figure 3.1 shows the growth in 
migrants working outside their home communities. In 2015, the number 
of cross-country migrants increased only 0.4 percent from the previous 
year. The increase in wages inevitably means that China’s competitive-
ness in labor-intensive manufactures is eroding. Producers of garments, 
shoes, and sporting goods are beginning to find that cheaper wages in 
Vietnam and Bangladesh make it worthwhile moving there, even though 
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these changes in relative costs will likely only strengthen in the future. 
This fundamental change in labor costs is strongly correlated with the 
end of the miracle growth era in earlier developing economies such as 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. China, in that sense, is no different. 
In one respect, however, China has a distinctive labor force pro-
blem. Because of the country’s “one-child policy,” cohorts of young 
people entering the labor force today are unusually small. Figure 3.2 is 
a 2014 population age pyramid. It shows that the age groups graduating 
from high school and college are already much smaller than the age 
cohorts just above them, which are the mainstay of the current labor 
force. Indeed, the cohorts entering the labor force are slightly smaller 
than the age groups retiring from active labor. The second challenge is 
thus that since 2010 China’s total labor force has plateaued and actually 
shrunk slightly. The really large decline in China’s labor force will not 
begin until after 2020, but the process has already begun. It is worth 
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emphasizing how different this is from the experience of Japan and 
Korea. In those economies, the end of low-cost labor and the decline 
in total labor force size were two distinct events separated by decades. 
For example, Japan’s first growth slowdown occurred in 1972, but the 
Japanese labor force only began to decline in the late 1990s, more than 
25 years later. In China, both these changes are occurring at the same 
time, which means that the two effects reinforce each other, and the 
adaptation is bound to be especially challenging. 
The third challenge is the debt overhang that China has built up over 
the past 7–8 years. China managed to sustain growth through the global 
financial crisis. Moreover, since the crisis, policymakers have attemp-
ted to keep the growth rate from falling too abruptly. In both cases, one 
of the primary tools they have used has been to aggressively expand 
bank lending to keep investment high. For example, one aspect of that 
debt overhang has been the debt accumulated by local government 
“funding vehicles.” Between 2007 and 2014, that debt jumped from 17 
to 35 percent of GDP (Figure 3.3). Debt loads have been increasing in 
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other areas of the economy as well. While the overall debt level is not 
yet unsustainable, the trajectory certainly is. China needs to find a way 
to both slow the increase in debt and restructure the portion of debt that 
will never be repaid. In a broader sense, sustaining rapid growth by con-
tinuously increasing credit simply cannot work indefinitely. Economic 
policy needs to be adapted to be consistent with an economy growing 
in the 5–7 percent range. 
THE POLICY OBJECTIVES 
As described above, the end of China’s miracle growth phase echoes 
and recapitulates what happened earlier in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. 
Policymakers in each of those previous miracle growth economies 
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responded in a distinctive fashion, but their responses shared a com-
mon feature: they all moved to a lower-investment and a “lighter touch” 
pattern of government intervention. For Japan and Korea, the heyday 
of government industrial policy occurred before the slowdown, during 
the latter half of the miracle growth era. In those countries, industrial 
policy arguably sustained high growth rates by making sure that the 
economy could move smoothly into large, capital-intensive heavy-
industry sectors. Then, as the miracle growth era ended, both Japan 
and Korea shifted to a less interventionist industrial policy stance. The 
logic was that as these countries approached the world technological 
frontier, it was less likely that government bureaucrats would have an 
advantage over private actors in foreseeing the next stage of technologi-
cal or sectoral evolution. Rather than trying to tell businesses how to 
invest, bureaucrats in Japan and Korea shifted to provide support for 
private businesses in whatever choices they made. Government invest-
ment in research and development, for example, remained high but was 
increasingly carried out by universities and government research insti-
tutes, and it sought to improve society’s general knowledge base. Of 
course, this transition also corresponded with a transition to democ-
racy in both Korea and Taiwan, and in general to more permissive and 
diverse societies. 
Although China has a very different political and economic system 
from Japan and Korea, the general direction in which China has evolved 
since 1978 seemed consistent with the earlier evolution of Korea and 
Japan. Since the 1980s, the Chinese government has stepped back from 
many aspects of society, and as China became richer, Chinese society 
became more diverse and tolerant. However, to a remarkable extent, Xi 
Jinping has sought to reverse this direction. This is most evident in the 
purely political aspects. Xi Jinping has consolidated his own individual 
power more rapidly than anyone expected, and he has established his 
own personal dominance of the political process more thoroughly than 
most believed possible. The result has been a qualitative change from 
what had been called the “collegial enlightened dictatorship” of the 
Deng-Jiang-Hu era toward a more personal rule. Moreover, Xi seeks to 
infuse the political system with a kind of revivalist spirit and a stron-
ger, top-down discipline. He seeks to project his own charismatic rule 
to nearly every corner of the system. We can see this objective in Xi’s 
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in the ongoing ideological crackdown that is affecting many areas of 
Chinese society. 
In a sense, Xi’s policies can be seen as the opposite of those adopted 
in Japan or Korea, but for structurally similar reasons. As Chinese soci-
ety has become middle income, the urgency of political goals has faded 
and materialism and corruption have increased. Rather than acceding to 
those changes, Xi seeks to reverse them. He has laid out an ambitious 
agenda that includes Chinese nationalism, assertive and charismatic 
authoritarian rule, and also economic reform. The question is, do these 
elements fit together? 
Xi Jinping has consistently positioned himself as the architect of a 
significant economic reform program. The Third Plenum, in November 
2013, laid out an economic reform agenda that was bold and broad. 
Although many parts of the reform resolution were vague—as is nor-
mal in top-level China policy documents—a number of concrete com-
mitments were built into the document in order to establish credibility. 
Moreover, Xi Jinping himself took over a new “leadership small group” 
(LSG) that had direct authority over the economic reform process. The 
LSG was an implementation device: the overall reform resolution was 
broken down into 336 “initiatives” that were farmed out to special-
ized subgroups under the LSG. The most important of these subgroups 
from an economic standpoint was the “Economic System and Ecologi-
cal Civilization Specialized Group.” (Paradoxically, it is the only one 
not headed by a Politburo member.) This specialized group was given 
the responsibility for 118 out of the 336 total initiatives. Headed by 
Xi Jinping’s close economic counselor, Liu He, this specialized group 
serves as a kind of economic secretariat, charged with implementing 
Xi’s policy preferences. 
This implementation process is a significant departure from past 
Chinese practice. Since the early 1980s it has been standard practice for 
economic policy to be run directly out of the governmental State Coun-
cil by the premier. Successive premiers Zhao Ziyang, Zhu Rongji, and 
Wen Jiabao all controlled day-to-day economic decision making and 
placed their own personal stamp on economic policy. Under Xi Jinping, 
however, most of the crucial economic decisions relating to economic 
reform have been pulled back into the specialized group. 
These changes mean that Xi Jinping’s personal stamp is inevitably 
on the economic reform process. Xi has laid out a set of goals that shape 






and constrain the economic reform process. He has identified his own 
personal leadership with economic reform. The policy process has been 
changed in important respects that reflect Xi’s wishes. The success or 
failure of economic reforms in China today, therefore, depend directly 
on whether the “Xi Jinping model” of economic reform is a reality or 
an illusion. 
2015: THE ANNUS HORRIBILIS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
Reforms came out of the gate quickly after the Third Plenum in 
November 2013. There was a great deal of activity during 2014 that 
seemed to be focused on moving the reform process ahead in produc-
tive ways. However, during 2015, these initiatives met with unexpected 
problems. Indeed, it is reasonable to say that in 2015 economic reforms 
failed. We can see this in three major reform initiatives: 
1) restructuring local government debt, 
2) opening the stock market, and 
3) state enterprise reform. 
Each of these initiatives went off track in 2015. Whether they can be 
revived is an open question. 
Restructuring Local Government Debt 
Beginning in 2014, the Minister of Finance, Lou Jiwei, laid out an 
ambitious program of local debt restructuring. Even more impressive, in 
Lou’s vision, debt restructuring was merely the first phase of a broader 
fiscal system reorganization. After weaning local governments off their 
dependence on debt, Lou believed he would be able to create appropri-
ate conditions for an across-the-board overhaul of the fiscal system. In 
his original vision, this overhaul would be carried out in three years, 
from 2014 to 2016. 
Following Lou’s program, overall government debt was audited 
and officially registered as of December 2014. The intention was to 
cap debt at this year-end level and then begin to transform debt into 
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the marketplace at an interest rate that reflected the relative creditwor-
thiness of different local governments. This bold vision not only com-
prised restructuring fiscal relations but also the creation of a new fixed-
income market that would contribute to China’s financial reforms as 
well. However, this initial program of debt restructuring failed. When 
the first batch of bonds created by Jiangsu Province was offered to the 
market in April 2015, buyers and sellers were unable to agree on an 
interest rate. If this were to be a truly market-based sale of debt, buyers 
wanted substantially higher rates as compensation for their risk than the 
Jiangsu government was willing to pay. The government was forced to 
withdraw the offer. 
The program was reformulated and converted essentially into a 
bailout. The mechanism was that the banks, which held the existing 
debt, were now pressured to buy the new municipal bonds. While a fic-
tion was maintained that the interest rate was to be “mutually agreed,” 
banks were led to understand that the appropriate interest rate should 
be similar to that of central government bonds—that is, extremely low. 
The banks were given some sweeteners to induce their compliance, but 
of course these predominantly state-owned banks could not refuse a 
central government policy initiative in any case. Under these new cir-
cumstances, local debt restructuring proceeded quickly. An initial quota 
of 1 trillion RMB was rapidly converted and, over the course of 2015, 
slightly more than 3 trillion were sold. Further debt restructuring con-
tinued, and even accelerated, and in 2016, an additional 5 trillion RMB 
in debt was converted. 
Debt restructuring achieved some partial objectives, since it low-
ered interest rates and reduced the debt servicing burden on local gov-
ernments. In that sense, it was not a complete failure. However, the 
objective of debt restructuring is not simply to reduce financial burdens 
but also to place the system on a new, more sustainable basis. A restruc-
turing that is little more than a bailout sends a message to local gov-
ernments that fiscally reckless behavior will be accepted and, indeed, 
may be costless. Of course, the Ministry of Finance has argued that 
local governments are no longer allowed to take on any new debt, but 
it remains to be seen whether this prohibition is credible. Moreover, the 
broader Ministry of Finance program of fiscal restructuring is in sham-
bles. Major new taxes have not been introduced, and the restructuring 
of central-local relations is still far over the horizon. 
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Stock Market Reform 
Beginning in 2014, Chinese policymakers laid out an ambitious 
reform of equity markets. Two measures exemplified this reform. First, 
all qualified firms were allowed to be listed on the market. This was 
a dramatic departure from past procedure in which only a select few 
firms, individually approved by the securities regulator, could list on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The old system had unduly favored 
state-owned enterprises and led to delays, inefficiency, and corruption. 
Moreover, the old system had repeatedly tempted the government to 
use the pace of new listings as a tool to manipulate the stock markets’
overall level. When the market was sluggish, policymakers would sus-
pend new listings, so market participants could be confident that there 
would be no liquidity shocks. Indeed, new listings had been suspended 
for years before 2014. By taking steps to open up the listing process, 
the government was committing to a much more market-driven stock 
market, even at the risk of allowing short-term downward pressure on 
the market. Second, the Chinese stock market was de facto opened up 
to international investors for the first time. The creation of the Hong 
Kong–Shanghai Capital Connect allowed Hong Kong brokers to buy 
and sell shares on the Shanghai market up to a certain relatively gen-
erous quota. Since any international financial institution can maintain 
a Hong Kong subsidiary, this was a tentative and gradualist, but still 
unmistakeable, opening of the Shanghai market to foreign investment. 
The impact of these initial reform measures was swept away by a 
huge boom and bust in the Chinese stock market. The Chinese market 
soared to a peak of 5,166 on June 12, 2015. From there, it wobbled 
and then crashed, amid something close to panic, to a low point of 
3,507 on July 8. When the market plummeted, China’s leaders lost their 
nerve. Beginning on July 5, Premier Li Keqiang presided over a series 
of meetings designed to bail out the stock market. An existing organi-
zation, the China Securities Finance Corporation, was provided with 
unlimited liquidity to buy up blue-chip (or, rather, red-chip) stocks. 
Remarkably, despite this massive intervention, the market continued to 
drop for another three days before finally stabilizing. With substantial 
direct government ownership now complementing already large state 
enterprise holdings, the stock market ended up further away than ever 
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from genuine marketization. Moreover, public funds had once again 
been used to bail out politically influential groups. 
From this account, it might seem that Premier Li Keqiang was the 
crucial actor in the stock market fiasco, but that is not the case. The 
entire political leadership, including Xi Jinping, had been complicit in 
statements that directly or indirectly encouraged the stock market bub-
ble. Xi Jinping was widely quoted in Weibo (Chinese Twitter) as having 
advocated much higher market valuations. While there is no official 
source for these comments, the Chinese government could easily have 
denied or deleted them, had it chosen to do so. It is inconceivable that 
Xi Jinping did not either instruct Li Keqiang to intervene or at least 
signal his support for such intervention. After the bailout, new listings 
were once again suspended. The Hong Kong–Shanghai stock connect 
was still intact, but interest from overseas investors quickly evaporated. 
Not only did the market still seem to be in a bear mode, but the added 
risk of unpredictable government policy was too great for most foreign 
investors to take. A later episode in January 2016 merely accentuated 
these fears. As of mid-2016, government holdings in the stock mar-
ket were still large, and the overall Shanghai index was languishing at 
around 3,000 points, which is to say below what it was after the summer 
of 2015 crash. The overhang of government holdings deters new inves-
tors from entering the market. 
State Enterprise Reform 
State-owned enterprise (SOE) reform started strong after the Third 
Plenum (November 2013) resolution. It was given high priority in the 
resolution, which also generated excitement because it introduced a 
number of potential innovative approaches. These included an expanded 
role for “mixed ownership,” new investment funds that would manage 
government wealth, and a role for employee share owning. However, 
the attempt to translate these innovative ideas into reality was quickly 
stifled. Disagreements about basic definitions and philosophy pre-
vented progress. Then, in the summer of 2014, the reform LSG made 
several decisions that thoroughly upended the stalled (but gradual) SOE 
reform process. Most strikingly, the LSG approved a limitation on the 
salaries of SOE managers. This policy, designed to bring SOE manag-
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ers’ salaries in line with those of bureaucrats at a similar level, reduced 
salaries in listed state-owned enterprises and dramatically lowered the 
salaries of managers at Chinese state-owned banks. The abrupt adop-
tion of these salary caps underlined the extent to which Xi Jinping was 
seeking to achieve mixed objectives in his approach to SOEs. 
Perhaps as a result of this confusion, at the same meeting a new spe-
cialized “SOE Reform LSG” was created to hammer out a compromise. 
However, this group—whose composition must have been endorsed by 
Xi Jinping—was headed by a long-time veteran of the economic bureau-
cracy, Vice-Premier Ma Kai. Moreover, it was staffed by the head of the 
existing agency that controlled SOEs, namely, the State Asset Super-
vision and Administration Commission (SASAC). This choice was 
unfortunate, to say the least. The whole purpose of SOE reform was to 
replace SASAC, which had evolved out of earlier government agencies, 
with a mixed mandate of incremental improvements to state firm man-
agement. However, if there were to be a substantial improvement in the 
way state ownership was exercised, it would almost certainly have to 
involve the creation of new kinds of investment funds. By handing the 
design of SOE reform over to SASAC leaders, Xi Jinping effectively 
ensured that the creation of new investment funds would be controlled 
by the insiders in charge of existing institutions. SASAC leaders would 
understandably seek to limit change, or at least make sure that any reor-
ganization occurred under their own direct control. 
It took one year for the SOE Reform LSG to draft its program. 
When that program finally emerged in September 2015, it was marked 
by contradictions and compromises and was met with a general sense 
of disappointment. Underlying this disappointment was the realization 
that SASAC had opted for an extremely gradual process of insider-
controlled change. The 2013 reform resolution had called for the cre-
ation of new “State Capital Investment and Operation Companies.” 
Much of the previous deadlock had been due to competing conceptions 
of what those companies should do. One version of the investment com-
panies, proposed by the Ministry of Finance, held that those companies 
should manage state firms as purely financial assets. The investment 
funds would seek to maximize the financial returns of their holdings, 
potentially by having competing managers evaluated by the return they 
generate. This conception evoked comparisons with successful sover-
eign wealth funds, such as Singapore’s Temasek. The alternative ver-
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sion of the investment companies, proposed by SASAC, stressed their 
utility as development agencies. After the SOE reform document was 
published, SASAC announced that it would convert two of its existing 
companies into “State Capital Investment and Operation Companies.” 
These companies were designed to have specific developmental objec-
tives and engage in hands-on restructuring. Thus, from the standpoint 
of the firms, the new ownership agencies that emerged from the SOE 
reform process were really not much better than the old SASAC control. 
It was clear that Xi Jinping’s vision of SOE reform included many 
competing objectives. Related to his anticorruption drive, Xi clearly 
wanted to improve oversight of SOE management. Paralleling his over-
all stress on Communist Party leadership, Xi insisted that Communist 
Party committees in the enterprise should have first right to discuss 
important strategic decisions on the enterprise. Overall, this meant that 
Xi Jinping was asking for SOEs to be given new tasks and to be subject 
to new oversight, even while telling them they should be given more 
autonomy to work as market-oriented entities. 
The above account oversimplifies the complex process of SOE 
reform. On the positive side, the long, stalled agenda of converting all 
SOEs into corporations, with an established board of directors, has been 
given new momentum. In addition, firms are to be categorized accord-
ing to whether they are in a competitive market environment or primar-
ily a public service operation. In addition, many different provinces are 
experimenting with accelerating SOE reform. These positive elements 
may well improve the conduct and performance of China’s SOEs in the 
medium term. But in 2015 it was clear that dramatic progress in SOE 
reform had not been achieved, and this was because of the conflict-
ing goals and obligations placed on SOEs by top political leadership 
without a dramatic push toward a stronger market orientation. The SOE 
reform that emerged from this jumble of objectives is unlikely to be a 
real reform at all. 
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION 
By the end of 2015, all three of the reform initiatives described 
in the previous section had failed. While the government continues 
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to give verbal support to the goals of the Third Plenum, it has tacitly 
acknowledged the failure of the program by shifting emphasis to a new 
reform initiative called “Supply-Side Structural Reform.” First floated 
at the end of 2015, this complex new initiative clearly represents a new 
approach. Policymakers have shown some inclination to resume prog-
ress in equity and fiscal system reform, and 2016 was designated as the 
first year of implementation of SOE reform (taking the September 2015 
document as the definitive elaboration of the program). However, as of 
2016, progress in these areas has been extremely modest. 
What can we conclude from this situation? First, there is a Xi Jin-
ping model—a model of economic reform that follows from his com-
mitment to top-down, personalized rule. Xi declares a bold set of objec-
tives, but they are not in the form of a broad, philosophical commitment 
to a new type of system; rather, they represent a wish list of objectives 
Xi would like to achieve from the existing system. In order to achieve 
those objectives, Xi sets up a new top-down implementation process. 
At the beginning of the Xi administration, a number of analysts 
suggested that Xi Jinping’s efforts to concentrate political power on 
its own hands were a necessary prelude to dramatic economic reforms. 
According to this view, entrenched interest groups had made incre-
mental reform increasingly difficult in China. Therefore, an authorita-
tive policymaker would need to concentrate power first and then push 
through with reforms. The experience of 2015 indicates that this view 
has very little explanatory power. On the contrary, concentration of 
power in the hands of just a few may even retard the reform process. 
Xi’s personalized style leads him to impose contradictory demands on 
the reform process. This in turn leads to sometimes abrupt about-faces 
in the tasks set for other policymakers, which is exemplified in each of 
the reform areas discussed in this chapter. Xi’s sudden moves to cap 
SOE salaries, abandon high-quality municipal bond markets, and inter-
vene to save the stock market all had dire implications for the overall 
reform process. 
The new organs Xi set up to implement these policies have also not 
worked well. These new agencies do not themselves have direct imple-
mentation capabilities—they can talk about bold reforms, but when it 
comes to actually designing a reform process, they end up falling back 
on the same government agencies that cater to interest groups. This 




Is There a Xi Jinping Model of Economic Reform?  41 
benefit to concentrating power if that newly concentrated power needs 
to compromise with existing interest groups to achieve institutional 
change. 
Finally, there may be a deeper contradiction between the require-
ments of this stage of economic reform and the exercise of authority by 
a single individual. To be sure, an authoritative leader may be helpful 
in the first stage of reform, adapting to crises and throwing off old con-
straints. However, at a certain point, market-oriented reforms require 
the authoritative leader to step back and allow market forces to work 
without constraint. China today has developed a vigorous market econ-
omy—the greatest need at this stage is for independent regulatory and 
financial institutions, which have not been a prominent part of the Xi 
Jinping reform package. Therefore, the year 2015 provided little sup-
port for the idea that an authoritative Xi Jinping leadership can contrib-
ute effectively to the economic reform process. 
With the failure of reform initiatives in 2015, China has been left 
without a good strategy to cope with the end of the miracle growth 
period. In a general sense, everyone understands that the “new nor-
mal” requires greater innovation, stronger orientation to domestic con-
sumers, and the shift to a service economy. Economic reform is ideally 
suited to facilitate those structural shifts. Without a successful program 
of economic reform, Xi’s China will be forced to rely on endless pro-
grams of government investment supported by an ultimately unsustain-
able increase in credit and debt. 
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Understanding the Major Threats 
to China’s Economic Growth 
Wing Thye Woo 
University of California, Davis 
and Sunway University 
Predictions of gloom and doom for China have a long tradition 
among economists. In the mid-1990s, Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson 
Institute for International Economics started highlighting the de facto 
insolvency of the Chinese banking system with the implication that 
a bank run leading to financial sector collapse (which would then be 
likely to send the economy into a tailspin) was a strong possibility in the 
medium term.1 The twenty-first century began with the claim by Gor-
don Chang (2001) that China’s imminent accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) would cause such widespread unemployment 
within China’s already alienated population that China’s economic and 
political systems would collapse. 
These two dire predictions have turned out to be wrong. China, in 
fact, accelerated its annual GDP growth to double-digit rates after 2001. 
Nicholas Lardy was wrong because while the banks were indeed bank-
rupt, the Chinese government, which owned them, was not and could 
hence afford to bail out the banks when necessary. The fiscal strength of 
the government made it irrational for depositors to contemplate a bank 
run. Gordon Chang was wrong because the WTO membership quick-
ened the pace of job creation in China by greatly increasing the volume 
of foreign direct investment inflow. The WTO membership made China 
more attractive to foreign direct investment because it guaranteed the 
access of Chinese goods to the U.S. market by eliminating the need for 
China to get the most-favored-nation (MFN) status annually from the 
U.S. Congress (McKibbin and Woo 2003). 
The literature on China’s future growth became pessimistic again 
in the mid-2000s. One of the most astute analysts in China, Minxin Pei 
43 
   





(2006), argues that China is now in a trapped transition that is described 
as “a transformative phase in which half-finished reforms have trans-
ferred power to new, affluent elites” who are using crony capitalism to 
generate high economic growth that is not sustainable. He believes that 
meaningful reform to ensure continued high growth is improbable.2 
Pei’s pessimism about the inevitable exhaustion of China’s growth 
momentum has been shared by another leading China scholar, Yasheng 
Huang (2008). In Huang’s contrarian assessment, China in 1999 was 
actually less capitalistic than China in 1989. He asserted that the admin-
istration of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, which ended in March 2003, 
had reversed the march toward capitalism by systematically promoting 
the growth of large state-owned firms in the urban areas and suppress-
ing the activities of the privately owned small and medium firms in the 
countryside. Huang has attributed the deterioration in income distribu-
tion across classes and across regions to this reoccupation of the com-
manding heights of the economy by state-controlled companies (often 
in cahoots with foreign private companies), and the intensification 
of discrimination against the domestic private firms. Because Huang 
believes (very reasonably, based on international experience) that the 
state-controlled firms are intrinsically less innovative than the domestic 
private firms, he concludes that China will be unable to move on to 
the next stage of economic development in the near future (at least not 
before India does so).3 
THE ROUGH ROAD TO PROSPERITY
China’s economy has been like a speeding car—in just 30 years, 
China has gone from one of the world’s poorest countries to the second-
largest economy. It is not surprising, then, to hear more glowingly 
optimistic assessments of China’s future than dismissively pessimistic 
ones. For example, O’Neill et al. (2005) of Goldman Sachs predict that 
China’s GDP will surpass that of the United States in 2040 even after 
assuming that China’s GDP growth rate will slow down steadily from 
its annual average of 10 percent in the 1979–2005 period to 3.8 percent 
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A good guide on how one should regard the competing optimistic 
and pessimistic literature is found in the discussions of the Sixth Ple-
num of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) that concluded on October 11, 2006. The Sixth Plenum 
passed a resolution to commit the CPC to establish a harmonious soci-
ety by 2020. The obvious implication from this commitment is that the 
major social, economic, and political trends within China might not 
lead to a harmonious society or, at least not fast enough. 
Among the disharmonious features mentioned in the fifth paragraph 
of the “resolutions of the CPC Central Committee on major issues 
regarding the building of a harmonious socialist society” were the seri-
ous imbalance in the social and economic development across (and 
within each of) China’s 31 provinces, worsening population and envi-
ronmental problems, grossly inadequate social safety nets and medical 
care system, and serious corruption. The harmonious socialist society 
proposed by the Sixth Plenum would encompass a democratic society 
under the rule of law; a society based on equality and justice; an honest 
and caring society; a stable, vigorous, and orderly society; and a society 
in which humans live in harmony with nature. 
What is the origin of the CPC’s decision to change its primary 
focus from “economic construction” to “social harmony”? And why 
include a target date of 2020? I believe that this switch in emphasis 
from “economic construction” to “social harmony” occurs because the 
Hu-Wen leadership understands that the political legitimacy of CPC 
rule rests largely on maintaining an economic growth rate that is high 
enough to keep unemployment low, and also a growth pattern that dif-
fuses the additional income widely enough. Specifically, the Hu-Wen 
leadership recognizes that without accelerated institutional reforms and 
new major policy initiatives on a broad front, the 1978–2005 policy 
framework, which had produced an average annual GDP growth rate 
of almost 10 percent, is at odds with environmental sustainability and 
with international concerns about China’s persistent trade imbalances. 
More importantly, unless their new policies could produce significant 
improvements in social harmony by 2020, social instability would 
reduce China’s economic growth and thus make the leadership of CPC 
in Chinese politics unsustainable. 
Returning to the analogy of China’s economy being like a speeding 




were three high-probability failures that might occur and cause an eco-
nomic collapse: 1) hardware failure, 2) software failure, and 3) power 
supply failure. 
A hardware failure refers to the breakdown of an economic mecha-
nism, a development that is analogous to the collapse of the chassis of 
the car. Probable hardware failures include a banking crisis that causes 
a credit crunch that, in turn, dislocates production economy-wide, and a 
budget crisis that necessitates reductions in important infrastructure and 
social expenditure (and possibly generates high inflation and balance of 
payments difficulties as well). 
A software failure refers to a flaw in governance that creates fre-
quent widespread social disorders that disrupt production economy-
wide and discourage private investment. This situation is like a car 
crash that resulted from a fight among the people inside the speeding 
car. Software failures could come from the present high-growth strat-
egy creating so much inequality and corruption that it generates severe 
social unrest, which dislocates economic activities, and from the state 
not being responsive enough to rising social expectations, hence caus-
ing social disorder. 
A power supply failure refers to the economy being unable to move 
forward because it hits either a natural limit or an externally imposed 
limit—a situation that is akin, respectively, to the car running out of gas 
or to the car smashing into a barrier erected by an outsider. Examples 
of power supply failures are an environmental collapse, such as climate 
change or a collapse in China’s exports because of a trade war. In a 
sense, the repair of a power supply failure is more difficult than either 
the repair of a hardware failure or the repair of a software failure because 
a large part of the repair has to be undertaken in collaboration with other 
countries. For example, the lowering of trade barriers requires China to 
negotiate with other countries, and the reversal of environmental dam-
age could require an advance in scientific understanding—an outcome 
that is more likely to occur when the entire scientific talent in China and 
the rest of the world is focused on the task. 
A discussion of the many events that could make China’s high 
growth unsustainable is beyond the scope of this chapter. This analysis 
will focus on one or two of the most likely precipitating events in each 
class of failures. The following section identifies the weakening of Chi-
na’s fiscal position by nonperforming loans (NPLs) in the state banks 
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as the likely type of hardware failure that would occur. The next section 
discusses the outbreak of social disorder as the likely type of software 
failure. For power supply failures, the two most likely ones are the erec-
tion of trade barriers against China’s exports (discussed in the next three 
sections), and an environmental collapse, especially a shortage of water 
(discussed in the final section). 
Hardware Failure 
Among doomsayers, one favorite mechanism for the forthcoming 
collapse of an economy is the inevitable fiscal crisis of the state. It is 
noteworthy that this fiscal mechanism is used by doomsayers of all 
stripes. The Marxist economist James O’Connor (1973) predicted that 
the dynamics of capitalist America would precipitate a fiscal crisis that 
would destabilize the economy completely. In turn, the capitalist law-
yer Gordon Chang (2001) predicted that a fiscal crisis could trigger the 
event in the unavoidable disintegration of socialist China. 
This fixation on a large negative fiscal shock as a totally destruc-
tive systemic shock is understandable because fiscal imbalance is the 
proximate cause in most crises. The reason is that the state budget is 
often faced with the task of defusing the cumulative tensions unleashed 
by deeper, more fundamental social processes. To a first approxima-
tion, fiscal capacity is a fundamental determinant of system stability 
because economic sustainability depends on the ability to cover produc-
tion costs, and political viability depends on the ability to reward one’s 
supporters and to pay off one’s enemies. 
The reality in many cases is that fiscal sustainability is the prereq-
uisite for both economic sustainability and political viability, and that 
economic sustainability and political viability are intricately linked and 
mutually reinforcing. To see the mutual interdependence of the two, 
one only has to recall the many times that near-bankrupt governments 
have been driven out of power after raising the prices of a subsidized 
item like food, petrol, or foreign exchange.5 One could indeed go so 
far as to say that the degree of economic and political resilience of a 
state can be measured by the state’s ability to cover an unexpected, pro-










An OECD (2006) report has raised grave concerns about China’s 
fiscal management. 
China’s officially reported spending figures reflect only about three-
quarters of total government spending. Extra-budgetary spending, 
social security outlays and central government bond financing of 
local projects are not part of the official budget. Notwithstanding 
recent reforms, the government remains overly exposed to extra-
budget and off-budget activities, which make public expenditures 
difficult to plan and control and which impair their accountability 
and transparency. Contingent liabilities have been a major source 
of unplanned spending and pose perhaps the greatest risk to the 
controllability of future expenditure. (p. 10) 
Fiscal sustainability is central to economic management. This can 
be seen in the two fiscal targets that the original Growth and Stability 
Pact of the countries in the eurozone specified for its members to meet: 
1) the consolidated government budget deficit should not exceed 3 per-
cent of GDP except in case of unusually severe downturn, and 2) the 
debt-GDP ratio should be brought down to 60 percent or lower. 
The very aggressive fiscal-monetary policy mix undertaken by the 
government to combat the global financial crisis that hit China at the 
end of the third quarter of 2008 has now created an NPL ratio that the 
investment house CLSA has put in the range of 15–19 percent, com-
pared to the official estimate of 1.6 percent. A recapitalization of the 
banking system is inevitable. 
The important question is, how many more rounds of bank recapi-
talization can China afford without generating a fiscal crisis? The sim-
ple fact is that fiscal sustainability lies at the heart of whether a banking 
crisis would actually occur. As long as the state is perceived to be able 
and willing to bail out the state-owned banks (SOBs), depositors would 
retain their confidence in the SOBs regardless of the actual state of their 
balance sheets. The current value of the debt-to-GDP ratio is not a good 
indicator of the sustainability of the existing fiscal policy regime; a bet-
ter indicator would involve working out the evolution of the debt-to-
GDP ratio over time. 
To put the issue formally, the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio as 
given by 
d (ln[Debt/GDP]) / d t = r + [GDP/Debt] × [f + b] – y












Understanding the Major Threats to China’s Economic Growth  49 
where 
r = real interest rate on government debt 
f = primary fiscal deficit rate [(state expenditure excluding debt service
– state revenue) / GDP] 
b = NPL creation rate [(change in NPL in SOBs) / GDP] 
y = trend growth rate of real GDP 
As long as y > r, then the debt-to-GDP ratio will have a steady-state 
value that is nonzero when sum of (f + b) > 0. Specifically,
 = (f + b) / (y – r) when y > r(Debt/GDP)steady-state 
China appears to belong to this case because its post-1978 annual 
growth rate has averaged 9.4 percent, its growth rate in the next 10 years 
is likely to be above 8 percent; and the real interest rate has been about 
4 percent. For the generation of likely future scenarios, I will make the 
conservative assumptions that y is 8 percent, f is 1 percent, and r is 6 
percent.6 It is difficult to predict b, the rate that banks would generate 
NPLs, because it depends on the type of banking reform undertaken. If 
no meaningful reforms are undertaken, then b is likely to remain at the 
historic value of 6 percent. 
So, conditional on the effectiveness of reforming the SOBs, the 
steady-state ratio is
 = 350 percent when b = 6 percent(Debt/GDP)steady-state 
(Debt/GDP)  = 200 percent when b = 3 percentsteady-state
 = 100 percent when b = 1 percent(Debt/GDP)steady-state 
The noteworthy finding from the above scenarios is that China will 
produce a level of (Debt/GDP)steady-state that is high by international expe-
rience despite the optimistic assumptions that long-run growth rate is 
8 percent, that b will be lowered from 6 percent of GDP to 1 percent. 
The most optimistic outcome is still two-thirds larger than what the 
European Union has set to be the “safe” debt-GDP target (60 percent) 
for its members. The banking system has made China vulnerable to a 




debt-to-GDP ratio. Of course, the creation of NPLs cannot be attributed 
entirely to the SOBs; their chief customers, the embezzlement-ridden 
and inefficiency-ridden state-owned enterprises (SOEs), deserve an 
equal share of the blame (see Woo [2001]; Woo et al. [1994]). 
The important point from this second fiscal feature is that the pres-
ent ongoing recapitalization of the SOBs is the last time that the govern-
ment can afford to recapitalize the SOBs, and possibly the last time that 
the government can do so without upsetting confidence in the financial 
markets about the soundness of China’s fiscal regime. 
How difficult is it to stop losses in the SOBs in order to ensure fiscal 
sustainability? The solution lies in imposing a hard budget constraint on 
the SOBs. SOB managers must be convinced that the present recapital-
ization is indeed the last free supper (which the 1998 recapitalization 
was announced to be), and that their compensation and promotion will 
depend only on the profitability of the SOBs relative to the profitability 
of private banks. 
At the same time, the prudential supervision and monitoring of bank 
operations will have to be strengthened to prevent asset stripping and 
discourage reckless investments fostered by the asymmetrical reward 
system under the soft budget constraint.7 The operations of SOBs could 
be further improved by bringing in foreign strategic investors who 
would be part of the management team, and by removing the influence 
of the local governments on bank operations. 
Another way to harden the budget constraint faced by the SOBs 
is to privatize some of their branches and use the performance of the 
new private banks to gauge the performance of the remaining SOBs. 
The privatization of some branches will also help convince the SOB 
managers that the government is indeed serious about the present SOB 
recapitalization. 
Software Failure 
A successful market economy requires its regulatory institutions to 
have the prerequisite scientific understanding to determine whether a 
patent case involves real technological innovation. China’s strategy of 
incremental reform, combined with the fact that institution building is 
a time-consuming process, means that many of its regulatory institu-
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failures on many fronts, of which the most well-known recent gover-
nance failures are the violations against the welfare of consumers and 
workers. 
There have been significant regulatory failures in keeping China’s 
food supply and pharmaceutical products safe. The misuse of chemi-
cals to lower production costs has resulted in the addition of poisonous 
substitutes into toothpaste (Barboza and Bogdanich 2007; Bogdanich 
2007), cough medicine (Bogdanich and Hooker 2007), and animal feed 
(Barboza 2007a; Barboza and Barrionuevo 2007); the application of 
lead paint to children’s toys (Barboza and Story 2007; Financial Times
2007; Lipton and Barboza 2007);8 and the overemployment of antifun-
gals and antibacterials in fish farming (Barboza 2007b; Martin 2007a). 
Most of these abuses received enormous attention because these 
items were exported to other countries, and their harmful effects were 
reported widely in the international press.9 Clearly, Chinese consumers 
have been suffering much more from such types of malfeasance, the 
scope of which has not been realized because of the considerable press 
censorship in China (Barboza 2007c). 
Dereliction in duty by government officials is the fundamental rea-
son for such governance failures. The most well-known recent case was 
the conviction of Zheng Xiaoyu, the former director of China’s food and 
drug safety agency, for accepting bribes to approve production licenses 
for pharmaceutical companies and food companies. Such dereliction in 
official oversight has resulted in 
tens of thousands of people [being] sickened or killed every year 
as a result of rampant counterfeiting of drugs, and tainted and sub-
standard food and drugs. For instance, last year 11 people died 
in China with an injection tainted by a poisonous chemical. Six 
people died and 80 others fell ill after taking an antibiotic that had 
been produced . . . with a substandard disinfectant. Small drug 
makers in China have long been accused of manufacturing phony 
or substandard drugs and marketing them to the nation’s hospitals 
and pharmaceutical companies. And mass poisonings involving 
tainted food products are common. (Barboza 2007d) 
There have also been significant regulatory failures in the treat-
ment of labor, especially in the areas of occupational safety and wage 
payments. One of the most recent horrifying accounts involved forced 
labor of kidnapped children in the brick kilns of Shanxi and Henan 











provinces (Buckley 2007; China Daily 2007). Reuters (2007) reports 
that “as many as 1,000 children may have been sold into slave labor in 
central China.” This deplorable affair was exposed partly “because of 
an open letter posted online by a group of 400 fathers appealing for help 
in tracking missing sons they believed were sold to kiln boss” (New 
York Times 2007). A parent visiting the brick kilns in her quest to find 
her son found that the local police were not only unwilling to help but 
also demanded bribes instead (French 2007). In one case, the brick kiln 
was owned by the son of the village Party secretary (New York Times
2007). 
Perhaps, the two most dismaying revelations from the news reports 
on the brick kiln slavery are that this sad state of affairs had been going 
on for a decade;10 and the “forced labor and sexual exploitation have 
increased as the trend in human trafficking in China has taken a turn 
for the worst” (Zhouqiong 2007). Yin Jianzhong, the senior official at 
the Ministry of Public Security who identified the worsening trend in 
human trafficking in China, recognized a reason for the negative devel-
opment to be “the loopholes in the legal and labor systems. . . . [Spe-
cifically,] the Criminal Law on human trafficking protects women and 
children only and leaves out grown-up and teen males. It doesn’t have 
provisions for punishing those trafficking people for forced labor or 
prostitution” (Zhouqiong 2007). The fact that such legal loopholes exist 
supports our contention that the main cause behind the administrative 
failures in China is the “dereliction of duty by government officials.”11 
Inadequate institutions of governance are not the only cause of 
social tensions in China, however. The present economic development 
strategy, despite its ability to generate high growth, also generates high 
social tensions because, in the last 10 years, it has had great difficulty 
further reducing extreme poverty and significantly improving the rural-
urban income distribution and the regional income distribution (see 
Démurger et al. [2002] and Woo et al. [2004]). In the first half of the 
1990s, the $1.00 poverty rate (i.e., the proportion of rural population 
receiving a daily income of $1.00 or less) dropped rapidly from 31.3 
percent in 1990 to 15.0 percent in 1996. But as Figure 4.1 shows, in 
the following six years the decline was only 5 percentage points. The 
$1.00 poverty rate stayed in the 10–12 percent rate in the 1998–2003 
period, even though the GDP growth rate averaged 8.5 percent annu-
ally. It was only after the sustained large-scale effort to develop western 
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Figure 4.1  Proportion of Rural Population under Different Specifications 
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NOTE: The 1990–1997 data are from World Bank (2001, Annex 1 Table 3), and the 
post-1997 numbers are computed by Ximing Yue (private communication). 
China began in 2001 and the post-2002 rise in the GDP growth rate to 
10 percent or higher that the $1.00 poverty rate dropped to 7.9 percent 
in 2004 and then to 7.2 percent in 2005. 
However, the progress in poverty alleviation in the last decade is 
considerably much less impressive when the poverty line is lowered. 
The $0.75 poverty rate stayed unchanged from 1998 (4.6 percent) to 
2005 (4.2 percent); and the $0.50 poverty rate actually increased from 
1.9 percent in 1998 to 2.8 percent in 2005. In short, the higher growth 
rate in the 2003–2005 period did not cause income to trickle down to 
the poorest 5 percent of the rural population, and hence caused income 
inequality to worsen. 
In the 1985–1987 period, China’s Gini coefficient was below 0.3.12 
According to a report in the official China Daily in 2005: 
China’s income gap widened in the first quarter of the year [2005], 
with 10 percent of the nation’s richest people enjoying 45 percent 
of the country’s wealth. . . . China’s poorest 10 percent had only 1.4 
percent of the nation’s wealth. . . . No precise Gini coefficient was 
provided [by the state statistical agency], but state press reports in 
54 Woo 
recent weeks said the value was more than 0.48 and approaching 
0.5. . . . Most developed European nations tend to have coefficients 
of between 0.24 and 0.36, while the United States has been above 
0.4 for several decades. (China Daily 2005) 
The Asian Development Bank (2007) recently conducted a study 
of income inequality in 22 Asian countries over the 1992–2004 period. 
For 2004, only Nepal had a Gini coefficient (47.30 percent) that was 
higher than China’s (47.25). However, in 2004, China’s income ratio 
of the richest 20 percent to the poorest 20 percent (11.37) was highest 
in Asia—significantly higher than the next highest income ratio (9.47 
for Nepal). China is probably the most unequal country in Asia today. 
Table 4.1 presents the income inequality in China within the inter-
national context. China’s income inequality today is generally lower 
than in Latin America but generally higher than in Africa. The steady 
increase in China’s income inequality since 1985 raises the possibil-
ity that China is heading toward the Latin American degree of income 
inequality. 
The reason that doing more of the same economic policies in today’s 
China will not produce the same salubrious results of quick reduction 
in poverty and slow increase in inequality as in the early phases of eco-
nomic reform is because the development problems have changed. In 
the first phase of economic development, the provision of more jobs 
(through economic deregulation) was enough to lower poverty signifi-
cantly. Many of the people who are still poor require more than just job 
opportunities; they first need an infusion of assistance (e.g., empower-
ing them with human capital through education and health interven-
tions) in order to seize these job opportunities. Effective governance for 
equitable growth has now become even more challenging, and so the 
probability of improving social harmony has been diminished. 
Furthermore, the present mode of economic development gener-
ates immense opportunities for embezzlement of state assets, seizure 
of farmlands for industrial development, and corruption because of the 
absence of effective mechanisms to supervise government employees 
(see Woo [2001]). These features certainly make social harmony hard 
to sustain. 
The data on social unrest are consistent with the hypothesis of ris-
ing social disharmony. First, the incidences of public disorder, or social 
incidents, have risen steadily from 8,700 in 1993 to 32,500 in 1999 and 
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Table 4.1  China’s Income Inequality across Time and Space 
Income ratio of 
Gini coefficients Top 20% Bottom 20% 
Period Initial year Final year Initial year Final year 
Nepal 1995–2003 37.65 47.30 6.19 9.47 
China 1993–2004 40.74 47.25 7.57 11.37 
India 1993–2004 32.89 36.22 4.85 5.52 
Indonesia 1993–2002 34.37 34.30 5.20 5.13 
Taipei, China 1993–2003 31.32 33.85 5.41 6.05 
South Korea 1993–2004 28.68 31.55 4.38 5.47 
Japan 1993 24.90 3.37 
Columbia 2003 58.60 25.30 
Brazil 2004 56.99 23.00 
Côte d’Ivoire 2002 44.60 9.70 
Nigeria 2003 43.60 9.80 
United States 2000 39.42 8.45 
United Kingdom 2002 34.37 5.59 
SOURCE: Asian Development Bank (2007) and United Nations (2006). 
then to 74,000 in 2004. Second, the average number of persons in a 
mass incident has also risen greatly, from 8 in 1993 to 50 in 2004.13 It 
should be noted, however, that these numbers might not accurately por-
tray the degree that social unrest has increased because the data include 
disco brawls and gambling den raids as well as social protests (see East-
SouthWestNorth [n.d.]). 
Clearly, the number of mass incidents would have been lower if 
China had better governance. There would have been more preemp-
tive efforts at conflict mediation by the government and less abuse of 
power if the government’s actions had been monitored closely by an 
independent mechanism and if the government had also been held more 
accountable for its performance. 
One main source of recent social unrest in rural China has been the 
conversion of farmland to industrial parks without adequate compensa-
tion to the farmers. It is interesting, therefore, that the No. 1 Document 
issued jointly in January 2006 by the CPC Central Committee and the 
State Council pledged not only to “stabilize and regulate the transfer 
of land-use rights and accelerate land acquisition reforms” but also to 
“expand channels to express public opinions in the countryside and 





The Hu-Wen leadership’s desire to improve the institutions of gov-
ernance is also borne out by the following report from the South China 
Morning Post (Xiangwei 2007) about what Premier Wen said when he 
met a group of Chinese citizens in Japan in April 2007: 
During 30 minutes of impromptu remarks, he said the key to pur-
suing social justice, the mainland’s most important task, was to 
“let people be masters of their houses and make every cadre under-
stand that power is invested in them by the people.” 
. . . Although he did not deviate from the official line and spoke 
informally on both occasions, Mr. Wen is known for being care-
ful about what he says, whether in prepared remarks or speaking 
off the cuff. The fact that he highlighted, in the presence of Hong 
Kong and overseas journalists, the need for political reform is 
uncharacteristic and interesting, particularly in the context of the 
leadership reshuffle looming at the Communist Party’s 17th con-
gress later this year. 
There have been signs that the leadership under President Hu 
Jintao is under increasing pressure to undertake drastic political 
reforms to consolidate the party’s grip on power and stamp out 
widespread corruption. 
While there are reasonable grounds for an analyst to doubt either 
the sincerity of Premier Wen’s words or his ability to act on them, the 
analyst cannot doubt that Premier Wen is at least aware that democ-
racy is one way to solve many of China’s problems of governance. The 
embrace of the Harmonious Society program by the Hu-Wen leadership 
reveals CPC’s acknowledgment that democracy, the rule of law, and a 
stable income distribution make up an indivisible combination that is 
necessary to ensure the social stability that will keep the economy on 
the high-growth path to catch up with the United States (a vision that 
acts as the bedrock of CPC’s legitimacy to rule). 
Power Supply Failure 
China’s emergence as a major trading nation has been accompanied 
by increasing conflicts with the European Union (EU) and the United 
States about China’s trading practices and its exchange rate policy. The 
dissatisfaction over trade with China is evident from the following two 
press reports: 
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Peter Mandelson, the EU trade commissioner . . . called various 
aspects of China’s trade policy “illogical,” “indefensible” and 
“unacceptable” and accused [China] of doing nothing to rein in 
rampant counterfeiting. . . . Mr. Mandelson also refused to grant 
China market economy status . . . [because it has] fulfilled [only] 
one of five criteria.” (Bounds 2007) 
After years of inconclusive skirmishing, trade tensions between 
the United States and China are about to intensify. . . . “We are 
competing not only with a country with low wages but with very 
high and heavy subsidies and a rigging of their currency . . .” says 
Rep. Sander Levin, D-Mich., chairman of the House trade sub-
committee. . . . “I hate the term trade war because it is always used 
when you try to get a fair break . . . ,” he says: “Sometimes pres-
sure works.” (Lynch 2007) 
While the trade deficit is many times identified as the cause of the 
trade tension, the true cause is the ongoing large shift in the international 
division of labor that has been set in motion by the post-1990 accelera-
tion of globalization and by the continued fast pace of technological 
innovations. The next two sections argue that the trade tensions reflect, 
one, the pains of structural adjustment in the United States because of 
its very inadequate social safety nets, and, two, the dysfunctional nature 
of China’s financial system. 
CAUSES OF TRADE PROTECTIONISM AGAINST CHINA 
Defects in the U.S. Economy 
It is not uncommon to encounter allegations that the bilateral U.S.-
China trade deficit represented the export of unemployment from China 
to the United States, and that it lowered the wage for labor. These alle-
gations are not supported by the facts, however. Table 4.2 shows that 
the steady rise in the trade deficit from 1.2 percent of GDP in 1996 to 
5.9 percent in 2006 was accompanied by a fall in the civilian unemploy-
ment rate from 5.4 percent in 1996 to 4.6 percent in 2006, and by a rise 
in the total compensation (measured in 2005 prices) received by a full-






What is fueling the resentment toward imports from China when 
the median U.S. worker is experiencing neither more unemployment 
nor lower compensation? The U.S. worker is feeling more insecure in 
the 2000s than in the 1980s because of faster turnover in employment. 
Globalization and technological innovations have required the worker 
to change jobs more often, and she finds that there are considerable 
costs associated with the job change because of the inadequacies in the 
U.S. social safety nets. 
Table 4.2 documents the more frequent change in jobs by the declin-
ing trend in the length of the median job tenure for older male workers. 
The median job tenure for males in the 
• 33–44 age group decreased from 7.0 years in 1987 to 5.1 years 
in 2006; 
• 45–54 age group decreased from 11.8 years in 1987 to 8.1 years 
in 2006; and 
• 55–64 age group decreased from 14.5 years in 1987 to 9.5 years 
in 2006. 
In terms of social safety nets, Burtless (2005) reports that within the 
G-7 in 2004, only the United Kingdom has a less generous unemploy-
ment benefits scheme than the United States. An unemployed person in 
the United States received initial unemployment benefits that equaled 
53 percent of previous income compared to 78 percent in Germany, 76 
percent in Canada and France, 61 percent in Japan, 60 percent in Italy, 
and 46 percent in the United Kingdom. The duration of unemployment 
benefits was 6 months in the United States compared to 12 months 
in Germany, 9 months in Canada, 30 months in France, 10 months in 
Japan, and 6 months in Italy and the United Kingdom. 
There are two major factors behind the more frequent changes in 
jobs. The first factor is globalization, especially the post-1990 integra-
tion of the labor force in the former Soviet Union, India, and China 
(SIC) into the international division of labor. Table 4.3 shows that the 
number of workers already engaged in the international division of 
labor in 1990 was 1,083 million, and the combined labor force of SIC 
was 1,232 million. The international division of labor in 1990 was cer-
tainly an unnatural one because half of the world’s workforce had been 
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Table 4.2  Trade Balance, Unemployment Rate, Total Compensation for
Labor, and Job Tenure in Selected Year 
1987 1996 2000 2006 
Trade deficit as a percent of GDP 3.1 1.2 3.9 5.9 
Unemployment rate (%) 6.2 5.4 4.0 4.6 
Total compensation for a full-time 46,041 48,175 52,728 55,703a 
equivalent employee (2005 $) 
Median tenure at job for male 
workers by age group (years) 
33–44 7.0 6.1 5.3 5.1 
45–54 11.8 10.1 9.5 8.1 
55–64 14.5 10.5 10.2 9.5 
NOTES: Trade deficit and unemployment data are from the White House (2007). Data 
on compensation in real terms and 1987 data are from Burtless (2007). Data on aver-
age job tenure in 1996–2006 are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics: http://www.bls
.gov/news.release/tenure.t01.htm. 
a From 2005. 
The economic isolation of the Soviet bloc started crumbling when 
the new noncommunist Solidarity government of Poland began the mar-
ketization and internationalization of the Polish economy on January 1, 
1990.16 For the Chinese elite, the end of the Soviet Union in August 
1991 confirmed that there was no third way in the capitalism-versus-
socialism debate. In early 1992, Deng Xiaoping entrenched China firmly 
on the path of convergence to a private market economy.17 In 1991, 
India faced a balance of payments crisis, and it responded by going well 
beyond the administration of the standard corrective macroeconomic 
medicine of fiscal-monetary tightening and exchange rate devaluation 
into comprehensive adjustments of microeconomic incentives. 
Table 4.3  Distribution of the Global Labor Force (millions) 
The non-SIC countries The SIC countries 
Global 
total 
Non-SIC Developed Developing 
total economies economies 
SIC 





























A decade after the start of the deep integration of the SIC economies 
into the world economic system, the number of workers involved in the 
international economic system in 2000 had increased to 2,672 million 
(with 1,363 million workers from SIC); see Table 4.3. The Heckscher-
Ohlin model would predict that this doubling of the world labor, 
achieved by bringing in cheaper labor from SIC, would lower the rela-
tive price of the labor-intensive good and hence reduce the real wage 
in the industrialized country.18 Furthermore, the fact that U.S. capital 
could now move abroad to build production facilities in the SIC econo-
mies to service the U.S. market as well as third markets also gave glo-
balization another channel to lower the U.S. wage. 
However, the U.S. real wage has not fallen (Table 4.2). The reason is 
that the remarkably high U.S. productivity growth since the late 1980s 
(perhaps enabled in large part by the information and communications 
technology [ICT] revolution) prevented the real wage from declining. 
Furthermore, as the import competition is focused on the good that uses 
low-skilled labor intensively, the wage gap between low-skilled labor 
and high-skilled labor in the United States has widened. In short, the 
economic impact of globalization in the United States is therefore man-
ifested in a diminished labor share of GDP, rather than in a lower real 
wage, and in an increased dispersion in U.S. wages. 
While the Heckscher-Ohlin model does provide a coherent mecha-
nism for globalization to have the above two wage outcomes, the incon-
venient truth is that China might not be the most influential factor in 
these developments even though China accounted for 764 million of the 
combined SIC labor force of 1,383 million in 2000. China is unlikely to 
be the most important culprit because there are three other independent 
developments that have had important consequences for U.S. wages. 
First, many technological innovations have substituted capital for 
labor and have transformed many of what have been traditionally non-
tradable services into tradable services, allowing jobs to be outsourced 
to foreign service providers. For example, the ICT revolution has 
allowed offshore call centers to handle questions from U.S. customers, 
offshore accountants to process U.S.-based transactions, and offshore 
medical technicians to read the X-rays of U.S. patients. The empirical 
literature suggests that technological innovations are likely to have had 
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Second, institutional changes have attenuated labor share of income. 
Union membership has declined, reducing the bargaining power of 
labor. There has also been an upward shift in the compensation norms 
for high-level executives. Third, there has been increased immigra-
tion into the United States (before 2001), especially a disproportionate 
inward immigration of low-skilled labor.20 
In short, much of the popular outcry in the United States and the 
European Union against China’s trade surpluses is misplaced. A wid-
ening of the U.S. trade deficit creates additional stress on U.S. labor 
because U.S. imports are more labor-intensive than its exports. How-
ever, even if China’s trade balance were zero, the pains of structural 
adjustment and income redistribution caused by technological innova-
tions, institutional changes, globalization, and immigration would still 
be there; and the amount of worker anxiety they generated collectively 
would be much larger than the additional worker anxiety generated by 
the widening trade deficit. 
If the United States strengthens its social safety nets to lower the 
cost of changing jobs, it could help reduce trade tensions between 
the United States and China. Specifically, the U.S. Congress should 
quicken the reduction in fiscal imbalance and expand trade adjustment 
programs, especially those that upgrade the skill of the younger work-
ers. The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program still functions 
inadequately after its overhaul in 2002. Brainard (2007) reports that 
participation has remained surprisingly low, thanks in part to con-
fusing Department of Labor interpretations and practices that ulti-
mately deny benefits to roughly three-quarters of workers who are 
certified as eligible for them. TAA has helped fewer than 75,000 
new workers per year, while denying more than 40 percent of all 
employers’ petitions. And remarkably, the Department of Labor 
has interpreted the TAA statute as excluding the growing num-
ber of services workers displaced by trade. . . . Between 2001 and 
2004, an average of only 64 percent of participants found jobs 
while they participated in TAA. And earnings on the new job were 
more than 20 percent below those prior to displacement. 
The TAA program clearly needs further improvement. Brainard’s 
(2007) proposal for the establishment of wage insurance is an excellent 
way to bring the U.S. social safety net more in line with the type of struc-
tural adjustments driven by globalization and technological changes. 





DEFECTS IN THE CHINESE ECONOMY 
China’s chronic and growing overall trade surplus reveals a deep-
seated serious problem in China’s economy, its dysfunctional financial 
system. This problem is revealed by the aggregate-level accounting 
identity that the overall current account balance (of which, in China, 
the overall trade account is the biggest part) is determined by the fiscal 
position of the government, and the savings-investment decisions of the 
state-controlled enterprise (SCE) sector and the private sector, which 
together make up the nongovernment sector.21 Specifically, 
CA = (T − G) + (S  − I ) + (S  − I ),SCE SCE private private 
where CA = current account in the balance of payments. 
CA = (X − M) + R 
X = export of goods and nonfactor services 
M = import of goods and nonfactor services 
R = net factor earnings from abroad (i.e., export of factor services) 
T = state revenue 
G = state expenditure (including state investment) 
SSCE = saving of the SCEs 
ISCE = investment of the SCEs
 = saving of the private sectorSprivate 
I  = investment of the private sectorprivate 
The Chinese fiscal position (T − G) has for the last decade been 
a small deficit, so it is not the cause of the swelling current account 
surpluses in the 2000s. The current account surplus exists because the 
sum of savings by SCEs and the private sector exceeds the sum of their 
investment expenditures.
Why has China’s financial system failed to translate the savings into 
investments? Such an outcome was not always the case. Before 1994, 
the voracious absorption of bank loans by SCEs to invest recklessly 
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When the government implemented stricter controls on the SOBs from 
1994 onward (e.g., removing top bank officials whenever their bank 
lent more than its credit quota or allowed the NPL ratio to increase too 
rapidly), the SOBs slowed down the growth of loans to SCEs. This cut-
back created an excess of savings because the SOB-dominated financial 
sector did not then rechannel the released savings (which were also 
increasing) to finance the investment of the private sector. This failure 
in financial intermediation by the SOBs is quite understandable. First, 
the legal status of private enterprises was, until recently, lower than that 
of the state enterprises; and, second, there was no reliable way to assess 
the balance sheets of the private enterprises, which were naturally eager 
to escape taxation. The upshot was that the residual excess savings 
leaked abroad in the form of the current account surplus. Inadequate 
financial intermediation has made developing China a capital-exporting 
country.
This perverse current account outcome is not new. Taiwan had 
exactly this problem up to the mid-1980s, when all Taiwanese banks 
were state owned and operated according to the civil service regula-
tion that required loan officers to repay any bad loans that they had 
approved. The result was a massive failure in financial intermediation 
that caused Taiwan’s current account surplus to be 21 percent of GDP in 
1986. The reason China has not been producing the gargantuan current 
account surpluses seen in Taiwan in the mid-1980s is because of the 
large amount of SCE investments.
Why is the nongovernment sector’s savings rate rising? The com-
bined savings of the SOE and non-SOE sectors rose from 20 percent in 
1978 to 30 percent in 1987, and then went above 45 percent since 2004. 
In discussions about the increasing savings rate, a common view is that 
the rise reflects the uncertainty about the future that many SOE work-
ers feel in the face of widespread privatization of loss-making SOEs. 
This explanation is incomplete because there also has been a rise in the 
rural savings rate, even though rural residents have little to fear about 
the loss of jobs in the state-enterprise sector because none of them are 
employed there.22 
We see two general changes that have caused both urban and rural 
savings rates to rise significantly. The first is increased worries about 
the future. The steady decline in state subsidies to medical care, hous-
ing, loss-making enterprises, and education, along with mismanage-
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ment of pension funds by the state, have led people to save more to 
insure against future bad luck (e.g., sickness, job loss), buy their own 
homes, build up nest eggs for retirement, and invest in their children. 
The second change is the secular improvement in the official Chi-
nese attitude toward market capitalism. Given the high rate of return to 
capital, this increasingly business-friendly attitude of the Communist 
Party of China has encouraged both rural and urban residents to save 
for investment—that is, greater optimism about the future has spawned 
investment-motivated saving.23 
In our explanations of the existence of the current account sur-
pluses and the growth of the surplus, there is a common element in 
both—China’s financial system. The fact is that savings behavior is not 
independent of the sophistication of the financial system. An advanced 
financial system will have a variety of financial institutions that would 
enable pooling of risks by providing medical insurance, pension insur-
ance, and unemployment insurance, and transform savings into educa-
tion loans, housing loans, and other types of investment loans to the 
private sector. Ceteris paribus, the more sophisticated a financial sys-
tem, the lower the savings rate. China generates the current account 
surplus because of inadequate financial intermediation, and the surplus 
grows over time because the dysfunctional financial system fails to 
pool risks to reduce uncertainty-induced savings and fails to provide 
loans to reduce investment-motivated saving. 
What is to be done in China? The obvious short-run policy package 
has two components. First, accelerate import liberalization (e.g., seri-
ously implement the commitments made in negotiations for WTO mem-
bership, such as IPR protection) and expand beyond WTO specifications. 
The second component of the short-run policy package is to have 
an expansionary fiscal policy (e.g., rural infrastructure investments) 
to soak up the excess savings, with an emphasis on import-intensive 
investments (e.g., buying airplanes and sending students abroad). It is 
important that time limits be put on the expanded public works and 
SCE investments because, in the long run, the increased public invest-
ments could follow an increasingly rent-seeking path that is wasteful 
(e.g., building a second big bridge to a lowly populated island to ben-
efit a politically connected construction company, as in Japan), and the 
increased SCE investments could convert themselves into nonperform-
ing loans at the SOBs. 
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Clearly, the optimum solution to the problem of excess saving is not 
for the government to absorb it by increasing its budget deficit but to 
establish an improved mechanism for coordinating private savings and 
private investments. The establishment of a modern financial system 
will not only achieve the objective of intermediating all of domestic 
saving into domestic investment; it will also enhance welfare and lower 
the savings rate by pooling risks through vehicles like medical insur-
ance and pension insurance. In a nutshell, China’s main challenge today 
is to develop smoothly functioning financial, planning, and regulatory 
systems that can employ the remaining rural surplus labor (as indicated 
by an average wage of about $120 per month for 480 million rural and 
migrant workers) and surplus capital, which now shows up as China’s 
sustained current account surplus and rising foreign exchange reserves. 
The important conclusion from this section is that U.S.-China trade 
tension would be lowered much more if both countries undertake cor-
rective policies rather than if China acted alone, and that a wider range 
of policy instruments should be employed (e.g., wage insurance pro-
gram in U.S. and financial market development in China) rather than 
relying just on exchange rate adjustment alone. 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL COLLAPSE IN CHINA
The present mode of economic development has given China 
the dirtiest air in the world, is polluting more and more of the water 
resources, and is possibly changing the climate pattern within China.24 
The reality is that CPC’s new objective of living in harmony with nature 
is not a choice because the Maoist adage of “man conquering nature” 
is just as unrealistic as creating prosperity through central planning. 
China’s fast growth in the last two decades has done substantial dam-
age to the environment. Economy (2004, pp. 18–19) summarizes the 
economic toll as follows: 
China has become home to six of the ten most polluted cities in the 
world. Acid rain now affects about one-third of China’s territory, 
including approximately one-third of its farmland. More than 75 
percent of the water in rivers flowing through China’s urban areas 








degradation continue largely unabated. . . . The [annual] economic 
cost of environmental degradation and pollution . . . are the equiva-
lent of 8–12 percent of China’s annual gross domestic product. 
Water shortage appears to pose the most immediate environmental 
threat to China’s continued high growth. Presently, China uses 67–75 
percent of the 800–900 billion cubic meters of water available annu-
ally, and present trends in water consumption project the usage rate 
to be 78–100 percent in 2030 (Lee 2006). The present water situation 
is actually already fairly critical because of the uneven distribution of 
water and the lower than normal rainfall in the past 15 years. Right now, 
“[about] 400 of China’s 660 cities face water shortages, with 110 of 
them severely short” (Noi 2004).25 
The extended period of semidrought in northern China combined 
with the economic and population growth have caused an increased 
amount of water to be pumped from the aquifers, leading the water table 
to drop three to six meters a year (Becker 2003; Ma 2003).And a study 
using measurements from satellites (the Global Positioning System) 
has established that the part of China north of the thirty-sixth parallel 
latitude has been “sinking at the rate of 2 millimeters a year” (Becker 
2003).26 Specifically, “Shanghai, Tianjin, and Taiyuan are the worst hit 
in China, with each sinking more than two meters (6.6 feet) since the 
early 1990s” (Agence France-Presse 2004). 
The overall water situation in northern China is reflected in the fate 
of the Yellow River, “which started drying up every few years from 
1972, did so for increasing periods of time over longer distances in 
the 1990s until 1997, when it dried up for almost the entire year over a 
stretch of several hundred kilometres” Noi (2004). 
The utilization rate of Yellow River’s water is 60 percent, far
exceeding the internationally recommended utilization limit of 40 per-
cent. All the mentioned factors have contributed to lowering the “amount 
of Yellow River water feeding into the Bohai Sea” from an annual 49.6 
billion cubic meters in the 1960s to 14.2 billion cubic meters in the 
1990s to the present 4.65 billion cubic meters (Lee 2006). 
Water shortage and the increasing pollution of current water sup-
plies are not the only serious environmental threats to the economy of 
northern China.27 The desert is expanding (possibly at an accelerating 
pace), and human activities appear to be the chief culprit. The State For-
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was affected by desertification in 1999, and 37 percent was affected by 
soil erosion. The report identified about 65 percent of the desert as hav-
ing been created by “overcultivation, overgrazing, deforestation, and 
poor irrigation practices” (South China Morning Post 2002). The rate 
of desertification is 3,900 square miles a year, an annual loss of a land 
area twice the size of Delaware.28 One direct upshot is a great increase 
in the frequency of major sandstorms, which plays “havoc with avia-
tion in northern China for weeks, cripples high-tech manufacturing and 
worsens respiratory problems as far downstream as Japan, the Korean 
peninsula and even the western United States” (French 2004).29 In the 
assessment of Chen Lai, vice minister of water resources, “It will take 
nearly half a century for China to control the eroded land and reha-
bilitate their damaged ecosystems in accordance with China’s present 
erosion-control capabilities” (South China Morning Post 2002). 
While northern China has been getting drier and experiencing 
desertification, nature, as if in compensation (or in mockery), has been 
blasting southern China with heavier rains, causing heavy floods that 
have brought considerable deaths and property damage almost every 
summer since 1998.30 The sad possibility is that the northern droughts 
and southern floods may not be independent events but a combination 
caused by pollution that originates in China. I will have more to say 
about this possibility later. 
Clearly, without water, growth cannot endure. And in response, 
the government began implementation in 2002 of Mao Zedong’s 1952 
proposal that three canals—each over 1,000 miles long—be built to 
bring water from the south to the north: 1) an eastern coastal canal from 
Jiangsu to Shandong and Tianjin, 2) a central canal from Hubei to Bei-
jing and Tianjin, and 3) a western route from Tibet to the northwestern 
provinces (Phan 2002). Construction of the eastern canal (which would 
be built on a part of the existing Grand Canal) started in 2002, and 
the central canal in 2003. Work on the western canal was scheduled to 
begin in 2010 upon completion of the first stage of the central canal. 
The scale of this water transfer project is simply unprecedented 
anywhere: “Together, the three channels would pump about 48 billion 
liters of water a year—enough to fill New York’s taps for a quarter cen-
tury. Only a tenth as much water flows through the next-largest water 
diversion project, in California” (Phan 2002). 






This massive construction project will not only be technically chal-
lenging but also extremely sensitive politically and fraught with envi-
ronmental risks. The central canal will have to tunnel through the foot 
of the huge dyke that contains the elevated Yellow River, and the west-
ern canal will have to transport water through regions susceptible to 
freezing. The number of people displaced by the Three Gorges Dam 
was 1.1 million, and this water transfer scheme is a bigger project. The 
enlargement of the Danjiangkou Dam (in Hubei) alone to enable it to 
be the source of the central canal will already displace 330,000 people 
(Cheung 2003).31 Moving people involuntarily is certainly potentially 
explosive politically. The project could also be politically explosive 
on the international front as well. One plan for the western canal calls 
for “damming the Brahmaputra river and diverting 200 billion cubic 
metres of water annually to feed the ageing Yellow River,” a scenario 
that is reportedly “giving sleepless nights to the Indian government . . .
[which is concerned that this Great Western Water Diverson Project] 
could have immense impact on lower riparian states like India and Ban-
gladesh” (Bagchi 2006). 
The potential environmental damages caused by this project are the 
most serious for the central and western canals. In the case of the central 
canal, 
environmental experts [in Wuhan where the Hanjiang River flows 
into the Yangtze] are worried about . . . [whether the annual extrac-
tion of 8 billion cubic meters of water could affect] the river’s 
ability to flush out the massive pollution flows released by the 
thousands of factories and industries along the tributaries. . . . 
The reduced flows could increase the frequency of toxic red algae 
blooms on the Yangtze near the confluence with the Hanjiang 
River. There have already been three blooms . . . [by May of that 
year, 2003]. (Cheung 2003) 
The western canal has generated a lively controversy. Some scien-
tists are contending that it “would cause more ecological damage than 
good” (Oster 2006b) because it “could cause dramatic climate changes 
. . . [and] the changed flow and water temperature would lead to a rapid 
decline in fish and other aquatic species” (Simons 2006). 
Many opponents of the water transfer project have argued that 
water conservation could go a long way toward addressing this problem 
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50 percent of China’s industrial water is recycled compared to 80 per-
cent in the industrialized countries Noi (2004), and China consumes 
3,860 cubic meters of water to produce $10,000 of GDP compared to 
the world average of 965 cubic meters (Straits Times 2004). The most 
important reason for this inefficient use of water lies in the fact that 
“China’s farmers, factories and householders enjoy some of the cheap-
est water in the world” (Holland 2006), even though China’s per capita 
endowment of water is a quarter of the world average (Straits Times 
2004). 
There is, however, the unhappy possibility that neither the price 
mechanism nor the three canals can solve China’s water problem and 
make its growth sustainable unless the present mode of economic 
development is drastically amended. There is now persuasive evidence 
that China’s voluminous emission of black carbon (particles of incom-
pletely combusted carbon) has contributed significantly to a shift in the 
climate pattern that produces northern droughts and southern floods 
of increasing intensity (Menon et al. 2002; Streets 2005). The biggest 
source of what has been called the “Asian brown cloud” in the popular 
media is burning of coal and bio-fuels in China. If the pollution-induced 
climate change analysis is valid, it means that 
• China’s massive reforestation program will not succeed in reduc-
ing sandstorms in the north because trees cannot survive if the 
amount of rainfall is declining over time; 
• the number of south-north canals will have to be increased over 
time to meet the demand for water in northern China; and 
• China needs to significantly reduce its emission of black carbon 
(presuming no new large emissions from neighboring countries 
like India). 
The general point is that effective policy making on the environ-
mental front is a very difficult task because much of the science about 
the problem is not known. For example, China must no longer separate 
its water and energy strategies. A systems approach in policy making 
is necessary because the interaction among the outcomes from the dif-
ferent sectoral policies can generate serious unintended environmen-
tal damage. If part of the shift in China’s climate is integral to global 




a complete rethinking about the location of population centers and 
types of enhanced international cooperation on global environmental 
management. 
The uncomfortable reality for China is that unless ecological bal-
ance is restored within the medium term, environmental limits could 
choke off further economic growth. And the uncomfortable reality for 
the rest of the world is that the negative consequences of large-scale 
environmental damage within a geographically large country are sel-
dom confined within that country’s borders. The continued march of 
China’s desertification first brought more frequent sandstorms to Bei-
jing and has sent yellow dust clouds not only across the sea to neigh-
boring Japan and Korea but also across the ocean to the United States. 
China’s environmental management is a concern not only for China’s 
welfare but for global welfare as well. 
In discussing the environmental aspects of the water transfer plan, 
it is important to note that there is now an open controversy in China 
involving a key government infrastructure project, and that this con-
troversy is not limited to members of the technocracy. The very public 
nature of the controversy and the involvement of more than just sci-
entists, engineers, and economists in it reveal how very far social atti-
tudes have progressed. The important point is that this change in social 
expectations will require any government in China to live in harmony 
with nature. However, any government will have great difficulties in 
doing so even if it wants to, because a green growth policy involves 
a systems approach, and scientific understanding of many ecological 
subsystems and the nature of their interactions is still rather incomplete. 
Proper management of the environment has now become critical 
for China if it is to continue its industrialization process. The unex-
purgated version of a 2007 World Bank reported that “about 750,000 
people die prematurely in China each year, mainly from air pollution 
in large cities” (McGregor 2007), and a 2007 OECD study estimates 
that “China’s air pollution will cause 20 million people a year to fall ill 
with respiratory diseases” (Anderlini 2007). Pan Yue, the deputy head 
of the State Environmental Protection Agency, summed up the present 
situation in China very well when he said, “If we continue on this path 
of traditional industrial civilization, there is no chance that we will have 
sustainable development. China’s population, resources, and environ-
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able development and new sources of energy are the only road that we 
can take” (Kynge 2004). 
CONCLUSION
In appraising whether the attainment of the October 2006 vision 
of a Harmonious Society would be sufficient to sustain high economic 
growth in China, the greatest inadequacy I see is the absence of a paral-
lel objective to build a harmonious world. A harmonious society cannot 
endure in China unless there is also a harmonious world, and vice versa. 
China’s pursuit of such a society requires it to actively help provide 
two global public goods that make a harmonious world possible: the 
strengthening of the multilateral free trade system and the protection of 
the global environmental commons. 
China has benefited immensely from the GATT-WTO free-trade 
regime, and yet up to this point it has played a passive role in push-
ing the Doha Round negotiations forward to completion. By default, 
Brazil and India have assumed the leadership of the developing econo-
mies camp in the trade negotiations. According to Susan Schwab, the 
U.S. Trade Representative, at the G4 (United States, European Union, 
Brazil, and India) meeting in Potsdam in June 2007, Brazil and India 
retreated from their earlier offers to reduce their manufacturing tariffs 
in return for cuts in agricultural subsidies by the developed economies 
because of “their fear of growing Chinese imports” (Beattie, Callan, 
and Pilling 2007; Luce and Callan 2007). The Brazilian-Indian action 
caused the Potsdam talks to fail and hurt the many developing econo-
mies that were agricultural exporters. 
China should now seek a leadership role in the Doha Round negoti-
ations that is commensurate with its participation in international trade. 
Failure of the Doha Round could set in motion the unraveling of mul-
tilateral free trade because the present international atmosphere is right 
for protectionism. The United States, which has traditionally been a 
leader in expanding the multilateral free trade system, is now beset by 
self-doubt for three major reasons. 
First, the United States was willing to endure the pains of struc-








ing imports from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and ASEAN because 
they were frontline allies in the Cold War. When the Cold War ended, 
it was natural for the United States to reconsider the economic cost of 
structural adjustment because the security and ideological benefits from 
it went down. 
Second, the amount of required structural adjustment in the United 
States to accommodate the rise of the SIC bloc is far greater than the 
earlier adjustment to the rise of its Cold War allies. As noted, the entry 
of the former SIC economies has doubled the labor force participating 
in the international division of labor. 
Third, the strongest lobby for free trade in the United States has 
been the economics profession, and the free trade doctrine has come 
under strong internal criticism in the last few years. Paul Samuelson has 
made many fundamental contributions to the development of the stan-
dard trade models that convinced mainstream economists that free trade 
is the best policy, and it was therefore an intellectual earthquake when 
he argued in 2004 that under free trade, where outsourcing accelerates 
the transfer of knowledge to the developing country, there could be a 
decline in the welfare of the developed country (see Bernstein [2004] 
and Samuelson [2004]). 
While the veracity of the Samuelson hypothesis is uncertain, the 
hypothesis clearly reflects the widespread pains of structural adjust-
ment that they witness around them—a phenomenon captured by the 
decreasing length of median job tenure. In April 2007, the United States 
bypassed multilateralism in free trade by agreeing to form a Free Trade 
Area with South Korea. With the United States weakening in its resolve 
to protect the multilateral free trade system, China should now become 
more active in the Doha Round negotiations to further deregulate world 
trade. Such a role will be very much in China’s interest because Brazil 
is now bypassing multilateral trade liberalization by entering into Free 
Trade Area negotiations with the European Union. The fact is that a 
growing number of nations like Brazil “are increasingly wary of a multi-
lateral deal because it would mandate tariff cuts, exposing them more 
deeply to low-cost competition from China. Instead, they are seeking 
bilateral deals with rich countries that are tailored to the two parties’
needs” (Miller 2007). It is time for China to show that it is a responsible 
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The global environment is the second area where China can help to 
build a harmonious world system. Specifically, China should be mobi-
lizing international consensus to form an international research con-
sortium to develop ways to burn coal cleanly because China is now 
building a power station a week and is hence able to facilitate extensive 
experimentation on prototype plants to burn coal cleanly. If successful, 
this global cooperation on clean energy research will unleash sustain-
able development in China as well as the rest of the world. 
We realize, of course, that while the need to maintain high growth 
could motivate China to become more active in supplying global public 
goods, it might not be allowed to do so because of the usual reluctance 
of the existing dominant powers to share the commanding heights of the 
world political leadership. The sad experience of Japan being denied 
permanent membership in the Security Council of the United Nations is 
a case in point. Harmonious international relations are the omitted item 
in China’s perception of a Harmonious Society in 2006, and it could 
turn out to be a very soft spot in the Chinese growth engine. 
Besides the adept management of international relations, the com-
petent management of economic issues is also fundamental to maintain-
ing China’s path to high growth. The most important realization on this 
front is that in today’s China, doing more of the same economic policies 
will not produce the same salubrious results on every front because the 
development problems have changed. For example, in the first phase of 
economic development, the provision of more jobs (through economic 
deregulation) was enough to lower poverty significantly. Many of the 
people who are still poor require more than just job opportunities; they 
need an infusion of assistance (e.g., empower them with human capital 
through education and health interventions) in order to take advantage 
of these job opportunities. 
On the fiscal management front, my analysis suggests that the man-
agement of state assets and the regulation of the financial sector should 
be reformed to eliminate the phenomenon of repeated recapitalization 
of the SOBs. The privatization of some units of the SOBs, and the emer-
gence of large domestic private banks will help strengthen the budget 
constraints perceived by the managers of SOBs. 
The fact is, however, that the probability of a software failure and 
the probability of a power supply failure are both higher than the prob-
ability of a hardware failure. This means that development policy mak-
  




ing in China has become more challenging. There must now not only be 
more adroit but also fuller accommodation of domestic social demands 
in order to keep China’s growth rate high. The reality is that popular 
satisfaction with the status quo depends inversely on the level of expec-
tations, and the expectations of the Chinese people toward their govern-
ment have risen dramatically along with income and, more importantly, 
along with their growing knowledge of the outside world. A Chinese 
government that consistently fails to produce results in line with the rise 
in social expectations runs the increasing risk of being challenged by 
another faction within the CPC, culminating in an open split with each 
side seeking the support of nonparty groups. 
Complicating matters is that there has not only been rising expecta-
tions but also diversification of expectations. In this new situation, the 
greater use of democratic procedures, the establishment of an indepen-
dent judiciary, and the restoration of a free press might be inevitable 
if CPC is to successfully accommodate the rising social expectations 
and mediate the emerging differences in social expectations. What will 
happen will depend on whether the CPC is sufficiently confident that it 
will be politically skillful enough to lead the democratic transition and 
emerge afterward as the most important political force. History tells us 
that the French and British monarchies reacted very differently to the 
popular requests for reform, and the outcomes were very different in 
each case. 
Notes 
I was deeply honored to deliver this paper as the Werner Sichel Lecture at Western 
Michigan University on October 7, 2016. I am extremely grateful for the guidance I 
received in the discussion for revising the lecture. The insightful comments of Professor 
Huizhong Zhou and Professor Wei-Chiao Huang were most helpful. 
1. Lardy (1998) wrote that “China’s major banks are even weaker than most official 
data suggest. . . . On a realistic accounting, these banks’ capital adequacy is nega-
tive, and they are insolvent (p. 95). . . . The failure of China’s largest financial 
institutions would disrupt the flow of credit and disrupt the payments system, lead-
ing to a collapse of economic activity. The failure of major banks also could have 
long-term implications for the household savings rate. . . . A lower savings rate 
would mean a lower rate of investment and slower growth, in turn depressing the 
rate of new job creation, leading to sustained higher levels of unemployment” (pp. 
143–144). 
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2. According to Pei (2006), “In a ‘trapped transition,’ the ruling elites have little 
interest in real reforms. They may pledge reforms, but most such pledges are lip 
service or tactical adjustments aimed at maintaining the status quo.” 
3. As Huang (2006) sees that India does not discriminate against its indigenous capi-
talists in favor of foreign capitalists, he predicts that “[u]nless China embarks on 
bold institutional reforms, India may very well outperform it in the next 20 years.” 
4. For a review of the debate on how to interpret China’s high growth in the 1978– 
2000 and why China, unlike the economies of the former Soviet bloc, did not 
experience a recession when it made the switch from a centrally planned economy 
to a market economy, see Sachs and Woo (2000) and Woo (2001). 
5. For example, President Soeharto of Indonesia was pushed out of office in May 
1998, one month after raising fuel prices. 
6. f has been above 1.5 percent for the past seven years; r was 4 percent in the past 
only because the interest rate was regulated. I think that the implementation of 
financial deregulation that is necessary for normal healthy development of the 
financial sector will render r to be at least 6 percent because 1) according to Solow 
(1991), the stylized fact for the real interest rate in the United States is that it is 
5–6 percent; and 2) both the marginal rate of return to capital and the black market 
loan rate have been more than 20 percent. 
7. The asymmetry is from the absence of financial punishment when a loss occurs. 
8. Lipton and Barboza (2007) also report the recall of a ghoulish fake eyeball that 
was filled with kerosene, and of an infant wrist rattle that was a choking hazard. 
9. For example, radial tires were manufactured without the gum strips that prevented 
the tires from separating; see Martin (2007). 
10. This point was made by the popular tabloid Southern Metropolis Daily; see
Buckley (2007). 
11. This point was made by the Shanxi governor, Yu Youjun, who said, “For a long 
time, relevant government departments did little to regulate rural workshops, 
small coal mines and small factories, and they are basically out of control and are 
not being supervised. . . . The dereliction of duty by civil servants and the corrup-
tion of individuals have made it possible for illegal labour to exist, particularly 
the abductions of migrant workers, and forced labour of children and mentally 
disabled people” (Ma 2007a). 
12. The Gini coefficient has a value between 0 and 1, and the higher the value, the 
greater the degree of income inequality. 
13. The 1993 number is from Keidel (2006, p. 1), and the 2004 number is from Pei 
(2005), who wrote that, in 2004, there were 74,000 “mass incidents” involving 3.7 
million people compared to 10,000 such incidents involving 730,000 people in 
1994. Possibly, because of the widespread attention in the Western media on the 
marked rise in mass incidents, the post-2004 definition of mass incidents appeared 
to have been changed, making post-2004 data not comparable with the 1994–2004 
data; see discussion in EastSouthWestNorth (n.d.). 








   
 
   
  









15. This positive wage trend for the average worker is also seen in that for the average 
blue-collar worker; see Woo (2008). 
16. The economic transition and political disintegration of the Soviet bloc became 
irreversible when Yeltsin replaced Gorbachev as the unambiguous leader of Rus-
sia in August 1991 and implemented market-oriented reforms in January 1992. 
17. Today, under the heading of a socialist market economy with Chinese characteris-
tics, the Chinese constitution gives private property the same legal status as public 
property, and the Chinese Communist Party accepts capitalists as members. 
18. More accurately, the wage of the formerly isolated SIC worker would rise while 
the wage for the worker in the industrialized country would fall. 
19. There is a large empirical literature on the relative impact of technological changes 
and globalization on the U.S. wage rate; see for example, Sachs and Shatz (1994) 
and Feenstra and Hanson (1996). 
20. Ottaviano and Peri (2005) offer a good discussion of this topic. 
21. The SCE category covers companies, which are classified as SOBs, and joint-
venture and joint-stock companies, which are controlled by third parties (e.g., 
legal persons). 
22. Economist Intelligence Unit (2004, p. 23) reported that “farmers’ propensity to 
save seems to have increased.” 
23. Liu and Woo (1994) and Woo and Liu (1995) contain formal modeling and econo-
metric support for the investment-motivated saving hypothesis. 
24. Air pollution is a serious problem. Of the 20 cities in the world identified by the 
World Bank as having the dirtiest air, 16 of them are in China. It is shocking that 
lead and mercury poisoning are more common than expected. See Financial Times 
(2004) and Oster (2006a). 
25. The shortage is reported to be most acute in Taiyuan in Shanxi and Tianjin (Becker 
2003). 
26. Some 60 percent of the land in Tianjin municipality is plagued by subsistence 
(Becker 2003). 
27. Examples of serious water pollution are Agence France-Presse (2006); Ma (2001); 
Straits Times (2003); Yardley (2004, 2006).  
28. This is average of the 3,800 square miles reported in Howard (2004) and the 4,014 
square miles reported in the South China Morning Post (2002). 
29. The number of major sandstorms in China was 5 in the 1950–1959 period, 8 in 
1960–1969, 13 in 1970–1979, 14 in 1980–1989, 23 in 1990–1999, 14 in 2000, 26 
in 2001, 16 in 2002, and 11 in 2003, according to Pumin (2005). 
30. The National Development and Reform Commission (2007) reported: “The 
regional distribution of precipitation shows that the decrease in annual precipita-
tion was significant in most of northern China, eastern part of the northwest, and 
northeastern China, averaging 20~40 mm/10a, with decrease in northern China 
being most severe; while precipitation significantly increased in southern China 
and southwestern China, averaging 20~60 mm/10a. . . . The frequency and inten-
sity of extreme climate/weather events throughout China have experienced obvi-
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and flood in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River and southeastern 
China have become more severe.” 
31. A lower estimate of 300,000 is given in Eckholm (2002). 
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State Enterprise Reform in China 
Grasp or Release? 
Mary E. Lovely 
Yang Liang 
Syracuse University 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Chinese government moved 
aggressively to close loss-making state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
to restructure underperforming state assets deemed central to economic 
development. Over the next decade, the state laid off almost 50 mil-
lion workers—40 percent of the public-enterprise workforce (Naughton 
2007, p. 179). The adjustment of labor and other factors to this restruc-
turing accommodated the rise of private enterprises and ushered in a 
sustained period of productivity growth. The wealth of newly minted 
entrepreneurs attested to the success of China’s “privatization” of its 
industrial sector (Lardy 2014; Nee and Opper 2012). 
While much attention has focused on the performance of China’s 
private sector, its state sector is now coming under renewed interna-
tional scrutiny. Even with the ascendancy of the private sector, China’s 
state-owned and state-controlled enterprises have hardly disappeared 
and are among the country’s largest firms. Geopolitically, this renewed 
interest is partly due to trade conflict in industries dominated by state 
enterprises, such as steel and shipbuilding, where shifts in global 
demand following the Great Recession led to global overcapacity and 
falling prices. Despite two decades of reform, state enterprises con-
tinue to dominate major sectors of the Chinese economy and have also 
emerged as global titans. Kowalski et al. (2013) investigate the extent 
of state ownership among the world’s 2,000 largest companies—the so-
called Forbes Global 2,000—and their 330,000 subsidiaries worldwide. 
Using an equally weighted average of shares of state-owned enterprises 
in sales, assets, and market value of the country’s top 10 firms, they 
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find that China tops the list of countries with the highest state presence 
among its globally elite enterprises. 
That state firms remain an important aspect of the Chinese economy 
is not a surprise since, as Naughton (2007) notes, “there has never been 
a clearly articulated rationale for privatization” (p. 324). Without a spe-
cific privatization policy, the nature of industrial restructuring must be 
discerned from the historical record. In this chapter, we examine the 
characteristics of firms that were retained by the Chinese state and those 
that were released to the private sector. We begin our analysis by track-
ing the evolution of enterprises away from China’s state sector, a task 
complicated by alternative definitions of state control, limited data, and 
opaque ownership arrangements. An initial contribution of this chapter, 
then, is the provision of new estimates of the size of the state sector, 
with a comparison to other recent characterizations in the literature. 
To better understand the factors that influenced state decision mak-
ing, we review and categorize various descriptions of the objectives of 
both central and local governments in enterprise restructuring. We then 
formulate these views as hypotheses and test them using data from Chi-
na’s Annual Survey of Industrial Production. We employ a linear prob-
ability model to link firm characteristics to the likelihood of remaining 
under state control. We undertake this exercise for two time intervals: 
1998–2002, a period following massive urban state-owned enterprise 
(SOE) restructuring and significant labor unrest; and 2002–2006, the 
early years of the Hu administration.1 We then summarize the findings 
of recent analyses of restructuring’s success in reducing factor misal-
locations and, hence, its contribution to productivity growth. Finally, 
we use our analysis of the grasp-or-release decision to highlight some 
of the challenges of continued SOE reforms. 
OWNERSHIP RESTRUCTURING, ENTERPRISE
CLASSIFICATION, AND THE EXTENT OF STATE
CONTROL IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
Identification and measurement of the Chinese “state sector” are 
complicated by the variety of ways in which state-controlled firms are 
organized. According to Gan (2009), SOE restructuring stems from 
  
State Enterprise Reform in China 85 
policies initiated in the 1980s and early 1990 permitting changes to 
enterprise governance structures rather than outright privatization. The 
formal adoption of the Company Law in 1994 provided a legal frame-
work into which different ownership forms could fit. The law permitted 
the formal conversion of state-owned enterprises to joint stock compa-
nies, allowing for the option of selling off some or all shares of the new 
organization (Naughton 2007, p. 301). Shareholding conversion, called 
“corporatization” when the state retains a controlling interest, became a 
broad-based initiative after 1997 when the Chinese Communist Party’s 
Fifteenth Congress elevated the shareholding system as a vehicle for 
enterprise restructuring. The changing ownership composition was also 
shaped by the adoption at the Fifteenth Party Congress of the policy 
known as “grasping the large, letting go of the small” (Gan, Guo, and 
Xu 2015). This policy sought to protect and promote the largest, typi-
cally centrally controlled, state enterprises while spurring the privati-
zation or exit of smaller, often loss-making, enterprises controlled by 
lower levels of government. The policy quickly led to dramatic changes 
in China’s industrial sector. Jefferson et al. (2005) find that from 1997 
to 2001 the number of large and medium-sized SOEs declined by over 
40 percent, and the number of large and medium-sized collective enter-
prises declined by 35 percent, while the number of shareholding firms 
soared. 
These policies resulted in a distinct blurring of boundaries between 
state-controlled and privately held enterprises. Since 2001, the evolu-
tion of the Chinese industrial sector has continued, but tracking the 
extent to which state control has receded is difficult. China’s National 
Bureau of Statistics assigns each firm an ownership classification, 
known as its “registration status.” State-owned enterprises include 
those that are majority owned by the central government or a local 
government, those registered to the state but jointly operated with a 
nonstate entity, and those wholly state owned. Private firms, by registra-
tion status, include those registered to natural persons, whether solely, 
in partnership, as limited liability enterprises, or shareholding firms. 
Distinctions between ownership types become truly opaque in another 
type of domestic registration status, legal persons. Firms registered as 
legal persons include limited liability and shareholding limited liability 
firms. Their relationship to the state is not indicated by their registration 
status. An additional complication is that the state may control firms in 
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which it has only a minority holding, firms that are correctly registered 
as private or foreign owned. These complexities imply that measures 
of the state-controlled industrial share drawn from aggregate statistics 
based on registration type are misleading. 
Enterprises registered as legal persons are mostly shareholding 
firms, an organizational form integral to reform of China’s state-owned 
enterprises (Jefferson et al. 2005). Shareholding firms may operate under 
state control, may be privately controlled, or may simply be “hybrid 
ownership.” Fortunately, progress in identifying firms not classified as 
SOEs by registration status yet controlled by the state can be made by 
accessing additional information contained in China’s Annual Survey 
of Industrial Production (ASIP). This census of all state-owned enter-
prises and other industrial firms with revenues above 5 million RMB 
is available to us for the period 1998–2006 only. The ASIP includes 
information on the origin of the various sources of registered capital 
in the firm—the state, collectives, legal persons, private persons, and 
foreigners.2 This information on equity shares can be used to classify 
firms based on majority ownership. If 50 percent or more of equity 
originates from state, collective, private, or foreign sources, the enter-
prise can be reclassified accordingly. However, for many firms, legal 
person is a significant source of capital, making it impossible to classify 
these firms based on paid-in capital shares alone. Indeed, of the 54,320 
firms officially registered as legal person, 21,910 enterprises cannot be 
reclassified using equity information because the majority of their capi-
tal originates from a legal person. In other words, equity shares do not 
allow us to completely peer around the veil of legal-person status. 
Other researchers have faced this problem. Dollar and Wei (2007) 
add legal-person capital to private capital before calculating majority 
ownership. While subsequent researchers have followed the same pro-
cedure, this method ignores Huang’s (2008) observation that categoriz-
ing legal-person firms as private can be misleading because “(e)ven a 
casual glance at the data reveals that many of these legal-person share-
holding firms are among the best-known and quintessential SOEs in 
China” (p. 16). Huang concludes that “(t)he majority of the sharehold-
ing firms, especially the large ones, are still state-controlled” (p. 46). 
His observation suggests that an alternative grouping of firms, in which 
legal-person capital is treated as state-owned capital before calculating 
majority ownership, is also reasonable.3 Kamal and Lovely (2013) take 
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a middle approach in their study of labor misallocation: they separate 
legal-person enterprises from both SOEs and firms registered as pri-
vately owned. 
Fortunately, the ASIP contains additional information that defines 
the firm’s controlling shareholder as either the state, a collective, a for-
eigner, or a private person. Together with data on equity shares, the ASIP
allows us to define state-owned and state-controlled (SOSC) firms. We 
define a firm as SOSC when it is registered as an SOE, when the share 
of registered capital held directly by the state exceeds or equals 50 per-
cent, or when the state is reported as the controlling shareholder. The 
method captures those firms registered as SOEs and those in which the 
state holds a controlling interest, whether directly or through a holding 
company. Hsieh and Song (2015) use a similar method to identify state-
controlled firms, and they report that this method resulted in correct 
categorization when they manually checked the results using informa-
tion directly from firm websites.4 
To identify enterprises that remain under state control from those 
that transition to another type of ownership, we need to trace firms over 
time. However, linking firms across years can be problematic because 
firm IDs may be changed or missing when there are revisions in legal 
registration status. We follow Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang’s 
(2012) method of constructing complete firm histories. We supplement 
matching via the firm’s Legal Person Entity Code with matching based 
on five additional identifiers: firm name, industry code, geographic 
code, founding year, and name of main product. After completing this 
multistep procedure, we can match over time more than 95 percent of 
the firms in the data set. 
The state sector appears to recede far less when corporatized yet 
state-controlled firms are included in the definition of state enterprises 
rather than considered private firms. Figure 5.1 shows trends in the share 
of total enterprises by type of ownership. When ownership is defined 
using NBS registration status, the number of state-owned enterprises 
falls by more than 90 percent between 1998 and 2006, accounting for 
only about 3 percent of all above-scale firms by 2006.5 However, using 
information on equity shares to define ownership allows us to observe 
another 1 percent of firms as being state majority owned in 2006. We 
also find an additional 1 percent of firms for which ownership cannot be 
determined directly from paid-in capital shares but which are identified 
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as state controlled by the NBS. In total, we find that about 5 percent of 
total enterprises are state owned and controlled in 2006. 
If these adjustments seem too small to bother with, Table 5.1 shows 
that the state controls a much larger share of industrial output than the 
number of firms might suggest. As seen in Figure 5.2, firms registered 
as SOEs account for 15 percent of gross industrial output, even though 
they make up only 3 percent of all enterprises. Similarly, corporatized 
firms controlled by the state punch above their numbers due to their 
larger than average size. Firms in which the state owns 50 percent or 
more of registered capital provide 5.4 percent of gross output, while 
firms controlled by the state without having registered majority state 
ownership account for fully 11 percent of gross output. Altogether, as 
shown in Figure 5.2, SOSC enterprises provided 31.4 percent of gross 
industrial output by 2006, more than double the share produced by reg-
istered SOEs, and that the decline in state share appears to level out by 
2005. 
Figure 5.3 shows trends in output shares for SOSC firms, distin-
guished by their official registration type. While about 60 percent of 
state-controlled firms are registered as SOEs, the share of SOSC firms 
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Table 5.1  Enterprise Size and Performance: Linear Probability Model of 
Firm Remaining State Controlled or State Owned, 1998–2002 
and 2002–2006 
1998–2002 2002–2006 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln Output value 0.0506*** 0.0472*** 0.0606*** 0.0481*** 
(normed) (0.00299) (0.00541) (0.00241) (0.00740) 
ln Viability 0.0491*** 0.0329*** 0.0352*** 0.0275*** 
(0.00475) (0.00456) (0.00661) (0.00611) 
ln Return on −0.0326*** −0.0258*** −0.0340*** −0.0157*** 
assets (0.00428) (0.00465) (0.00544) (0.00480) 
Observations 55,502 55,502 35,719 35,719 
Industry fixed No Yes No Yes 
effects 
NOTE: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Dependent variable takes value of 1 if firm 
remains state owned or state controlled over full-time period. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered at the two-digit census industry code. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
registered as limited liability corporations grew dramatically after 2001. 
Recognizing that firms officially registered as legal-person enterprises 
are larger than average, properly classifying these organizational forms 
is integral to tracking the extent of state control in China’s industrial 
sector. Proper classification leads to quite different conclusions about 
the extent of “privatization” from that drawn using registration type 
alone. We conclude that the Chinese state continues to control firms 
supplying more than 30 percent of industrial output and that earlier 
downward trends in the state share appear to level off by 2005. 
GRASPING AND RELEASING 
Large-scale restructuring of China’s state-owned firms began in the 
late 1990s. As we have shown, this process resulted in a smaller share 
of firms owned by the state. With about a third of gross industrial out-
put still under state control, however, we now examine the characteris-




    
 
90 Lovely and Liang 














State-owned capital share > = 50% 
SOE by registration 
SOSC 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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chose to grasp. Such an analysis provides insight into both the process 
of sculpting the modern state sector in China, and also the problems that 
continued to face the state industrial sector after 2006. 
The slogan “grasp the large, let go of the small” suggests that 
enterprise performance was a major determinant of decisions about 
industrial restructuring. Naughton (2007) reports that “In ‘grasping the 
large,’ policymakers sought to focus their attention on the largest, typi-
cally centrally controlled firms” (p. 31). In addition to size, the financial 
status of the firm likely contributed to the retention decision. An impe-
tus for selling assets, especially at the local level, was the negative bud-
getary impact associated with loss-making and insolvent enterprises. 
Firms with debts in excess of the value of their assets were essentially 
bankrupt. Because of “soft budget constraints” in the period before 
restructuring, enterprises could lose money for a prolonged period yet 
continue to receive financing and investment. These injections of funds 
sapped the resources of local governments and contributed to concerns 
about government indebtedness. As reported by Gan, Guo, and Xu 
(2015, p. 7), by the late 1990s, “the deteriorating performance of SOEs 
put increasing pressure on the fiscal conditions of local governments 
because they are the residual claimants of the SOE earnings and some 
were on the verge of insolvency following the losses of their SOEs.” 
While selling off the shares of insolvent firms may have solved the 
government’s problem, finding buyers for such firms would be difficult 
without some indication that the firm could be profitable. Consequently, 
profitability may also have been a factor in determining which enter-
prises the state retained, with better-performing firms being sold while 
others were held under various organizational forms. We can summa-
rize these enterprise performance criteria for retaining a firm under state 
control in the following hypothesis: 
H1: The Chinese state was more likely to retain control of an en-
terprise that, ceteris paribus, was larger, financially viable, and less 
profitable. These factors matter in both time periods, 1998–2002 and 
2002–2006. 
To test this hypothesis, we measure the size, viability, and profit-
ability of each firm in the initial year of each time period. Table 5.2 
provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in our regression 
analysis. We measure enterprise size as the gross value of industrial 
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output of the firm relative to the average output value of private firms 
in the same three-digit industry. Viability is measured as the ratio for 
the firm of total current assets to total current liabilities. Lastly, we use 
sales revenue divided by total assets of the enterprise as a measure of 
firm profitability. 
Some observers express the view that privatization was shaped by a 
desire to continue to guide economic development through the alloca-
tion of resources to sectors with strategic importance. Naughton (2007) 
states that the central government concentrated its focus on energy, 
natural resources, and other industries with large economies of scale. 
These upstream industries provide inputs into many different industrial 
activities and thus have strategic importance in driving economic devel-
opment. The state may then have sought to retain control of firms in the 
upstream industries. 
While local governments were given de jure control rights for local 
SOEs in 1997, the pressures they faced to restructure were associated 
with their own resources and assets. Lower levels of government held 
assets that may have been deemed less strategically important and more 
tempting to use as a source of revenue. Gan, Guo, and Xu (2015) find 
that direct sales of firm assets to insiders was the method of privatization 
used most often by local governments to release local SOEs from state 
control. This method of privatization is the most controversial because 
it lacks transparency and may result in the underpricing of state assets. 
Thus, local governments may have found SOEs under their jurisdiction 
less strategically important to retain and more tempting to sell off. We 
can summarize these strategic importance perspectives on state control 
in the following hypothesis: 
H2: The Chinese state was more likely to retain control of an enter-
prise that, ceteris paribus, was further upstream in the industrial sector 
and was affiliated with a higher level of government. 
To measure strategic importance, we control for the degree of 
“upstreamness” of the three-digit industry to which the enterprise 
belongs. We measure this industry characteristic using the upstream 
index for two-digit sectors created by Tang, Wang, and Wang (2016) 
for China using the method of Antras et al. (2012). The index essen-
tially measures the number of industries between a producer and the 
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State owned or =1 if start as SOSC and remain 0.45 0.39 
state controlled SOSC to end of period (see text (0.50) (0.49) 
for definition of SOSC) 
ln Output value Log of output value divided by −1.38 −1.31 
(normed) averaged private firm’s output (2.10) (2.09) 
value in same 3-digit industry 
ln Viability Log of total current assets divided −0.16 −0.13 
by total current liabilities (0.82) (0.94) 
ln Return on assets Log of industrial sales revenue −1.04 −0.95 
divided by total assets (1.24) (1.31) 
Social burden Log of the ratio of firm’s industrial −1.44 −1.25 
sales per worker to the averaged (1.36) (1.37) 
industrial sales per worker in the 
same 3-digit industry 
Strategic burden Log of ratio of industry’s total −2.84 −2.91 
export values to industry’s total (1.63) (1.61) 
domestic sales 
Upstream index From Tang, Wang, and Wang 3.30 3.33 
(2014) (0.55) (0.56) 
Central affiliated Enterprise affiliated with 0.07 0.09 
central government (0.25) (0.28) 
Province affiliated Enterprise affiliated with a 0.13 0.17 
provincial government (0.33) (0.38) 
City affiliated Enterprise affiliated with a city 0.25 0.25 
government (0.43) (0.43) 
Private competition Share of output in 3-digit industry 0.04 0.13 
from private enterprises (0.03) (0.10) 
Foreign-invested Share of output in 3-digit industry 0.11 0.12 
enterprise from foreign-invested enterprises (0.09) (0.11) 
competition 
Central state-owned Share of output in 3-digit industry 0.09 0.08 
enterprise from state-owned enterprises (0.16) (0.16) 
competition 
NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 




94 Lovely and Liang 
more upstream location in the production chain. We also include a set 
of dummy variables indicating the level of government with which the 
enterprise is affiliated. The ASIP contains this information, distinguish-
ing between central, provincial, city, or town government affiliation. 
The last set of explanations for privatization decisions refers to 
what we can term “legacy burdens.” These burdens reflect the use of 
state enterprises to achieve goals other than production and take three 
forms: social burdens, strategic burdens, and competitive burdens. 
Because these burdens reduce the efficiency and profitability of state 
enterprises, they distinguish firms that may be difficult to sell off with-
out prior restructuring and that fill an important and continuing social 
obligation. 
Prior to the mid-1990s, state enterprises often served to ensure full 
employment in urban areas, a responsibility for social stability termed 
the “social burden” by Lin (2012). Cai, Park, and Zhao (2008) explain 
that SOE managers were prohibited from firing urban workers and that 
municipal governments continued to place workers into state-sector 
jobs well into the 1990s even when they were not required. We hypoth-
esize that excess staffing would contribute to the desirability of priva-
tizing a firm to increase productivity, but the problem of uninsured and 
unemployed workers would remain. Indeed, Lin argues that much of 
this responsibility remains today with SOEs, who still shoulder a social 
burden. 
Another burden identified by Lin (2012) is what he terms the 
“strategic burden.” This handicap resulted from the presence of state 
enterprises in sectors deemed strategically important for economic 
development but not in line with China’s comparative advantage. 
These enterprises would not be viable without significant state support, 
including competitive restrictions. To the extent that the state continues 
to seek industrial upgrading, they may have retained control of enter-
prises in these “comparative-advantage-defying” industries. 
A final burden for state enterprises flows from a competitive squeeze 
experienced by local SOEs operating in sectors dominated by foreign-
invested firms and large, centrally controlled SOEs. These enterprises 
may not be able to withstand the pressure of more advanced competi-
tors and, thus, may be allowed to go bankrupt or be sold. 
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H3: The Chinese state was more likely to retain control of an enter-
prise if, ceteris paribus, it bore a larger social burden; it bore a strategic 
burden related to comparative disadvantage; it was subject to a com-
petitive squeeze from foreign firms and large SOEs. 
To measure the social burden borne by a firm, we create an index of 
overstaffing based on average labor productivity in the industry. Specifi-
cally, we calculate sales revenue per employee in each given firm and 
divide by the average sales per employee in the firm’s three-digit indus-
try. Higher values of the index indicate that the firm has a higher labor 
productivity relative to the average firm in the industry. The strategic 
burden reflects an industry’s comparative advantage, so we create an 
industry-level measure based on the ratio of export sales to total domes-
tic sales. Higher values of this measure indicate that the industry has 
strong international sales. Lastly, we control for the competitive squeeze 
by including the market share in each three-digit industry of private 
firms, foreign-invested enterprises, and centrally affiliated SOEs. 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate a linear probability model of the 
likelihood that a state enterprise remains active and state controlled by 
the end of the period.6 Our dependent variable takes the value of unity 
if an initially state-controlled firm remains state controlled, using the 
method of classifying enterprises as SOSC described above, until the 
last year in the interval. Since China experienced a change of regime 
(President Hu took office in December 2002) and reemphasized deepen-
ing SOE reform in the 16th CPC Plenary Session, we divide our sample 
into two periods. The sample contains 67,509 initially state-controlled 
firms for the period 1998–2002 and 40,857 initially state-controlled 
firms for the period 2002–2006. 
Table 5.1 provides the results of the linear probability estimation, 
including only those variables related to firm performance. We use 
these results to test the hypothesis that the government was more likely 
to retain control of an enterprise that, ceteris paribus, was larger, finan-
cially viable, and less profitable. For each period we provide estimates 
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As seen in Table 5.1, all three firm performance indicators are sig-
nificant determinants of state retention. The estimated coefficient on 
enterprise size, normed by average industry output value, is positive 
and highly significant in both time periods. The coefficient, when esti-
mated with industry fixed effects, is of very similar magnitude in both 
periods. A 1 percent increase in a firm’s output value relative to the 
industry average, all else equal, raises the probability that it is retained 
by the state by about 5 percentage points. 
A firm’s financial viability, measured as the ratio of its assets to its 
liabilities, is also a significant determinant of state retention. When we 
include industry fixed effects, the estimated coefficient implies that a 1 
percent increase in this ratio raises the probability that the state main-
tains control by about 3 percentage points. This finding is consistent 
with the view that the state sold off enterprises that were bankrupt. 
Our last indicator of firm performance is ROA, the ratio of firm 
revenues to assets. The estimated coefficient is negative and highly 
significant, even when we include industry fixed effects. A 1 percent 
increase in this revenue ratio reduces the likelihood of state retention 
by 2.6 percentage points over the period 1998–2002 and by 1.6 points 
over the period 2002–2006. This finding is consistent with state reten-
tion of underperforming assets. In the data set, 45 percent of initially 
SOSC firms remain state controlled by 2002 and 39 percent by 2006, 
so the magnitudes of the marginal effects on retention decisions of all 
three firm performance factors appear to be both economically and sta-
tistically significant. 
We extend our analysis with the results shown in Table 5.3, which 
provides coefficient estimates obtained by adding the strategic impor-
tance characteristics to our linear probability model. We hypothesize 
that the Chinese state was more likely to retain control of an enterprise 
that, ceteris paribus, was further upstream in the industrial sector and 
was affiliated with a higher level of government. Since our upstream 
index is an industry characteristic, we do not include industry fixed 
effects in these models. 
Surprisingly, we find that the upstreamness of the firm’s industry 
is not significantly correlated with the probability of state retention in 
either period. Moreover, the level of governmental affiliation has no 
significant relation to retained control over the period 1998–2002, dur-
ing which the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee had the 
State Enterprise Reform in China 97 
Table 5.3  Strategic Centrality: Linear Probability Model of Firm 
Remaining State Controlled or State Owned, 1998–2002 and 
2002–2006 
1998–2002 2002–2006 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln Output value 0.0533*** 0.0458*** 0.0588*** 0.0474*** 
(normed) (0.00270) (0.00239) (0.00399) (0.00390) 
ln Viability 0.0467*** 0.0345*** 0.0489*** 0.0321*** 
(0.00471) (0.00291) (0.00472) (0.00393) 
ln Return on assets −0.0350*** −0.0272*** −0.0269*** −0.0145*** 
(0.00439) (0.00374) (0.00410) (0.00391) 
Upstream index 0.0150 −0.00899 0.0164 −0.00222 
(0.0197) (0.0101) (0.0228) (0.0115) 
Central affiliated 0.144 0.216** 
(0.150) (0.0939) 
Province affiliated 0.117 0.167*** 
(0.0913) (0.0510) 
City affiliated −0.00493 0.0745 
(0.0488) (0.0458) 
Observations 43,819 43,819 24,686 24,686 
Industry fixed effects No No No No 
NOTE: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0. 01. Dependent variable takes value of 1 if firm 
remains state owned or state controlled over full time period. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered at the two-digit census industry code. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
political support necessary to issue an official policy statement on the 
urgency of reform of state-owned enterprises (Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China 1999). Our results suggest that the party was 
then able to align the direction of reform at all levels of government. 
During the first years of the Hu administration, however, the level 
of state affiliation appears to have become a powerful determinant of 
whether a firm remained under state control. Being affiliated with the 
central government raised the likelihood of remaining state controlled 
by an estimated 21.6 percentage points, while affiliation with a prov-
ince or provincial-level city raised the likelihood of retention by 16.7 
percent, both measured relative to the likelihood of retention of firms 
affiliated with city or town governments. These estimated magnitudes 
are quite large and suggest that corporatization, rather than privatiza-
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tion, became the mode of choice for higher-level governments seeking 
to improve the performance of their state assets. Enterprises associated 
with local governments were more likely to be privatized or closed, all 
else equal, than those affiliated with higher levels. 
Table 5.4 provides additional results that include measures of the 
legacy burdens faced by each state-controlled firm. We hypothesize that 
an enterprise was more likely to be retained if it bore a larger social 
burden, bore a strategic burden related to comparative disadvantage, 
and was subject to a competitive squeeze from foreign firms and large 
SOEs. Among all these factors, our results suggest that only the social 
burden is a significant determinant of state privatization decisions. Esti-
mate coefficients for the strategic burden variable, defined as the export 
success of the firm’s industry, and all measures of the competitive 
squeeze faced by local SOEs are statistically insignificant in both peri-
ods. In contrast, the coefficient for social burden is significant in both 
periods. Defined as the firm’s sales per worker relative to the average 
sales per worker in the industry, social burden is a measure of relative 
labor productivity. Our results indicate that a 1 percent increase in this 
ratio reduces the likelihood of state retention by 2.7 percentage points 
in the first period, 1998–2002, and by 0.8 points in the second period, 
2002–2006. Essentially, firms with better labor productivity were more 
likely to be privatized or exit than to remain state controlled. This find-
ing supports the view that restructuring did not discharge all SOE social 
burdens and that the state sector continues to some extent to bear the 
legacy of social stability goals, as argued by Lin (2012). 
STATE RESTRUCTURING AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Our regression analysis indicates that larger, more financially stable 
firms, especially those affiliated with higher levels of government, were 
more likely to remain under state control. We also find that the state 
was less likely to shed enterprises with low labor productivity. These 
patterns are consistent with the creation of a state sector comprising 
firms with dominant industry positions but possibly weak performance. 
Explicit comparison of state firms to nonstate firms, a task that has 
recently been undertaken by several groups of researchers, is important 
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Table 5.4  Legacy Burdens and Competitive Squeeze: Linear Probability 
Model of Firm Remaining State Controlled or State Owned, 
1998–2002 and 2002–2006 
1998–2002 2002–2006 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln Output value 0.0541*** 0.0545*** 0.0507*** 0.0508*** 
(normed) (0.00290) (0.00296) (0.00429) (0.00433) 
ln Viability 0.0387*** 0.0379*** 0.0332*** 0.0324*** 
(0.00401) (0.00391) (0.00420) (0.00385) 
ln Return on assets –0.0155*** –0.0158*** –0.0111*** –0.0111*** 
(0.00316) (0.00339) (0.00378) (0.00384) 
Upstream index –0.00814 –0.00954 –0.00334 0.000485 
(0.0106) (0.0128) (0.0126) (0.0142) 
Central affiliated 0.161 0.132 0.205* 0.199*** 
(0.171) (0.159) (0.101) (0.0559) 
Province affiliated 0.147 0.134 0.152*** 0.145*** 
(0.105) (0.102) (0.0515) (0.0514) 
City affiliated 0.00551 –0.00277 0.0669 0.0637 
(0.0624) (0.0611) (0.0432) (0.0386) 
Social burden –0.0273*** –0.0271*** –0.00887** –0.00853** 
(0.00471) (0.00471) (0.00390) (0.00363) 
Strategic burden –0.0102 –0.0100 0.00196 –0.00130 
(0.00884) (0.00902) (0.00570) (0.00738) 
Private competition 0.0775 0.0269 
(0.183) (0.0865) 
Foreign-invested 0.0132 0.0928 
competition (0.0839) (0.0935) 
State-owned enter- 0.121* 0.0147 
prise competition (0.0588) (0.132) 
Observations 40,317 40,317 24,686 24,686 
Industry fixed effects No No No No 
NOTE: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Dependent variable takes value of 1 if firm 
remains state owned or state controlled over full time period. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered at the two-digit census industry code. 
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because if factor productivity is systematically related to state status, 
and if inputs are allocated to state-controlled enterprises in a discrimi-
natory manner, the economy will not perform at its full potential. 
Performance gaps between SOEs and other types of firms were 
present early in the reform process: Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu (2013) find 
significant productivity differences between the state and the nonstate 
in nonagricultural sectors from 1985 to 2007. By their estimates, over 
the entire period, misallocation of factors between the state and non-
state sectors and across provinces lowered aggregate nonagricultural 
total factor productivity (TFP) by an average of 20 percent. Interest-
ingly, given the massive layoffs of state workers beginning in the mid-
1990s, these losses—after initially declining—increased appreciably as 
retrenchment expanded. Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu attribute these trends 
almost exclusively to increasing misallocation of capital between state 
and nonstate sectors caused by contemporaneous government poli-
cies that encouraged investments in state enterprises at the expense of 
investments in the more productive nonstate sector. 
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) also emphasize the systematic distortions 
caused by preferential access to capital in their assessment of the eco-
nomic cost of an inefficient state sector. Relying on firm-level data to 
calculate total factor productivity, measured by revenue productivity, 
for Chinese firms over the period 1998–2005, they find that state-owned 
firms exhibit 41 percent lower TFP than nonstate firms, an outcome con-
sistent with the provision of subsidies to these firms to remain active. 
These findings agree with Dollar and Wei (2007), who also find lower 
productivity at state-owned firms in China during this time. 
Misallocation of labor has also been found by researchers using 
Chinese microdata. Fleisher et al. (2011) find that the marginal prod-
uct of both highly and less-educated workers is lower in SOEs than in 
domestic private or foreign-invested firms. Kamal and Lovely (2013) 
also focus on the allocation of labor across enterprises with a special 
emphasis on how SOEs compare to enterprises owned by legal persons, 
a category that includes “corporatized” state-owned firms. They cal-
culate the marginal revenue product of labor for all firms in the ASIP
during two periods, 2001–2004 and 2004–2007. They find that labor 
productivity varies systematically within industries by ownership type 
and that all organizational forms, on average, exhibit higher labor pro-
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persons had a higher average product than labor employed in private 
firms. Kamal and Lovely also find that labor productivity differentials 
fell over time, with the gap between SOEs and other firm types falling 
by about half between the two periods they analyze. 
Several recent studies account for the sources of China’s economic 
growth, attempting to discern the particular contribution of SOE restruc-
turing. Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012) estimate TFP at the 
firm level using the ASIP for the period 1998–2007. They find that the 
main source of growing aggregate TFP is productivity improvement in 
continuing firms and the entry of new firms with higher productivity. 
They also find that large Chinese firms increased productivity at a faster 
than average rate, and the restructuring of large state-owned firms was 
one driver for this pattern. The authors identify an important dynamic 
as the state sector receded: “The relative success in attracting new input 
factors determined relative growth rates. New state firms that appeared 
between 1998 and 2007 were able to produce almost five times as much 
value-added as disappearing state firms, even though their real capi-
tal stock only grew marginally and employment was a quarter lower”
(p. 35). Despite this positive dynamic pattern, Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, 
and Zhang suggest that biases in favor of state-connected firms likely 
depressed productivity growth after 2007. 
Hsieh and Song (2015) measure the quantitative importance of the 
restructuring policies pursued from 1998 to 2007 on aggregate produc-
tivity growth. They find that reforms were potentially responsible for 
20 percent of aggregate output by 2007. Explicitly comparing surviving 
state-owned firms to those that were privatized, Hsieh and Song find 
that for both types the labor productivity gap with surviving private 
firms narrowed, a finding consistent with Kamal and Lovely (2013), 
while the capital productivity gap narrowed by much less. Indeed, their 
estimates indicate that as late as 2007, capital productivity of state-
owned firms was less than 50 percent of private firms. 
In light of our estimates, the lower productivity of state-controlled 
firms appears a natural consequence of how enterprises were grasped 
and released. Our linear probability model estimates suggest that the 
state was more likely to retain control of firms that produced low rev-
enues relative to assets and that exhibited relatively low labor produc-
tivity. The picture that emerges is one in which the state sector was 
shaped by retention of firms that required continued preferential access 
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to capital and that suffered from the failure to develop adequate alterna-
tive policies for redundant workers. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
average state sector productivity continued to lag behind the private 
sector, despite innovation in the form of state control. 
CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 
After several decades of retrenchment, the Chinese state remains a 
dominant player in several strategic industries. State-controlled enter-
prises provide most of the output in the heavy industries, including 
oil production and distribution, minerals and mining, steel, shipbuild-
ing, and transportation equipment. The state also continues to control 
important pieces of the service sector: construction, utilities, financial 
services, media, and air travel and logistics. 
The outlook for the foreseeable future is one in which the Chinese 
state continues to play a major role in the economy. Hsieh and Song 
(2015) find that after 2005, privatization rates declined on average even 
though they increased for small firms. Based on an analysis of industry-
level data, they also suggest that there was little convergence in capital 
productivity from 2007 to 2012. This finding suggests a continuing cost 
in terms of lost national income, especially since, according to China’s 
NBS, “state-owned and controlled enterprises” accounted for 41 per-
cent of fixed asset investment from 2004 to 2012. 
A recent study from Goldman Sachs Investment Strategy Group 
(2016) also supports the view that the return on state sector assets con-
tinues to lag. They report that “about 150,000 SOEs control over $15 
trillion of assets in China, which in aggregate and excluding financial 
institutions returned 2.4 percent as of 2014” (p. 26). This return on 
assets can be compared to a 3.1 percent return estimated for comparable 
Chinese listed companies and 6.4 percent for U.S. companies. These 
numbers indicate continuing low profitability for Chinese SOEs. 
Aside from lost productivity, continued differential investment into 
state enterprises may make the goal of macroeconomic rebalancing 
more difficult to achieve. To raise consumption, Chinese households 
must receive a larger share of aggregate income. However, while some 
parts of the state sector are very profitable, almost none of this profit 
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is returned to the public for services or to reduce taxes. Rather, it is 
reinvested by the state sector. The likely response of households to this 
continuing pattern is to continue to hold high savings balances. Because 
continued investment in the state sector produces low returns or is non-
productive, households may guard against the effect of future financial 
repression by saving for future higher taxes or service cuts. Investment 
in the state sector, in this sense, conflicts with the goal of pivoting the 
economy toward consumption-led growth. 
In 2015, the CPC Central Committee and State Council issued 
guidelines for SOE reform emphasizing the desire for “mixed owner-
ship,” with private investors becoming shareholders in state-controlled 
firms (Xinhua 2015). Our analysis of the history of grasping and releas-
ing suggests that the state will continue to control the largest firms, 
especially those affiliated with higher levels of government, in a variety 
of forms. Our review of recent assessments of the role of SOE reform 
in China’s growth suggests that significant productivity gains have 
stemmed from privatization and corporatization. Despite these gains, 
however, SOEs as a whole continue to provide subpar returns on assets 
while receiving a disproportionate share of total investment. How much 
more their performance can be enhanced by further promotion of mixed 
ownership without full privatization remains an open question. 
Notes 
1. To flag wavering commitment to continued adjustment, a policy directive was 
issued in 1999 emphasizing the urgency of continued SOE reforms. See Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China (1999). 
2. Foreign-owned includes capital from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and all other 
foreign sources. 
3. Other methods for classifying firms have also been used. For example, Brandt, 
Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012) use equity shares to classify firms as state, 
private, or hybrid. 
4. Hsieh and Song (2015) do not select firms based on registration type, whereas we 
include registered SOEs as SOSC firms. This difference in method makes only a 
minor difference in the resulting state share estimates, as registered capital held by 
the state in most registered SOEs exceeds 50 percent. 
5. Collective enterprises also declined sharply in number, falling 85 percent over the 
period. In contrast, firms registered as private enterprises rose sharply—the num-
ber of private firms grew 670 percent and constituted over half of all above-scale 
firms by 2006. The number of firms registered as legal persons, most of which are 
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shareholding enterprises, rose 160 percent by 2006. See Kamal and Lovely (2013) 
for more details. 
6. A drawback of the linear probability model is that the estimated coefficients can 
imply probabilities outside the unit interval [0,1]. The model also implies constant 
marginal effects. We use the linear probability model here because the coefficient 
values permit straightforward interpretation. When we use a logit model, our qual-
itative results remain unchanged. 
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Why Exit Rights Are the Key 
to the Reduction of Urban-Rural 
Income Disparity in China 
Guanzhong James Wen
Trinity College 
Since the adoption of the “open up and reform” policy in 1978, 
China has reached many economic milestones. Until recently, it had 
maintained an average growth rate that was not only higher but also 
longer than almost any other nation in modern history (Naughton and 
Tsai 2015). 
China is now the second-largest economy and is poised to become 
the largest in a not too distant future. It currently holds the largest for-
eign reserves, producing almost half of the world’s total steel and coal, 
and is the biggest producer of many important industrial products. 
However, China also has been facing some challenges. This chapter 
discusses the following issues: 
• The change in China’s social structure has been lingering much 
more slowly behind that in its economic structure, resulting in 
relatively impoverished farmers and migrant workers, languor-
ous rural communities, and an inefficient farming sector com-
pared with its urban areas. 
• Two institutional barriers will result in a middle-income trap 
through exclusive urbanization: the hukou system and the com-
pulsory collective land ownership. 
• The reasons it is impossible for China to develop a real land 
market under its Constitutional stipulation. 
• The essence of market allocation: price mechanism. 
• How to balance between efficiency represented by market allo-
cation and control of externalities represented by urban planning 
and zoning. 
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Toward the end of this chapter, I propose how to reform the land 
tenure system in China. 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE,
AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
As mentioned above, China’s growth rate since 1979 has been 
ranked among the highest for the longest period for almost any nation 
in modern history—a great achievement of China’s open and reform 
policy. However, as shown in the next two sections, its income dis-
parity, particularly its urban/rural income ratio, has become one of the 
worst in East Asia, and perhaps in the world. 
The World Bank (1993) defines the real economic miracle as growth 
with equity. There is truth in this definition. Many countries have 
achieved high growth, but few have achieved good income distribution. 
Among those having achieved relatively equal income distribution, most 
found their economic growth stagnated. Few nations have achieved high 
growth and relatively equal income distribution at the same time. For 
these few, they truly deserve to be crowned as economic miracles. 
To achieve this, it is necessary to keep the sectoral share in the total 
labor force (defined here as the social structure) close to its sectoral 
share in total GDP (defined here as the economic structure). In other 
words, the social structure should evolve closely and in the same direc-
tion as the economic structure (Wen 2013). 
In China’s context, the share of agriculture in the total labor force 
should follow the trend of a declining share of agriculture in total GDP. 
To achieve this, the rural population must find their way out of the agri-
cultural sector as its share in total GDP falls. 
Developed economies have already reached a very low farming 
share in GDP (2–5 percent) and a correspondingly low farming share in 
total population (2–9 percent). It took several hundred years for them to 
achieve both. The other East Asian economies accomplished this much 
faster, in roughly 30–40 years, starting from the early 1960s after a land 
reform to provide farmers an equal footing in land distribution in the 
early 1950s. The rights to free land trading and free rural-urban migrat-
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growth but also help prevent the worsening of their urban/rural income 
distributions. According to Oshima (1998, Figure 1), the values of the 
Gini coefficient in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan never exceeded 
0.4 during the period 1955–1995. Since then, their social structures 
have been evolving closely to the changes in their economic structure 
because without institutional barriers, farmers could freely trade their 
land and freely migrate to urban areas and to settle down there. 
The Much-Worsened Income Distribution 
However, Oshima (1998, Figure 1) shows that, in sharp contrast, 
China started with a relatively low Gini coefficient value of around 0.2 
in the mid-1960s; this value rose significantly above 0.4 by the mid-
1990s. Since then, the income distribution has worsened until recently. 
According to Wildau and Mitchell (2016), the value of the Gini coef-
ficient in China rose to 0.49 in 2012. 
Han, Zhao, and Zhang (2016) put China’s income distribution 
inequality in a more global perspective. As Figure 6.1 shows, the value 
of China’s Gini coefficient (0.481) was very close to that of the Latin 
American average (0.486), and significantly higher than that of several 
other continents. 
In addition to high values of the Gini coefficient, the urban/rural 
ratio in China is also very high. Based on China’s official data (Xinhua
2017), the urban/rural income ratio was 2.72 in 2016.1 Using this ratio, 
one can easily see that the average income of people living in rural 
areas was only about 36.76 percent of the income of those living in 
urban areas. This ratio was once as high as 3.3:1 in 2013; obviously 
this indicator is now looking better.2 However, in terms of income gap, 
the urban-rural income disparity is still worsening—it increased from 
CNY19,758 in 2015 to CNY21,253 in 2016 (Xinhua 2017). 
WHY CAN ONLY ENDOGENOUS URBANIZATION BEST
ACCOMMODATE RURAL POPULATION? 
Urbanization provides the best channel of social mobility for the 
vast majority of the rural population in terms of their income and their 
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SOURCE: Han, Zhao, and Zhang (2016, Fig. 3.2). 
upward movement along the social ladder. This is attributed to opportu-
nities for greater specialization among these laborers, and to the ability 
to combine with the huge stock of capital and human capital agglomer-
ated in urban areas. 
When urbanization is endogenous—that is, driven by agglomera-
tion effect, not simply by the government—then those who migrate to 
urban areas will be able to earn a higher income, and their children 
will have a better education than rural residents in general; otherwise, 
people will not choose to leave their native villages. 
Figure 6.2 shows the determination of population size in an endog-
enously urbanizing city. The curve MB represents the marginal benefit 
of the agglomeration, and the curve MC represents the marginal cost 
of agglomeration, such as congestion, pollution, crime, and legal risks. 
The last one is conspicuously significant because of the insecure prop-
erty rights and seriously distorted land and housing prices. The intersec-
Europe Asia North America Latin America China 
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tion of the two curves C, or the corresponding point N on the horizontal 
axis, indicates the natural population size of the city. The space on its 
left, where the MB curve is still above the MC curve, implies that the 
net agglomeration is still positive, and the city can generate net gains by 
attracting additional migrants. 
In other words, positive agglomeration effect can only be exhausted 
through trial and error by marginal migrants. To try out this population 
boundary of a city, rural residents must have the right to freely relocate 
themselves and to freely trade their land in case they decide to settle 
down in a city. 
THE FIRST TRAP: HUKOU AND LOW SOCIAL MOBILITY 
Two institutions stand out as the most important barriers for the 
rural population to legally share urban prosperity and to accumulate 
wealth on equal footing: the hukou system and the land tenure system.3 
China’s hukou system has resulted in urbanization of land much faster 
than the growth of the rural population. 
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The hukou system, represented by line KD, artificially limits the 
size of urban population to OK (O refers to the origin of the graph). 
Therefore, population measured by KN is excluded from the ben-
efit of urbanization. The triangle CDE measures the deadweight loss 
caused by the hukou system. As mentioned above, for income distribu-
tion between urban and rural areas not worsening, the social structure 
should evolve in the same direction as a nation’s economic structure 
and at a similar pace. 
China’s agricultural share in its total GDP has fallen to less than 
10 percent, representing a great achievement for China in its effort to 
develop its economy. However, given this rapid drop in its agricultural 
share in GDP, it is more urgent to reduce the share of its rural popula-
tion in its total population. It is not a good sign to see that more than 60 
percent of its total population is still holding rural hukou, and around 48 
percent of its total population is still living in rural areas. 
Migrant workers are forbidden to legally settle in urban areas, 
although they are legally allowed to work there temporarily, and their 
children—some 60 million—are left behind in rural areas. The lack of 
educational opportunities in rural areas dictates that most migrant chil-
dren will have limited human capital and will have low social mobility 
and low incomes in the future. If this situation continues, the prospect 
for China to improve its urban-rural income distribution is severely 
clouded. 
THE GOOD NEWS 
The central government is gradually dismantling the hukou system. 
Although big cities will remain closed to most migrant workers, towns 
and small cities are urged to open up to rural migration. Only time will 
tell how effective and how soon China can ultimately eliminate the con-
trol over free migration and free settlement. It remains to be seen if 
the rural population in the Western region is allowed to freely settle in 
towns and small cities in China’s prosperous coastal region. If such free 
migration and settlement between regions are allowed, the policy will 
represent a significant breakthrough. 
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THE SECOND TRAP—LAND TENURE SYSTEM 
Compared with the hukou system, the land tenure system is an even 
bigger trap for the following reasons: 
• It gives local governments either a legal basis or an excuse by 
misinterpreting Article 10 of China’s Constitution to take rural 
land for urban development. 
• It prevents the growth of a true land market by prohibiting all 
land trading except by the government. The government under 
this system becomes a monopsony in buying farmers’ land and 
a monopoly in auctioning the leaseholds to developers. The land 
price is seriously distorted, either inflated or suppressed. 
• The monopolized and seriously distorted land markets have 
almost totally ignored the strong demand of migrant workers for 
affordable housing thus far. Affordable houses have been sup-
plied by suburban farmers, but they are illegal under the land 
system, frequently facing demolition risk, making the permanent 
settlement of migrant workers impossible. 
In the absence of a true land market, the current land system is 
still allocating land through issuing land quotas to provinces and cit-
ies, a practice typically seen under the Central Planning System. How-
ever, these land quotas are not based on equilibrium land prices, hence, 
excess supply and rampant shortage coexist without an automatic cor-
recting mechanism. On one side, ghost towns, idling apartment build-
ings, and deserted industrial parks are emerging everywhere, especially 
in China’s vast inland, but in its coastal areas, housing prices are sky-
rocketing; on the other side, most of the 2.6 hundred million migrant 
workers are living in shelters, slums, ghettos, or urban villages, which 
are being bulldozed by the local governments, aggravating the shortage 
of affordable housing. 
Clearly the current land tenure system has shifted upward the mar-
ginal cost of living in an urban area by making housing and rental prices 
prohibitively expensive in coastal areas where most migrant workers 
could find jobs. Figure 6.2 shows that when the marginal cost curve 
shifts up, the size of the city population reduces from point N to point 
A, causing another deadweight loss measured by triangle ABC. 
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In summary, the current land tenure system has failed to allo-
cate both rural and urban land efficiently, and it has failed to convert 
rural land into urban land efficiently and fairly. The last point will be 
explained shortly. 
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPING A TRUE LAND
MARKET UNDER THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION
Article 10 of China’s Constitution makes it impossible to nurture a 
true land market. According to this article, 
land in the cities is owned by the State. Land in the rural and 
suburban areas is owned by collectives except for those portions 
which belong to the State as prescribed by law; house sites and 
privately farmed plots of cropland and hilly land are also owned 
by collectives. 
The State may, in the public interest and in accordance with law, 
expropriate or requisition land for its use and make compensation 
for the land expropriated or requisitioned. 
No organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or other-
wise engage in the transfer of land by unlawful means. The right to 
the use of land may be transferred according to law. All organiza-
tions and individuals using land must ensure its rational use. 
Why is it impossible to develop a real land market under such Con-
stitutional stipulations? First, let’s review the definition of what is a 
market economy. According to the MIT Dictionary of Modern Econom-
ics (Pearce 1992, p. 267), “An economic system in which decisions 
about the allocation of resources and production are made on the basis 
of prices generated by voluntary exchanges between producers, con-
sumers, workers and owners of factors of production. Decision mak-
ing in such an economy is decentralized—decisions are made indepen-
dently by groups and individuals in the economy rather than by central 
planners. Market economies usually also involve a system of private 
ownership of the means of production—i.e., they are ‘capitalist’ or ‘free 
enterprise’ economies.” 
Here, voluntary exchanges are most crucial to a market economy. 
However, the collective land ownership observed in China is established 
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on an involuntary basis. Rural collectives are not allowed to trade land 
among themselves, let alone the individual farmers. Even if a collective 
is totally inefficient or corrupt, or its leaders are abusive, members are 
not allowed to exit with their share of land to regroup a new collective 
on a truly voluntary basis. This means that collectives in China are com-
pulsory against the market principle of voluntarism. 
This system plays the function of permanently trapping those who 
want to leave their native village. They are not allowed to sell their 
land for market compensation. The rental market is underdeveloped 
and insecure because tenancy is not protected and leasing contracts are 
mostly verbal. Some peasants would rather keep their land vacant than 
return land to collectives or rent it out. This means that those who are 
determined to stay in the farming sector cannot steadily expand their 
land scales or significantly increase their incomes because of small-
scale land operation. Because they do not own their land, they cannot 
use it as collateral when seeking financial services. 
Therefore, the land tenure system in its current form is preventing 
the emergence of a real land market and consequently is preventing 
China’s agriculture from being modernized and more efficient. 
WHY IS EQUILIBRIUM LAND PRICE CRUCIAL? 
In the absence of a true land market, land prices are not generated 
by the forces of supply and demand. Therefore, 
• We do not know the opportunity cost of each piece of land in 
order to put it to the most valuable (efficient) use. 
• We do not know how to fairly compensate those whose land is 
taken away by the government. 
• We do not know what should be the fair base for property, hous-
ing, and capital gains taxes. Without tax revenues from land 
properties, governments at all localities will continue to be 
addicted to land financing. 
• We do not know how to allocate land of different uses in the correct 
proportions, because such price information can only be generated 
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• We do not know whether the decision on setting 1.8 billion mu 
of arable land as a red line is scientifically based. 
• We do not know whether estate-based mortgages are overlever-
aged, leading to housing bubbles and financial crises. 
• Urbanization cannot be an endogenous process and cannot sus-
tain because of the distortion in land and housing prices. The 
service sector is doomed to be underdeveloped because of the 
prohibitively high rentals. 
• Ghost towns are mushrooming everywhere, when hundreds of 
millions of migrant workers desperately need affordable housing 
in the urban areas where they are working and living. Unfortu-
nately, the misallocation of land and housing forces them to live 
in slums, shelters, and urban villages. 
FREE EXIT RIGHTS ARE THE KEY 
Based on the discussion of the hukou and land systems above, we 
can see that it is urgent and necessary to thoroughly reform the two sys-
tems. In what follows, I want to focus on how to reform the current land 
system. To facilitate discussion, we divide all the land in China into 
three basic zoning categories conceptually in terms of their relationship 
to urbanization: 
1) nonurban land—pure farmland and nonfarmland located far 
away from any urban areas, thus unlikely to be urbanized in 
the foreseeable future; 
2) urban land—built-up land located in existing urban areas, thus 
fully urbanized; 
3) suburban land—the farmland and nonfarmland located close 
to urban centers that is yet to be urbanized. 
To nurture a true land market, the boundaries of all the plots must be 
clearly marked and recorded and their property rights registered before 
they can be traded at market without disputes. As a very encouraging 
development in this direction, local governments in China have been 
certifying land use rights of each farmer by delineating the borders of 
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each plot and its legal users. Obviously, the completion of this task 
is conducive to the establishment of a true open and competitive land 
market. 
All the land, however, is either owned by the state (all the urban 
land) or collectives (almost all the farmland, including the suburban 
land). Individual farmers and urban citizens are not allowed to trade 
land. As we mentioned above, the land market in its current form is 
monopsonistic because the state is the only legal buyer of land, and 
also monopolistic because the state is the only legal supplier of urban 
land, far from being a typical land market that is open to everyone on a 
competitive level. 
To widen participation in a land market to make it open and compet-
itive, it is necessary to allow all plots to be tradable and all the farmers 
to participate as sellers or buyers of land. For this reason, the exit rights 
must be returned to farmers. As mentioned earlier, the current collective 
land ownership was imposed on farmers in the 1950s without neces-
sary consent from farmers. Such imposition was not only a violation of 
voluntarism, a principle allegedly cherished by the Chinese Communist 
Party, but it also led to rampant inefficiency and frequent power abuse. 
In the spirit of voluntarism, farmers should be given the choice to stay 
in their current collectives if they like them, to exit to form new col-
lectives on their own initiatives, or to return to family-based farming, 
which is the prevailing form of farming in the rest of the world. In other 
words, land privatization should be permitted if the party truly respects 
initiatives from farmers themselves. In this sense, certifying and docu-
menting all the plots, pushed by the party and government, are correct 
and necessary steps toward this direction. 
Above I divided all the land into three basic zoning categories. Now 
I briefly examine how a true land market will affect each of them. The 
long-standing mismatches between demand for and supply of land in 
different categories under the current land system will gradually be cor-
rected. First, in urban areas, trading land with different uses will gen-
erate the information required for adjusting zoning by observing the 
relative prices of industrial, residential, commercial, and infrastructural 
land. By gradually easing the restriction on arbitrage among land of 
different uses, efficiency in allocating the existing urban land can be 
significantly improved. The excess supply of certain types of land, such 
as land originally designated as industrial, will be corrected by its fall-
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ing price, and the undersupplied land of another type, such as the land 
originally designated as residential, will be corrected by rising price. 
Second, by allowing suburban farmland to enter the land market by 
farmers’ own initiative without changing zoning categories, China can 
avoid the possible chaotic situation that resulted from zoning violations. 
At the same time, local governments are not allowed to requisition sub-
urban land unless for the pursuit of public interest. This will immedi-
ately lead to the short supply of urban land and increased land prices 
where urban areas are growing. The increasing price sends a signal to 
zoning authorities to speed up converting suburban farmland into urban 
land. The suburban land market is crucially important because it con-
nects urban and rural areas, unifying the whole nation’s land market, and 
also helps determine the natural border between rural and urban areas. 
Third, more efficient farmers now can expand the operation scale 
of their farms through acquiring land at land market, and larger and 
modern farms will emerge from such transactions. Those who want to 
permanently migrate to urban areas will get compensated when they 
sell their land. 
As stated earlier, to avoid disorder in land and housing markets, nei-
ther sellers nor buyers of any type of land should be allowed to change 
the current zoning categories of their land for the time being unless they 
first obtain approvals from the government. Under this condition, free 
land trade will not trigger a collapse of the land and housing markets. 
The fear of a possible collapse of land and housing markets is a main 
source of government hesitation in land system reform, a serious con-
cern often cited by those who are opposed to the market-oriented land 
reform as a main argument. To remove government’s fear, the current 
zoning categories should be kept for a certain period. The planning and 
zoning office should gradually adjust zoning categories by designating 
more land in suburban areas as urban land if the land price there is ris-
ing, and designating less land as urban land in urban areas where the 
land price is declining. 
To reduce manipulation and interference in the land market, the 
government should stop acquisitioning land from local farmers for 
nonpublic purposes, as Article 10 of China’s Constitution stipulates. 
This means that the role of planning and zoning in China should be 
fundamentally reformed; its rise in market economies was, and is still, 
a necessary response to the increasing need to address market failure, 
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represented by negative externalities and lack of public space due to 
urbanization (Wen 2014). However, in China, different from playing a 
complementary role in market allocation, as is seen in developed mar-
ket economies, planning and zoning are a main remnant of its disman-
tled Central Planning System, and the government has been directly 
allocating land by arbitrarily determining land zoning and prohibiting 
non-state-owned land to enter land market with equal rights. It is worth 
noting that China’s urban planning and zoning are selectively regulat-
ing market failures, depending on the type of land ownership, as the 
case of the urban village shows. 
After establishing a true land market, the main target of planning 
and zoning should focus on filtering negative externalities and securing 
land of public use, not on filtering out the non-state-owned land. The 
thorny issue of urban villages and housing with few property rights will 
be resolved accordingly. Since they are either surrounded by or adja-
cent to urban areas, they should be part of urban land. Therefore, the 
local government has the same responsibilities to provide better plan-
ning and zoning regulation to all the urban villages and housing with 
few property rights, and better infrastructures such as sanitation, clean 
water, public toilets, schools, and clinics. In return, the owners in urban 
villages and owners of housing with few property rights have full obli-
gation to pay all kinds of property taxes and capital gains taxes. If this 
proposal is accepted and enforced, the issue of urban village and hous-
ing with few property rights will be an issue of enforcing planning and 
zoning instead of an issue of discriminating against nonstate ownership. 
Finally, the government should stop relying on land financing and 
instead levy property, housing, and capital gains taxes, in addition to 
issuing local public bonds to finance local infrastructure, using future 
land taxes to pay off. Land taxes are recurrent compared with one-time 
land financing. The latter will dry up sooner or later when urbanization 
nears an end. 
CHINA IS AT A CROSSROADS 
China’s urban-rural income disparity is among the worst in the 
world. Historical experiences from developed nations and from China’s 
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East Asian neighbors eloquently demonstrate that to reduce this dispar-
ity, China must rapidly reduce its rural population. Only when a nation’s 
social structure matches its economic structure can it achieve the goal 
of narrowing its urban/rural income gap. However, not only does 48 
percent of China’s total population live in rural areas while its agricul-
ture’s share in total GDP is less than 10 percent, but also 2.6 hundred 
million migrant workers remain unsettled in urban areas because of the 
hukou system, and because of the prohibitively high housing prices as 
a result of the current land tenure system. 
As Figure 6.2 shows, the hukou and land systems are causing two 
types of deadweight loss—if they can be eliminated, then China can 
easily accommodate hundreds of millions of migrant workers and their 
families in urban areas. To make its urbanization more efficient and 
inclusive, China should focus on urbanizing its rural population rather 
than its rural land. If China decides to nationalize all the urban land, as 
advocated by some, then it will lose its last chance to develop a land 
market. If China is serious about nurturing a true competitive land mar-
ket, it needs to give farmers the exit rights from compulsory collective 
land ownership and legalize land trading as long as the land use is not 
changed by users themselves. 
China should also unify its land market nationwide. To avoid per-
manently fragmenting its rural land market, it should not consolidate 
the exclusively community-based collective land ownership. China 
should also abolish its hukou system as soon as possible. Only when it 
implements these two reforms can the country accelerate the absorption 
of rural surplus labor. Such an endogenous urbanization will soon sig-
nificantly improve its urban-rural income disparity, as the experiences 
from China’s East Asian neighbors have demonstrated. 
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Notes 
1. According to this official news agency, “Urban and rural per capita disposable 
income reached 33,616 yuan and 12,363 yuan in 2016, up 5.6 percent and 6.2 
percent in real terms, respectively, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.” 
Based on these two numbers, we can calculate the urban-rural income ratio (See 
Xinhua 2017). 
2. According to the 2013 data released from the China State Statistical Bureau, in 
2012 China’s urban-rural income ratio reached its highest since 1978. In 2012, 
urban average income was 17,175 yuan, while it was 5,153 yuan in rural areas, 
and the urban-rural income ratio was 3.33:1, compared to 3.32:1 and 3.31:1 in 
2007 and 2008, respectively. If we include the hidden benefits received by resi-
dents with formal urban hukou, this ratio could rise to 6:1. See http://wenda
.so.com/q/1363044987065138 (in Chinese; accessed June 21, 2017). 
3. In 1958, the Chinese government officially promulgated the family register sys-
tem to control the movement of people between urban and rural areas. Individuals 
were broadly categorized as a rural or urban worker. A worker seeking to move 
from the country to urban areas to take up nonagricultural work would have to 
apply through the relevant bureaucracies. The number of workers allowed to make 
such moves was tightly controlled. Migrant workers would require six passes to 
work in provinces other than their own. People who worked outside their autho-
rized domain or geographical area would not qualify for grain rations, employer-
provided housing, or health care. 
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Trade, Migration, and Growth 
Evidence from China 
Xiaodong Zhu 
University of Toronto 
Citizens in rich countries such as the United States and those in the 
European Union have enjoyed two fundamental economic freedoms: 
free movement of goods and movement of people. This has not been the 
case, however, for citizens in many developing countries, where gov-
ernments often impose significant restrictions on internal movements of 
both goods and people. Economists have argued that these restrictions 
create distortions that result in lower income and welfare for the citi-
zens in these countries. Restrictions on free movement of goods shield 
inefficient producers from competition and therefore lower the average 
productivity of firms and raise the costs of goods faced by consum-
ers. Restrictions on movement of people prevent workers from seek-
ing more productive opportunities and households from moving to 
high-income regions, which leads to persistent labor misallocation and 
regional income inequality. Removing these restrictions can improve 
citizens’ welfare in these countries by increasing product market com-
petition and reducing labor misallocation, which leads to higher aggre-
gate productivity. 
In this chapter I use the period 2000–2005 in China as a case study 
of the benefits of reducing restrictions on movements of goods and peo-
ple in an economy. In 2000, China had significant restrictions on inter-
nal trade, as well as severe restrictions on movement of people within 
the country because of a very stringent household registration system 
called hukou. Both restrictions were relaxed between 2000 and 2005. 
China also joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the end of 
2001, which required China to reduce its international trade barriers, 









During the same period, China’s real GDP grew more than 11 per-
cent per year. How much of the GDP growth can be attributed to the 
reductions in restrictions on movements of goods and people? I will 
provide a quantitative answer to this important question. 
For background, I first discuss the state of the Chinese economy in 
year 2000 and some important changes that happened between 2000 
and 2005. I focus my discussion on three aspects: 1) regional income 
inequality, 2) internal migration, and 3) trade. 
SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCOMES AND
INTERNAL MIGRATION 
The cross-province differences in real income have been large in 
China. In 2000, the ratio of average real GDP per capita of the top five 
provinces to that of the bottom five was almost 4 to 1. Figure 7.1 plots 
the spatial distribution of real incomes across the Chinese provinces. 
The provinces of the coastal regions in the east generally had substan-
tially higher levels of real income than provinces in the central and 
western regions. 
Despite the large cross-province income differences, the percentage 
of workers who moved between provinces was very low because of a 
hukou registration system, which was introduced by the Chinese gov-
ernment in 1958 to control population mobility and urbanization. Under 
this system, each Chinese citizen is assigned a hukou (registration sta-
tus), classified as “agricultural” (rural) or “nonagricultural” (urban) in 
a specific administrative unit that is at or lower than the county/city 
level. Approvals from local governments are needed for an individual 
to change the category (agricultural or nonagricultural) or location of 
hukou registration, and it is extremely difficult to obtain such approv-
als. Before the economic reform started in 1978, working outside one’s 
hukou registration location/occupation category was prohibited. This 
prohibition was relaxed in the 1980s, and China started to have migrant 
workers who worked outside their hukou registration locations. How-
ever, prior to 2003 migrant workers were required to apply for a tempo-
rary residence permit, which was difficult to obtain. As a result, many 
migrant workers were without a permit and faced the dire consequence 
  
Trade, Migration, and Growth: Evidence from China  125 








































SOURCE: National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
of being arrested and deported by the local authorities. Even with a 
temporary residence permit, migrant workers without local hukou had 
very limited access to local public services and faced much higher costs 
for health care and for their children’s education. As the demand for 
migrant workers in manufacturing, construction, and labor-intensive 
service industries increased, many provinces, especially the coastal 
provinces, eliminated the requirement of a temporary residence per-
mit for migrant workers, and by 2003 all provinces had eliminated the 
requirement. This policy change helped ease migration, but migrant 
workers still face the costs of having only very limited access to local 
public services. More importantly, migrant workers always face these 
costs as long as they do not have local hukou. Because of these costs, 
most migrant workers are young and without children, and their migra-
tion is temporary. In 2000, for example, 70 percent of migrant workers 
were without children, and 70 percent of them moved within the last 
four years. Most of them had agricultural hukou but were working in 
the nonagricultural sector. 
As Table 7.1 shows, in 2000, there were 26.5 million migrant 
workers who worked outside the province of their hukou registration 
provinces. As the restrictions on migrant workers relaxed, the number 
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Table 7.1  Stock of Migrant Workers in China 
Interprovincial Intraprovincial 
2000 2005 2000 2005 
Total stock (millions) 









NOTE: Migrants are defined based on their hukou registration location. Interprovincial 
migrants are workers registered in another province from where they are employed. 
Intraprovincial migrants are workers registered in the same province where they are 
employed, but are either nonagricultural workers holding agricultural hukou or vice 
versa. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
increased to 49 million in 2005. These are enormous numbers; however, 
they only represent 4.2 and 7.2 percent of China’s total employment in 
2000 and 2005, respectively. The majority of migrant workers in China 
are those who move within a province. The numbers of within-province 
migrant workers were around 90 million in 2000 and 120 million in 
2005, representing 14.3 and 17.7 percent of China’s total employment 
in 2000 and 2005, respectively. 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TRADE 
It has been well documented that internal trade costs in China 
in the 1990s were high (Poncet 2005; Young 2000). It has also been 
documented that the degree of local market protection in a province 
was directly related to the size of the state sector in that province (Bai 
et al. 2004). Since 2000, these trade barriers have been reduced sig-
nificantly. Some of the reduction was a result of the deliberate policy 
reforms undertaken by the government. For example, the state coun-
cil under the then premier Zhu Rongji issued a directive in 2001 that 
prohibits local government from engaging in local market protections. 
More importantly, as a result of various state-owned enterprise reforms, 
the size of the state sector has declined significantly and consequently 
lowered local government incentives to engage in local market protec-
tions. Improved transport infrastructure and logistics also helped lower 
internal trade cost. 
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The province-level trade data, both between province pairs and 
internationally, are taken from the regional input-output tables for 2002 
and 2007. Table 7.2 reports the aggregate bilateral flows between the 
eight regions and each other and the rest of the world. To ease compari-
sons, we normalize all flows by the importing region’s total expendi-
tures. In addition to the bilateral trade flows, we also report in the last 
column the share of a region’s expenditures that are spent on goods 
from all other regions within China. A useful measure of a region’s 
trade openness is the fraction of its expenditures allocated to its own 
producers—that is, its “home share.” The diagonal elements in Table 
7.2 provide these values for each region. Interior regions of China have 
a much higher home share than coastal regions. In 2002, the central 
region’s home share is 0.88 compared to only 0.72 for the south coast 
and 0.63 for Beijing and Tianjin. 
While regions in China generally import more from abroad than from 
any particular region within China, the total imports from the rest of 
China are still higher than imports from abroad for most of the regions. 
The Central Coast and South Coast regions are the exceptions. In 2002, 
their imports from abroad were significantly higher than imports from 
the rest of China; they also had substantial international exports. 
TRADE AND MIGRATION COSTS IN CHINA 
Tombe and Zhu (2015) use a structural model combined with the 
data on trade and migration flows to estimate costs of trade and migra-
tion. The model generates gravity equations that relate the trade flow 
between two regions to the real GDP of the two regions and the trade 
cost between the two regions, and the migration flow between two 
regions to the real incomes of the two regions and the cost of migration 
between two regions. 
Trade flow between regions A and B = F(GDP of region A, GDP of 
region B, distance, trade cost) 
Migration flow from regions A to B = G(income of region A, income of 
region B, distance, migration cost) 
Table 7.2  Internal and External Trade Shares of China 
Exporter 
Beijing/ North Central South Central Total other 
Importer Northeast Tianjin Coast Coast Coast Region Northwest Southwest Abroad prov. 
Year 2002 
Northeast 87.9 0.7 1.0 0.8 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.9 5.5 6.6 
Beijing/Tianjin 3.9 63.4 9.4 3.0 2.6 3.3 1.4 1.2 11.9 24.8 
North Coast 1.8 3.3 79.8 3.4 1.8 3.8 0.9 0.8 4.4 15.8 
Central Coast 0.2 0.2 0.6 81.0 1.5 2.4 0.5 0.5 13.3 5.7 
South Coast 0.5 0.4 0.5 2.6 72.3 1.9 0.4 1.5 19.8 7.9 
Central Region 0.6 0.3 1.1 4.8 2.3 87.8 0.7 0.7 1.8 10.4 
Northwest 2.0 0.8 2.1 3.3 4.5 3.6 77.4 3.8 2.6 20.0 
Southwest 0.9 0.3 0.4 1.8 4.3 1.4 0.9 88.0 2.0 10.0 
Abroad 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.6 – 
Year 2007 
Northeast 78.7 2.0 2.0 0.9 2.7 1.0 1.4 0.9 10.4 10.9 
Beijing/Tianjin 3.8 62.3 10.1 1.5 2.4 1.8 2.1 0.7 15.5 22.2 
North Coast 2.1 5.8 76.8 1.5 1.5 3.7 2.3 0.8 5.5 17.7 
Central Coast 1.1 0.7 1.4 76.8 1.8 4.8 1.7 0.9 10.8 12.4 
South Coast 1.5 0.9 1.7 5.2 68.5 3.6 1.8 2.8 14.1 17.4 
Central Region 1.7 1.4 4.5 4.9 4.0 73.0 2.9 1.8 5.9 21.1 
Northwest 2.3 2.2 4.8 2.7 5.5 3.6 65.6 3.6 9.8 24.6 
Southwest 1.6 1.2 1.7 1.7 8.4 1.9 3.2 73.8 6.6 19.6 
Abroad 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.1 – 
128 
NOTE: The table displays the share of each importing region’s total spending allocated to each source region. See Tombe and Zhu (2015, 
Appendix A) for the mapping of provinces to regions. The column “Total other prov.” reports the total spending share of each importing 
region allocated to producers in other provinces of China. The diagonal elements (the “home share” of spending”), the share imported 
from abroad, and the share imported from other provinces will together sum to 100%. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
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With data on GDP, income, distance, and trade and migration flows, 
the trade and migration costs can be estimated as residuals. 
Migration Costs 
We measure the migration cost as a factor that deflates a migrant’s 
real income so that she is indifferent between migrating or staying in 
her hukou location. The cost may vary across the sector-location pairs. 
For example, if the cost of migrating to a destination is 3, then an indi-
vidual will migrate to the destination if and only if the real income in 
the destination is at least three times as high as the real income the 
individual can earn by staying at her hukou location. We summarize 
these costs, their changes, and the initial migration flows in Table 7.3. 
Overall, migration costs are largest for migrants switching both sectors 
and provinces, with an average initial cost of nearly 38. In contrast, 
switching sectors within one’s home province incurs average migration 
costs of 2.9. When estimating the migration costs by migrant work-
er’s age, the costs are much higher for older workers. These patterns 
of migration costs are consistent with our discussion earlier that the 
most important source of the migration costs is the lack of access to 
local public services at the migration destination. This is clearly more 
important for older migrant workers and workers who are farther away 
from their hukou location. 
Table 7.3 also reports the change in average migration costs between 
2000 and 2005 in the last column. Overall, migration costs declined to 
84 percent of their initial level. Costs to switch provinces fell the most, 
from 32.6 to 19.8. Sectoral switches within a worker’s home region also 
fell, from 2.9 to 2.4. 
Trade Costs 
The trade cost we estimate is a comprehensive measure of barriers 
to trade that includes tariffs, transportation costs, and other nontariff 
barriers, such as local protection policies. It is represented as an iceberg 
cost. For example, if the export cost is 3, then for one unit of good 
to reach the export destination, it will cost the exporter three units of 
goods. For a typical province in China in 2002, the average trade cost 




Table 7.3  Migration Rates and Average Costs, by Sector and Province 
Migration costs 
Initial share of Level in Level in Relative 
employment 2000 2005 change 
Agriculture to nonagriculture 
migration cost changes 
Overall 0.16 3.4 2.9 0.84 
Within province 0.13 2.9 2.4 0.84 
Between province 0.03 37.8 23.2 0.61 
Between provinces migration 
cost changes 
Overall 0.04 32.6 19.8 0.61 
Within agriculture 0.003 71.9 63.7 0.89 
Within nonagriculture 0.01 21.3 12.4 0.58 
Overall 0.174 3.6 3.0 0.84 
NOTE: Displays migration-weighted harmonic means of migration costs in 2000 and 
2005. We use initial (year 2000) weights to average the 2005 costs to ensure the dis-
played change reflects changes in costs and not migration patterns. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
internal and external trade costs are similar. So, trade costs were quite 
high in 2002. Overall, we find that poor regions face the highest export 
costs—consistent with existing cross-country evidence. 
Table 7.4 presents the relative change in the nonagricultural trade 
costs for eight regions in China between 2002 and 2007. Some notable 
patterns emerge. Within China, trade costs were largely decreasing, 
with trade-weighted change in trade costs within China of −11 percent. 
For trade between China and the world, the average change in trade 
costs was −8 percent. Poor regions such as Central, Northwest, and 
Southwest experienced much larger reductions in export costs than rich 
regions did. Also, the reductions in China’s costs of importing from the 
rest of the world were much larger than the reductions in China’s costs 
of exporting to the rest of the world. These numbers suggest that around 
the time when China joined the WTO, there were significant reductions 
in China’s internal trade costs and import costs and only modest reduc-
tions in China’s export costs. 
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Table 7.4  Percent Change in Trade Costs, 2002–2007 
Exporter 
North- Beijing/ North Central South Central North- South-
Importer east Tianjin Coast Coast Coast Region west west World 
Northeast −11.8 −16.7 −23.5 −24.7 −23.0 −18.0 −18.5 −27.7 
Beijing/Tianjin −14.2 −15.0 −15.5 −13.8 −23.9 −25.7 −18.5 −26.9 
North Coast −5.7 −1.0 −1.0 −11.2 −20.7 −22.6 −20.7 −20.3 
Central Coast −16.4 −5.2 −4.5 −11.2 −15.9 −17.9 −12.4 −19.1 
South Coast −18.4 −4.0 −15.1 −12.0 −20.7 −24.7 −20.8 −10.6 
Central Region −6.6 −5.2 −15.1 −6.7 −11.2 −19.1 −16.8 −27.9 
Northwest −4.0 −10.6 −20.0 −12.0 −18.6 −21.9 −17.8 −37.8 
Southwest −3.8 −1.2 −17.5 −5.4 −13.8 −19.1 −17.2 −27.7 
World −3.8 −0.2 −6.5 −1.6 9.7 −21.0 −29.4 −18.5 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
THE EFFECT OF MEASURED COSTS CHANGES 
In Tombe and Zhu (2015) we use a general equilibrium model to 
quantify the effect of the changes in trade and migration costs. In the 
quantitative analysis, we fit the initial equilibrium of our model to the 
Chinese data in 2002 and then quantify the impacts on aggregate pro-
ductivity and welfare of various changes in trade and migration costs. I 
summarize the main results here. 
The Effect of Lower Trade Costs 
Table 7.5 displays the change in trade and migration flows, aggre-
gate productivity, and welfare, and various other outcomes as a result 
of the changes in trade costs. Changes in trade shares are expenditure-
weighted average changes across all provinces and sectors. Lower inter-
nal trade costs, not surprisingly, decrease the amount of international 
trade as households and firms reorient their purchase decisions toward 
domestic suppliers. The share of expenditures allocated to producers in 
another province typically increases by over 9 percentage points, while 
the share allocated to international producers falls by almost 1 percent-
age point. Lower external trade costs reveal the opposite pattern. In 




Table 7.5  Effects of Trade Cost Changes 
Percentage point 
change in Migrant stock (%) 
Internal External Within Between Real GDP Aggregate 
trade trade province province (%) welfare (%) 
Internal trade 9.2 −0.7 0.8 −2.0 10.7 10.7 
External trade −0.7 3.9 1.8 2.4 3.8 2.6 
All trade 8.2 2.9 2.5 0.3 14.4 13.2 
NOTE: Displays aggregate response to various trade cost changes. All use trade cost 
changes as measured. The migrant stock is the number of workers living outside their 
hukou registration location or sector. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
In terms of migration, improved internal trade costs actually resulted 
in fewer workers living outside their home province. The total stock of 
migrants declined by over 2 percent (equivalent to approximately 0.5 
million workers). Intuitively, declining internal trade costs dispropor-
tionately lower goods prices in poor, interior regions. This increase in 
real income means that fewer workers living in other provinces were 
willing to continue to do so. On the other hand, a greater fraction of 
workers switched sectors within their home province. With lower inter-
national trade costs, richer coastal regions disproportionately benefit, 
so more workers relocate there in addition to more workers switching 
sectors within their home province. 
The change in income, goods and land prices, and workers’ loca-
tion decisions all have implications for aggregate welfare. We report the 
change in welfare and productivity (aggregate real GDP) in the last col-
umns of Table 7.5. In response to lower internal trade costs, aggregate 
welfare dramatically increased by nearly 11 percent. In contrast, exter-
nal trade cost reductions resulted in a much smaller gain of only 3.1 per-
cent. As in our earlier analysis, internal trade costs reductions appear to 
be significantly more important for aggregate outcomes. The differen-
tial impacts are not due to any significant differences in the magnitude 
of cost reductions. The main reason for the larger welfare gains from 
internal cost reductions is that most provinces allocate a larger fraction 
of their spending to goods from other provinces than from abroad. 
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The Effect of Lower Migration Costs 
Trade liberalization accounts for only a limited amount of migra-
tion. Not surprisingly, lower migration costs lead to substantially more 
workers living outside their home province-sector. As before, we simu-
late the effect of lower migration cost changes and report the effects in 
Table 7.6. 
The stock of migrants increases dramatically when the cost of 
migration declines as measured. The number of interprovincial migrants 
increases by more than 80 percent. Within provinces, there are also sub-
stantial moves from agriculture to nonagriculture. The stock of workers 
with agricultural hukou that have nonagricultural employment within 
their home province increases by nearly 15 percent. Clearly, the mea-
sured changes in migration costs are extremely important determinants 
of worker location decisions. The large flows are also beneficial for 
China as a whole; real GDP and welfare rise 4.8 and 8.5 percent, respec-
tively. Changes that facilitate the movement of workers from agricul-
ture to nonagriculture sectors, whether within or between provinces, 
account for most of the increases in aggregate GDP and welfare. 
While migration flows and real incomes respond greatly to the 
changes in migration costs, the effect on aggregate trade flows is muted. 
International and internal trade shares increase by only 0.2 and 0.1 per-
centage points, respectively. 
Table 7.6  Effects of Various Migration Cost Changes 
Percentage 
point change Migrant stock 
Within Between Real Aggregate 
Internal External province province GDP welfare 
trade trade (%) (%) (%) (%) 
All 0.1 0.2 14.5 82.4 4.8 8.5 
Agriculture to nonagriculture migration cost changes 
Overall 0.1 0.1 15.3 54.0 4.4 7.2 
Within province 0.0 −0.1 22.8 −9.6 2.0 4.8 
Between province 0.1 0.2 −7.0 71.0 2.9 2.7 
NOTE: Displays aggregate response to various migration cost changes. All use migra-
tion cost changes as measured. The migrant stock is the number of workers living 
outside their hook registration location or sector. 








Decomposing China’s Growth between 2000 and 2005 
While the results above show that the reductions in trade and migra-
tion costs have a large effect on the aggregate GDP growth, they cannot 
account for all the observed growth in China between 2000 and 2005. 
Other factors, such as technology improvements and reforms within 
each province and sector may also contribute to the aggregate GDP
growth during that period. In Tombe and Zhu (2015), we summarize 
the contribution of these factors by a residual productivity growth term 
for each province and sector so that the combination of the productiv-
ity growth and the measured changes in trade and migration costs can 
generate a GDP growth rate in our quantitative model that matches the 
actual GDP growth rate in that province and sector. By construction, 
the quantitative model with the measured cost changes and the implied 
residual productivity growth also matches the aggregate GDP growth 
exactly. The model can then be used to decompose China’s overall 
growth into one of four components: productivity growth, lower internal 
trade costs, lower international trade costs, and lower internal migration 
costs. The result of the decomposition is reported in Table 7.7. 
Overall, reductions in trade and migration frictions account for 
about one-third of China’s overall growth. Reductions in internal trade 
and migration costs contribute roughly one quarter (15.3 percent of 
the 57.1 percent). In stark contrast, international trade cost reductions 
account for only 7 percent of the overall growth (4.2 percent of the 57.1 
percent). 
Potential Gains from Further Reform 
Our decomposition shows that reductions in trade and migration 
frictions and the resulting reduction in misallocation of labor played a 
major role in China’s growth between 2000 and 2005. How much addi-
tional scope is there for further reductions in trade and migration costs? 
In Tombe and Zhu (2015), we use the quantitative model to evaluate 
the effect of two potential reforms: 1) lowering the internal trade costs 
to the average level observed in Canada, and 2) lowering the internal 
migration costs so that the average interprovincial migration rate in 
China is the same as the interstate migration rate in the United States. 
The results are reported in Table 7.8 and show that China’s real GDP
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Table 7.7  Decomposing China’s Overall Real GDP Growth 
Marginal effects 
Real GDP growth (%) Share of growth 
Overall (all changes) 57.1 — 
Productivity changes 37.9 0.66 
Internal trade cost changes 9.7 0.17 
External trade cost changes 4.2 0.07 
Migration cost changes 5.6 0.10 
NOTE: Decomposes the change in real GDP into contribution from productivity, inter-
nal trade cost changes, external trade cost changes, and migration cost changes. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
Table 7.8  Potential Gains of Further Trade and Migration Liberalization 
Relative to 2005 
Change in 
Real GDP (%) 
Aggregate 
welfare (%) 
Average internal trade costs as in Canada 
Between-province migration as in U.S. 







NOTE: Reports the change in real GDP and welfare that result from changing China’s 
internal trade and migration costs such that average internal costs equal Canada’s (by 
sector) or such that the between-province migration flows match the U.S. Percentage 
changes are expressed relative to the Chinese economy in 2005. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
if average internal trade costs fell to Canada’s level, and an additional 
22.8 percent and 15 percent if the average migration rate in China was 
the same as that in the United States. The scope for and gains from 
further policy reforms are therefore large. Both changes together would 
deliver real GDP gains of 37 percent and welfare gains of nearly 31 
percent. 
CONCLUSION 
China experienced rapid GDP growth between 2000 and 2005, and 





ated with China’s joining the WTO in 2001. This resulted in export 
expansion supported by a large increase in the supply of cheap migrant 
workers, hence the growth. Internal policy reforms undertaken by the 
Chinese government during the same period have not received as much 
attention. However, their contribution to China’s growth during that 
period is much more important than the contribution of the external 
trade liberalization. Reductions in internal trade and migration costs 
account for 27 percent of the aggregate GDP growth in China between 
2000 and 2005. In contrast, reductions in external trade costs account 
for only 7 percent of the aggregate GDP growth during the same period. 
Despite the reductions, internal trade and migration costs in China are 
still much higher than those in developed countries such as Canada and 
the United States. Further reforms that lower these costs to developed 
country levels could yield substantial increases in China’s aggregate 
GDP and welfare in the future. 
Note 
This chapter is largely based on my joint paper with Trevor Tombe (Tombe and 
Zhu 2015). I thank the Department of Economics at Western Michigan University for 
inviting me to present this paper at the 2015–2016 Werner Sichel Lecture Series. 
The data on regional income are constructed based on the GDP and employment 
series provided by Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu (2013); the data on trade are from the Inter-
Province Input-Output table provided by Li (2010) and the Inter-Regional Input-Output 
table provided by Zhang and Qi (2012); and the data on migration are from the 1 per-
cent sample of the 2000 China Population Census and the 20 percent sample of the 
China 2005 1 Percent Population Survey. 
There is no regional input-output table for 2000 in China, so we use trade shares 
from the 2002 China Regional Input-Output Tables to approximate trade shares in 2000. 
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